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ABSTRACT

Twenty-seven articles by different authors on the teaching of values comprise this yearbook. Theories, teaching strategies, and learning activities are suggested throughout the articles, intended for professionals and college students in all social science disciplines in which values can play an integral part in the curriculum. Sample chapter titles include the Nature of Human Values, The Teaching of Values, Enhancing Values with a Biologic Model of Human Behavior, The Impact of Teachers on Student Value Development, Value-Talk in Teacher Education, Basic Values Inherent in School Programs, Teaching Values in Higher Education, and an Educational Climate for the Process of Valuing. (JR)

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THE TEACHING OF VALUES

James John Jelinek
Arizona State University
Editor

Arizona Association for Supervision
and Curriculum Development

FEB 02 1976

THE TEACHING OF VALUES

THE THIRD YEARBOOK OF THE ARIZONA ASSOCIATION FOR SUPERVISION AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

JAMES JOHN JELINEK, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY,
EDITOR

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CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF HUMAN VALUES

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In his colossal study on The Nature of Human Values sponsored by the National Science Foundation and The Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Milton Rokeach (5, passim) analyzes huge collections of statistical data purporting to identify (a) the values of American society by sex, income, education, race, age, religion, and politics, and (b) the values of certain substrata in American society -- counselors, hippies, nonhippies, homosexuals, professors, police, priests, seminarians, laymen, students, scientists, writers, artists, business executives, small entrepreneurs, salesmen, and the like. The report is written with two audiences in mind -- first, it is written for professionals in all the social science disciplines and in philosophy and religion as well; second, it is written for college students as a textbook in courses on human values. It is on these grounds that a basic, critical and philosophical analysis of the assumptions foundational to the Rokeach study is warranted.

On the basis of his study of A. O. Lovejoy, (4) Robin Williams, (8) Clyde Kluckhohn, (3) M. Brewster Smith, (6) and Fred Strodtbeck, (7) Rokeach identifies eight assumptions upon which his study is based: (a) The total number of values that a person possesses is relatively small -- eighteen terminal values and eighteen instrumental values. (b) All men everywhere possess the same values to different degrees. (c) Values are organized into value systems. (d) The antecedents of human values can be traced to culture, society and its institutions, and personality. (e) The consequences of human values will be manifested in virtually all phenomena that social scientists might consider worth investigating and understanding. (5, p. 3) (f) Values are enduring mainly because they are initially taught and learned in isolation from other values in an all-or-none manner, such-and-such a mode of behavior or end-state always being desirable. (5, p. 3) (g) A value is a mode of conduct (an instrumental value) or an end-state of existence (a terminal value). (h) "Every human value is a 'social product' that has been transmitted and preserved in successive generations through one or more of society's institutions." (5, p. 34)

On the basis of these assumptions Rokeach presents to each of his respondents two lists of eighteen alphabetically arranged instrumental values and eighteen terminal values, each value being presented along with a brief definition in parentheses. (5, p. 27) Each respondent is instructed to arrange the values "in order of importance to YOU, as guiding principles in YOUR life." (5, p. 27)

By way of this approach he established frequency distributions of rankings obtained for each of the eighteen terminal values and the eighteen instrumental values separately for American men and women and separately for subgroups varying in income, education, race, age, religion. How the rank orders of the respondents is analyzed by Rokeach is shown in the following tables: (5, p. 57)

TABLE 1. TERMINAL VALUE MEDIANS OF RANKS OF RESPONDENTS AND COMPOSITE RANK ORDERS FOR AMERICAN MEN AND WOMEN

	Male	Female
A comfortable life	7.8(4)	10.0(13)
An exciting life	14.6(18)	15.8(18)
A sense of accomplishment	8.3(7)	9.4(10)
A world at peace	3.8(1)	3.0(1)
A world of beauty	13.6(15)	13.5(15)
Equality	8.9(9)	8.3(8)
Family security	3.8(2)	3.8(2)
Freedom	4.9(3)	6.1(3)
Happiness	7.9(5)	7.4(5)
Inner harmony	11.1(13)	9.8(12)
Mature love	12.6(14)	12.3(14)
National security	9.2(10)	9.8(11)
Pleasure	14.1(17)	15.0(16)
Salvation	9.9(12)	7.3(4)
Self-respect	8.2(6)	7.4(6)
Social recognition	13.8(16)	15.0(17)
True friendship	9.6(11)	9.1(9)
Wisdom	8.5(8)	7.7(7)

Figures shown are median rankings and, in parentheses, composite rank orders.

TABLE 2. INSTRUMENTAL VALUE MEDIANS OF RANKS FOR RESPONDENTS AND COMPOSITE RANK ORDERS FOR AMERICAN MEN AND WOMEN

	Male	Female
Ambitious	5.6(2)	7.4(4)
Broadminded	7.2(4)	7.7(5)
Capable	8.9(8)	10.1(12)
Cheerful	10.4(12)	9.4(10)
Clean	9.4(9)	8.1(8)
Courageous	7.5(5)	8.1(6)
Forgiving	8.2(6)	6.4(2)
Helpful	8.3(7)	8.1(7)
Honest	3.4(1)	3.2(1)
Imaginative	14.3(18)	16.1(18)
Independent	10.2(11)	10.7(14)
Intellectual	12.8(15)	13.2(16)
Logical	13.5(16)	14.7(17)
Loving	10.9(14)	8.6(9)
Obedient	13.5(17)	13.1(15)
Polite	10.9(13)	10.7(13)
Responsible	6.6(3)	6.8(3)
Self-controlled	9.7(10)	9.5(11)

Figures shown are median rankings and, in parentheses, composite rank orders.

In a most impressive array of statistical analyses, Rokeach uses the nonparametric median test as the main test of statistical significance of his data, but no amount of statistical significance covers the inadequacy of the basic assumptions upon which the entire study is founded. As Dewey pointed out more than three decades ago what is a value -- end-state of existence, is "determined in its concrete makeup by appraisal of existing conditions as means." (1, p. 26) "The assumption of a separation between things useful as means and things intrinsically good in themselves," says Dewey, "is foolish to the point of irrationality." (1, p. 25) As a matter of fact, he continues, "the measure of the value a person attaches to a given end is . . . the care he devotes to obtaining and using the means without which it cannot be attained." (1, p. 27)

The key to any meaningful general theory of value, a key that Rokeach does not take into account, is that values always emerge within a prior pattern of actions. More specifically, they are contrived by the individual when his dynamic equilibrium is disintegrated. (2, pp. 17-25) The restoration of the dynamic equilibrium, then, constitutes the need of the person. Where there is no need, there is no desire, and, therefore. no valuation. Value formulation is thus dependent upon our ability to analyze our needs, to anticipate what, under certain circumstances, will satisfy those needs, and to decide upon a course of action that tends to realize the projected end.

1. Rokeach states, "It is difficult for me to conceive of any problem social scientists might be interested in that would not deeply implicate human values." The concept of values, he says, "is the main dependent variable in the study of social attitudes and behavior." (5, p. IX) There is not argument on this point except perhaps to refine the statement by saying that value theory starts from the premise that all deliberate, all planned human conduct, personal and collective, is influenced, if not controlled, by estimates of value or worth of ends to be attained. Even among lay persons good sense in practical affairs is generally identified with a sense of relative values. It is clear that the problem of value, of valuation, is one of crucial significance in human affairs.

The difficulty, however, is that Rokeach muddies the waters of valuational analysis by identifying interjections, ejaculations, as values. To evince one's feelings is not quite the same thing as to express one's values. Interjections of feeling such as "hideous," "beautiful," "a world of beauty," "happiness," and such, are like the first cries of a baby or his early cooings, gurglings, and squeals.

They are sounds involuntarily uttered. They are part of a larger organic condition and are not in any sense whatever value expressions. They are in point of fact hypostatizations, words without referents, maps for territories that do not exist.

When a cry, gesture, or posture is purposely made, it is not a feeling that is evinced. It is a communicatory act undertaken to obtain a change in a condition or situation. It is not an hypostatization but rather a proposition. Even exclamations like "Fire" or "Help" are implicit propositions because they refer directly to an existing situation and indirectly to a future situation which they are intended to produce. The expressions are used to bring about an intended change. Involved in a value situation, then, is, first, the disintegration of the dynamic equilibrium of the person -- a dissatisfaction with an existing situation -- and an attempted restoration of the equilibrium -- an attraction toward a prospective possible situation, and, secondly, there is involved in a value situation a specifiable and testable relationship between the end-in-view and the activities that are to serve as the means of accomplishing it.

The main point, a point which the Rokeach theory of values does not take into account, is that valuations occur in concrete situations in which the individual has his dynamic equilibrium disintegrated, (2, pp. 17-25) situations in which the individual finds it necessary to bring into existence something which is lacking, or situations in which he finds it necessary to conserve in existence something which is being threatened.

In these terms the adequacy of a given value of a person depends upon its adaptation to the demands imposed by the situation, and this adequacy, stateable in proposition form, is empirically testable.

2. In a very specific sense each individual lives in a world of his own. He sees things not as they are but as he is. His values thus are a very personal thing, in many respects quite unlike the values of his fellows, Rokeach to the contrary.

Before a person acts, his dynamic equilibrium is disintegrated. He experiences a need or deficiency that suggests a goal for action that will alleviate the felt need and restore the lost equilibrium. In the light of this projected goal, the individual then examines, reexamines, and examines again the means that lead to the attainment of the goal. By way of this process or reexamination the goal itself might become a matter of deliberation and in the course of the reexamination, might become clearer and more detailed. The situation as a whole takes on more and more the aspects of an orderly consideration of the conditions and things, useful or otherwise, by means of which the goal in greater or less degree is attained or not attained. The evaluation of the value inherent in the situation thus culminates in the functional unity of a finished plan of action in which all the available means are effectively coordinated and the value realized.

Value-making, then, includes the universe of goals, the means of action, and the conditions that make the ends and means possible. To ignore any one of these phases of the value-making process, as indeed Rokeach does, is to come up with one sweeping hypostatization -- a generalization for which there is no referent in the real world.

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CHAPTER II

OVERSIGHT IN VALUE EDUCATION

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Since it is ultimately our values that give meaning to our lives, value education has taken on the enormous task of aiding in the development of qualitative human judgment. Insofar as it has contributed to a shift from mere desire to judgments of desirability, it has added to human development. Whatever the results have been in classroom practices, it does appear that such fields as social studies have incorporated value education into much of their recent theory and instructional methodology. Value education has contributed various procedures that are, on the whole, a useful addition to theory and practice, but the techniques have not been accompanied by a sufficiently basic transformation in social theory. As a result, the dominant frame of reference for most current value education is still misguided, unwittingly a reinforcer of the status quo, and therefore largely a deterrent to basic social progress.

Most current American value education presupposes that value education should concern itself with the improvement of individual rather than collective choice. It is an agent of a political philosophy based more on social atomism than social community. We are taught to improve our choices so that we think over what it is we really want within the existing society. We are not taught to design a society that makes it possible to serve common human needs, even though one would have reason to presume this goal would have something to do with values.

The dilemma is a virtual paradigm of the liberal dilemma in American society, for though it is committed in theory to the common good, it actually provides a method largely for maximizing individual and special corporate interests, and those interests are often in conflict with the common good.

Value education usually makes use of the more objective aspects of science, such as clarity, logic, and consistency, while omitting comparative experience and any moral presuppositions that might give the slightest suggestion of "indoctrination." The result is to authorize moral neutrality as a method, and so in most value education we see little analysis of the social, economic, and political implications of even the concept of the "worth and dignity of the human person." Such value education is disconnected from the design of future institutions even though institutions and public policies are probably the dominant carriers and shapers of values.

Oversight Number One: The Need for Moral Presuppositions. Any theory of human development must have preconceptions about the ideal toward which development should progress. And curriculum should be based, at least in part, on a theory of human development. The principle of "the worth and dignity of the human person" may sometimes become a cliche, but if its implications are applied to both interpersonal relations and institutional values (which includes public policy) it can become the major premise in value education. It requires that the teacher not only try to be responsible to aid in educating each student, no matter what race, creed, social class, sex, or personal attractiveness, but it also requires that the teacher and curriculum aim toward developing responsibility on the part of the student toward other people.

This precommitment would affect the "right" way to think about such a question as whether or not those who are dying from starvation might be considered expendable because they contribute to the "solution" to the food problem. It predetermines whether it is right to kill under conditions of war if the justification is to support one's nation or to eliminate an "enemy" that believes in the wrong ideology.

Radical moral equality would be involved in the selection of children's books, that so often support racist, sexist, or nationalist values. If "the worth and dignity of the human person" is the basic axiom, and if those books indoctrinate an exploitative set of values that violate this principle, they should not be used except as bad examples.

The moral growth of children would therefore not be "free," (which is a myth) it would be directed (as it always is). But instead of being directed toward acceptance of conventional exploitative ideologies as it now usually is, it would be directed toward concern for human life. Much American education, in its hidden and overt forms, is directed toward egocentricity and individual "freedom." It is a formula for irresponsibility and isolation, and it inhibits the development of the qualities of a responsible person and teaches the more immature goal of individual "freedom" from authority. But freedom from authority is not really freedom, for our life is always part of a context and therefore a structure. American anti-totalitarianism encourages freedom from all structure in order to escape oppressive structure. The only structure that most value education provides is the structure of intellectual analytic technique. This does not necessitate the older indoctrination of the "right moral and spiritual values" which were often narrow-minded assumptions about human nature based on ethnocentric views of human destiny. The "human person" principle is anti-ethnocentric and radically humanistic. And it has been represented in various ways in certain established traditions.

One type of "humanistic" tradition is based on the principle that knowledge should serve humanity rather than be an end in itself.

Medical schools have such a "bias." They do not endlessly debate whether there is some ultimate philosophical basis for deciding whether life is good or bad before they get on with the work of curing the sick and helping people prolong their lives.

The value of the human person and the equality that it implies has been recently represented through the policy of "affirmative action," which has affected all American institutions including the schools. Racial discrimination with respect to previous employment has been counteracted through compensatory hiring. The equality principle has made it absurd to debate whether racism is right or wrong; rather it makes it necessary to conduct responsible inquiry leading to social action to correct instances of such discrimination. If the schools recognize their moral obligation, they will also move into other applications of the principle of "affirmative action," especially those that would help correct traditions in which economic and political institutions have violated basic morality by institutionalizing poverty, war, and ecocide.

Oversight Number Two: The Need for Institutional Values. The need for improving human choice with respect to interpersonal values is obvious these days, and much of the educational literature, including the trends toward humanistic psychology, are designed to encourage responsible interpersonal relations. However political value education bearing on the development of public policy is conspicuous by its absence. Where it is taught it usually focuses on band-aid alternatives to minor social issues rather than the design of institutions that will eliminate such major pathologies as poverty, war, and ecocide.

In addition to developing responsible individual choice within existing institutions the development of choice between institutions should be included. Alternatives to present institutions therefore need to be illuminated, and we might identify examples, the first with respect to national sovereignty.

What are the positive values of national sovereignty? What are the negative values? Is war, including atomic, chemical and bacteriological war, part of the price of autonomous national authority? Is national competition for resources and profit inherent in the present system? Is the dominance of strong nations one of the consequences of the nation-state system, and is the global gap between the rich and poor one of the results of national autonomy? Is the continuation of the present system sensible?

What are the alternatives and are the alternatives any "better" with respect to their effect on people and on the ecosphere? Various forms of regional federation, limited world law, and also full world law and government should be examined.

In addition to alternatives to the nation-state system other basic systems alternatives need to be examined. What are the effects on poverty of different kinds of economic systems? Do some economic systems predetermine unequal distribution of income and wealth? Are there ways of designing economic systems so that they eliminate poverty? What distribution ratio would be feasible and morally responsible in the U.S. within 10 years? What should be the long run goal? What is the current ratio? What steps should be taken toward achieving a more equitable American economic system? What steps should be taken worldwide?

Notice that these series of questions presuppose that poverty is bad, that it can be changed, and that its retention therefore is based on structural immorality that permits the continued exploitation of people. It therefore does not focus mainly on individual choices within the present system but on alternatives to the present system. It elevates freedom to a new level of choice involving people controlling their institutions for the common good.

The current ecocide is subject to similar value analysis. One can talk about individual responsibility for reduced energy consumption, litter, etc., or else give central consideration to economic systems change. If the economic system were planned in such a way that it was required to sustain ecological equilibrium, it would be a "steady state" economic system that delivered goods and services within the framework of what the life support system will permit without deterioration. So inquiry questions might be: At what points are economic growth and expansion destructive to necessary ecosystems? What kinds of technologies can be used to reduce environmental impact? How can we stabilize population, consumption, and production? What quality of life do we want within alternatives that are ecologically feasible? What transition steps are necessary to achieve an ecologically responsible economic system? What new laws and institutions are necessary nationally and globally?

Once again the entire concern for systems change is grounded in a concern for human life, but the concern is applied to one of the contexts in which those values arise. Without the context the value questions are reduced to questions of individual responsibility within existing economic systems; when the ecological context is considered the problem becomes one of designing the appropriate transformation of the system. No significant change is likely to occur without fundamental systems change.

One system can be eliminated only by substituting another. The automobile transportation system will not be changed by eliminating transportation either voluntarily or through public planning. Rather it will be transformed when other systemic alternatives are substituted. The war system can not be eliminated until there are plans to substitute a peace system. The economic inequity system requires substitution of an equity system. The cancerous effects of an endless economic "growth" system requires the substitution of a steady state system in ecological equilibrium.

When a teacher guides students into a value analysis of some of the most important value questions it requires study of models of integrated systems alternatives. The failure of the progressive education era and of much recent "alternative" education has been that it was vacuous, for it either encouraged individual laissez-faire hedonism, or it applied inquiry into bits and pieces of ad hoc, short range problems, often taken from news headlines that illuminated the foam on the ocean rather than the central currents. Our present period of history requires that unless we learn to plan collectively, integratively, and systemically, we are denying the possibility of choice, freedom, and probably even survival.

We now live in a world where rational short range goals are likely to produce unwanted long range effects and where the self interest of sub-groups is likely to be contradictory to the needs of the larger society. So the wrong context for making value judgments is likely to be counter-productive to common human race values and to the development of plans for their realization.

Oversight Number Three: The Need for Comparative Experience. Value education is usually described as a very rational, cognitive process, in which the teacher is expected to help students think logically and to examine evidence and assumptions so that alternatives and consequences are more carefully considered. All of this is useful, but the examination of alternatives is usually restricted to intellectual judgment based on prior experience. It may require new direct experience based on involvement in the activity being assessed, for experience expands the self and provides a basis for more empathy and identification with others which changes the context in which judgment is made.

But even involvement in new experiences is not likely to be adequate without some comparison. Comparative experience has long been advocated by those who have supported "cross cultural" experience. Whether the experience is cross cultural, cross social class, or cross vocational, the principle remains the same. We usually cannot evaluate adequately without undergoing an experience and comparing it with contrasting experience.

Stated so boldly, this premise seems unoperational. How can we undergo all experiences in order to evaluate them? Clearly, we cannot, and so we must judge similarities between experiences we have undergone and those new situations we are judging. And we must use vicarious experience in the form of art, literature, role playing, and reports of others when direct experience is unattainable.

It is hard for overfed Americans to empathize with the increasing millions throughout the world who are now starving. Temporary fasts or periods of a week or two on reduced food intake could at least give some sense of the pains of hunger. The point is not to make people miserable unnecessarily but to provide a better sense of identification with those who are victims of mal-distribution of food and obsolete politics. If concern can be generated by such empathizing experiences, the next step is to identify ways of helping the hungry. Such plans could involve short range goals to help the current needy and also longer range plans to develop ecological and population stabilization and equitable political-economic planning.

Polls that try to measure satisfaction often have little meaning. When people are asked to make judgments about job satisfaction, they need to have some basis for comparing alternatives. To know what other jobs are like may require not merely observation of different jobs but even some direct work experience with them. This principle is incorporated into the work experience of people in China. Professors, doctors, and managers rotate with farmers and factory workers, at least occasionally, so that each will learn from the other and so that a broader appreciation of the social value of different kinds of work and new career choices will develop. Human development is the central goal rather than economic efficiency.

Antioch College has a long established tradition of incorporating the principle of comparative work experience. Cultural exchange of students and teachers recognizes the same need for situational comparison. Work experience programs and "schools without walls" can be arranged to encourage evaluation through comparison. Yet, the value education movement of recent times has largely ignored this principle. The refinement of intellectual technique has dominated most of the theory. It is ironical that value education has resorted so largely to technique solutions, since the obsession with technique is itself a central characteristic of the *quantitative* values on which our economic centered society is based. Value education is presumably concerned primarily with *qualitative* judgment.

Without comparative experience, the narrow range of experience characteristic of the social roles in most societies will restrict value judgment to the meaning framework of prior experience. In an established slave society, both the masters and the slaves are likely to consider their roles as normal, and any evaluation of alternatives is likely to be hypothetical until the meaning of a change in roles becomes plausible and apparent.

Enormous amounts of political energy are likely to be released when life alternatives such as new job opportunities become possible in the minds of those who have been conditioned to accept a demeaning view of their potentialities. But evaluation of comparative desirability of different kinds of work cannot occur merely by studying job descriptions. It requires experience working with people who do such work. If the doctor's son could work with the garbage collector and the garbage collector's son could work in a doctor's office, new aspirations and appreciations could develop. The urban student could work on a farm and the farm students could work in an urban setting. Other similar forms of basic social-political-cultural-esthetic contrast needs to be part of the input of value education.

Summary and Conclusions. The dominant assumptions of the recent value-education movement are based on an ideology of individual choice within existing social-cultural-economic-political systems. Choices include appraisal of minor reform but seldom of fundamental structural transformation, even though most of our collective habits, institutions, and traditions are now rapidly becoming obsolete.

Commitment to "objectivity" and fear of "indoctrination" has resulted in throwing the baby out with the bath and has precluded precommitment to people in favor of analytic technique. Both are needed, for humanistic pre-commitment applied to social systems would mean a value stand against poverty and for economic justice, against the war system and for a peace system, against ecocide and for ecological equilibrium. Intellectual technique should be used to show how these values can be achieved and maximized; *schools through curriculum policy* should take an explicit stand in favor of such values. Education should help people clarify the goals and to examine responsible steps for achieving such goals.

But without personal involvement in the meaning of some of the alternatives, value choice may be vacuous and empty. So value education should include a greater range of comparative experiences. Instead of career education to reinforce the present obsolete economic system, work of various kinds should be compared, to judge the intrinsic satisfactions and to explore the social use and the environmental effects of such work. Schools should help people learn to plan public policy which would create new jobs and recognize that since we become what we do, work shapes our values and much of the meaning of our life. So our aspirational values should be used to transform the economic system and the jobs it provides.

These proposals are offered to help shift the ideology of current value education toward a human community framework in the context of world ecological problems. They do not pretend to constitute a complete theory of value education, only an attempt to help counteract some of the oversight to which most value education currently contributes.

CHAPTER III

THE TEACHING OF VALUES

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We have all known the person who proclaims the virtues of fair play but who joins a friend near the front of a long ticket line. Or the 'patriot' who flies the flag every Fourth of July, but who cheats on his income taxes. Or the teacher who shouts "Quiet" to his class. Which are the real values of such people (and they are all of us), those they in voice profess or those they in behavior express?

When the question is put this way, most of us will probably contend that a person's behavior is a better measure of his true values than his speech. Still, in practice, we frequently settle for the latter. Or worse still, we confuse the latter for the former. Many teachers believe they have accomplished their task if their students can state what they "ought to do," for we have all heard teachers say, "Perhaps my students do not always behave as they ought to, but at least they know how they ought to behave." But do they really know? Mouthing a code of conduct is one thing. Displaying character is quite another.

If the title of this chapter is interpreted to mean teaching students to verbalize moral criteria, the task confronting the author is too easy. Teachers are skilled in imparting knowledge as information. With such an undertaking they need no help. But if "The Teaching of Values" is construed to mean teaching students to behave more morally, the task facing the author is difficult indeed for no doctor has yet come up with the perfect prescription. Still, it is with this latter task that this chapter is concerned for it is by far the more important task of the two and though the author may fail, such a failure is preferable to a trivial success.

An Epistemological Enigma

The ambiguity in the title of the chapter, "The Teaching of Values," is not unrelated to the ambiguity in the verb 'to know.' If I say "I know how to swim" I am referring to quite a different kind of knowing than I am when I assert "I know how steel is made." In the first instance I am announcing the possession of a skill while in the second I am asserting the possession of information. The first kind of knowing was acquired directly from my experience and can be called direct or experiential knowledge. The second kind of knowing, however, more likely came out of books or at least out of someone else's experience and is properly designated indirect or vicarious knowledge.

No claim is made that 'direct' is better than 'vicarious' knowledge for indeed, man would hardly be better off than the other animals could he not pass on his cultural heritage through symbols. It is only being argued that direct knowledge is different from vicarious knowledge and that methods appropriate for promulgating the latter are not only inappropriate for promoting the former, but are actually self-defeating. For one of the basic problems in developing moral behavior lies in the failure of many teachers to distinguish between the two kinds of knowing and consequently attempting to promote the one kind of knowing with methods appropriate only to the other.

It might be expected that teachers of all people would be the most aware of these epistemological differences since knowledge is their stock-in-trade, so to speak. But alas, such is not the case despite the fact that educational theorists throughout the centuries have handed out caveats. Socrates, for example, never confused the possession of information with knowledge for he contended that "no man knowingly harms himself." Hence, the addict who, with no intention of giving up his addiction, says, "I know I shouldn't smoke," is kidding himself. He doesn't really know it, Socrates would argue. He simply possesses information.

In modern times no one has put the distinction more clearly than John Ruskin who asserted, "Education is not teaching children that which they do not know. It is teaching them to behave as they do not now behave." While Socrates rejected knowledge as 'information' and Ruskin equated the two terms, both men recognized the difference between the possession of information and the formation of character. Mark Twain may have had something of the same distinction in mind when he remarked that he never let his schooling stand in the way of his getting an education.

It is true, of course, that youth need to be informed concerning values, but exhortation is not the most efficacious way to change behavior -- as any wise preacher knows. The story is told of St. Francis who, traveling on foot with a young monk as a companion, explained that he was going to a certain city to preach. Finally the two reached the town and slowly made their way through it, greeting its citizens and exchanging pleasantries along the way. Suddenly the young monk realized that they were almost through the town and he turned to the Holy Brother to inquire when he was going to preach only to be told by the wise Saint that they had been preaching all along. Saint Francis knew his epistemology as well as his theology.

The Sources of Confusion

Since our sages have repeatedly told us, and since common men in their better moments have always known, that teaching is not telling, why have teachers and parents insisted over the centuries on employing hortatory tactics in the vain hope of modifying behavior? The answer calls for us to recognize the motives of adults and to consider a faulty theory of communications upon which we often operate. Finally, we also need to become empathically aware of how our exhortation strikes the young.

Parents and all adults share a natural desire to spare the young the bumps and bruises, the hurts and heartaches which life has dealt them. Certainly such desires are understandable and commendable for only the psychologically sick enjoy watching suffering when it can be avoided. And since men, unlike the other animals, can transmit ideas through the spoken word, it just seems natural to tell our young what to do and what not to do in hopes of saving them the bitter experiences from which we gained our insights. To do so, however, is to short circuit the learning process.

We cannot teach our progeny how to walk through verbal instruction however much we might like to spare our children the pains of falling. And few parents are stupid enough to try. But after months of struggling to raise a child who cannot tell 'where it hurts' when he is sick, we are so delighted when our child learns to talk that we mistakenly think our instructional task becomes easier. We fall into the trap of assuming that when our child says "I know I shouldn't play in the street" that he actually knows he shouldn't play there.

The belief that wisdom can be transmitted verbally, however, rests also upon a faulty theory of communication. We see it illustrated every day. When Dad says to his son, "Turn your HiFi down," and the boy sits motionless, Dad may well follow up his request by increasing the decibels of his own voice. The theory he operates on is 'If I don't communicate the first time, I'll say it again only louder.' However, there is little to support the validity of this theory. Chances are that junior heard his father the first time for he seems to have no trouble at all hearing the sound of a horn a block away over the blast of his HiFi when that horn signals the arrival of his girl friend who is picking him up for a day at the beach. Basically, we communicate, at least we communicate best, when we share with others common goals. And language is one means, though only one means, of achieving cooperation in the attainment of such goals.

Just as it seems natural for parents to try to spare their children the pains of learning from experience, and just as it seems natural to try to communicate by raising the voice, so it seems natural to believe children should appreciate and accept advice rather than resist and reject it. But the very task of growing up requires the young to learn to make their own decisions.

Transactional analysis has provided a helpful rubric for understanding the need of the young to think for themselves. Claiming that each of us is a composite of the parent, the adult and the child (P-A-C), the contention is advanced that our ordinary conversation reveals these three components. To illustrate, I wake up at one o'clock in the morning and discover my high school daughter is still typing in her room and I inquire,

"What are you doing?"

"Finishing my English theme which is due tomorrow," she replies. Up to this point the transaction is 'adult,' my query being an adult request for information and her answer being an adult (mature) response. But then I add,

"Why don't you ever plan ahead and not put off your work until the last minute?"

My daughter may never have studied Transactional Analysis, but she immediately recognizes the 'Parent' in me coming out as a put down and the tenor of the conversation immediately changes, if not terminates altogether.

The chances are that the mature always give the young more advice than is desirable. Thus, we overload the minds of our children with values no longer viable and they must spend great amounts of time and effort in ridding themselves of their obsolete 'Parent.' For however certain we may be of the values we hold, can we really be sure they will be valid for our children? John Ciardi over a decade ago wrote

> It is easy enough to praise men for the courage of their convictions. I wish I could teach the sad young of this mealy generation the courage of their confusions. . . . . We labor to teach the young rules of conduct that amount to convictions, yet which of us are really sure of the convictions we peddle to our cubs? May it not be that we have made too much of conviction as an ultimate goal? Show me the man who

> is not confused and I will show you the man who has not been thinking. (1)

If the young are to learn to be free, to be autonomous and to lead authentic lives, then indeed they need all the help they can get. But they best learn to take the responsibility for their behavior when they undergo the consequences of decisions which they, not their parents and teachers, have made.

Still, you ask, does this mean adults should abdicate their roles as parents and teachers and throw away the wisdom they have acquired from life? No such a course is being suggested. The functions of parents and teachers remain. It is simply being suggested that parents and teachers carry out their functions in a different way.

The "Proper" Pedagogical Procedure

To understand a more effective pedagogical procedure for teaching values, it is well to begin with the realization that learning goes on whether there are schools or not. Life itself instructs the young and thus, teaching is a "cooperative" art. No teacher ever learned his students anything. Rather, by structuring the environment in certain ways as it is possible to do in formal institutions like the schools, the teacher can cooperate with and enhance the natural learning process that is already going on and thereby facilitate learning.

Of what does this natural learning process consist? It simply consists of doing, of undergoing consequences and of perceiving relationships between the doing and the consequences. (2) To illustrate. Jimmy has just entered his teens and like many of his age group has begun to discover the wonderful world of the opposite sex. He is, in fact, quite smitten with Karen and eagerly looks forward to the 5th Hour each day when they both take Geometry. One particular day he meets Karen on the way to school and invites her for a coke after school. She agrees. During the 5th Hour that day, however, Karen is having trouble working a problem and the teacher asks her if she remembers the Pythagorean theorem. When she fails to quote it, the teacher turns to Jimmy who rattles it off letter perfect. After school Jimmy approaches a group of students and says to Karen, "Ready for a coke?" "No," Karen replies icily, "I don't have time for cokes. I must study my geometry." After she had gone, Jimmy asks, "What's with her?" and one of Karen's friends answers, "That shouldn't be difficult to figure out for a smart kid like you. You know about every square but yourself so in time maybe you'll wise up." And once Jimmy connects his behavior in class to the treatment he later received from Karen, he will indeed have learned that it is not always wise to parade one's knowledge in public.

It is from experiencing the consequences of our doing and perceiving interrelations which exist between doing and consequences that accounts for our learning throughout life as well as in our youth and it is precisely the attempt to replace this process with words that causes our difficulties in promoting moral development.

But no sooner has a different approach been advocated than some critic will take it to its ridiculous extreme. He will ask, "Are you saying you would always have children learn from experience?" Of course not. Sometimes the consequences are too disastrous and other times the immaturity of the learner may make it impossible for him to perceive the relation of effect to cause. I would not permit a month old baby to put his hand on a hot stove nor would I let a two year old play in a busy street. But this does not mean I would exhort the latter to stay out of the street nor would I threaten to spank him if he got in it. As already explained, the efficacy of exhortation is highly questionable at best. Moreover, the threat of spanking encourages the child to shift his attention from the real reasons for not playing in the street to an extraneous one and thus it complicates the learning process. The child who stays out of the street for fear of a spanking has not learned he should not play in the street. He has only learned not to play in it when Dad is around while his desire to get there has likely been increased.

Thus, the procedure being advocated is one that is conducive to the development of self discipline since the behavior of adults generally is shaped by awareness of consequences. The sooner children are encouraged to consider consequences, the sooner they will become self-disciplined. And no greater pedagogical error can be made than to underestimate the intelligence of the learner. Yet we 'over-teach' constantly. Aesop's fables could still be part of a good reading diet for the young if only the moral were not specified at the end of each story. Few children who are able to read the story of the boy who cried "Wolf, wolf" are dull enough to miss its lesson and it is understandable they resent being told what they already have figured out. The child who has literally burned his fingers needs not be told that a hot stove burns, but it is the unusual parent that refrains from telling him so. To say "I told you so" is about as helpful as telling a drowning man he can improve his position by drinking a lot of water.

To be sure, the spoken word can be helpful IF (a) it is not exhortation, (b) it does not include threats of punishment or promises of rewards, (c) it helps youth consider the likely intrinsic consequences their immaturity would cause them to overlook, and (d) it deals with the means of attaining ends they seek to attain. The latter suggestion might be illustrated by the help a parent or teacher could give a child trying to learn to ride a bicycle. First, the child must want to learn which means the idea should be his, not that of his parents. When this is the case, the child welcomes the expertise of anyone who can help him accomplish his goal and under such conditions an adult can safely be quite directive so long as he avoids value pronouncements. He can suggest it might be best to get the pedal near the top when beginning to pump and may even warn the child not to look at the tree he wants to miss but rather to look at the place he wants to go.

The example given is quite outside the concerns of ethics, but the pedagogical principles involved are analogous. However, when youth are faced with moral dilemmas, the suggestion that adults can help them consider consequences their immaturity might lead them to ignore can easily be misinterpreted. Such possible consequences need to be identified in as 'value free' context as possible or the youth will rightly regard such efforts as preaching. To put the matter differently, we must be sincere when we permit a child a choice and accept the decision he makes whether it be the one we believe he ought to make or not. If such is not the case, the child will quickly learn that his choices are not free but conditional -- decide the way your elders want you to decide or you lose their approval.

Rejoinders to Likely Criticisms

It takes no seer to anticipate criticism of the procedures just proposed. Many a concerned adult will wonder whether a child will feel guilty when he misbehaves unless he has been told in advance that certain behavior is morally wrong. And unless a child feels guilty will he be inclined to change his ways?

The answer to the last question was provided by the wag who first said preaching never kept anyone from sinning. It only keeps a person from enjoying it. The humorist rightly recognized that a feeling of guilt simply serves no useful purpose. The weight of guilt is a heavy load to carry and is sometimes crushing. It does not, contrary to popular belief, reduce the likelihood of recidivism. In fact, the opposite is true for it diverts the sinner's attention from the natural consequences of his action to the search for a means of reducing his stultifying emotional burden. An analysis of the story of the prodigal son makes this point abundantly clear.

When the profligate son finally came to his senses, he realized he had squandered a good share of his family's wealth in his riotous living and his feelings of guilt led him to seek his father's forgiveness. The father, the true hero of the story, not only forgave him, but held a feast in his honor -- an action the prodigal's brother had great difficulty understanding. The story was doubtless told to indicate that love -- divine love -- is unconditional. The parent who loves his children only when they reward him by behaving in ways he approves simply does not understand the true meaning of love. But another message in the story is to be found in the brother's resentment of the treatment his father gave the prodigal son. He not only missed the point about love, he misunderstood the limits of forgiveness. For no amount of forgiveness, either earthly or divine, can ever relieve a sinner of the natural consequences of his acts. Forgiveness may have removed the prodigal son's feelings of guilt, but it in no way changed him into the man he could have been had he not squandered his time, energies and wealth. Thus the brother's attention, and perhaps the attention of the prodigal son as well, was diverted from the intrinsic consequences of misbehavior to the efforts made to eliminate guilt. Had the prodigal son really learned that *la dolce vita* was not life at its best, he would have hurried home and *asked not for* his father's forgiveness, but for the opportunity to learn the skills and gain the wisdom essential to the good life.

The view that the child will not change his ways if his misbehavior is simply viewed as a mistake (rather than a moral transgression creating a feeling of guilt) rests upon a number of presuppositions, the validity of which is highly suspect. One presupposition is that there are absolute, universal and eternal moral laws which exist and a companion assumption is that these laws can be known with certainty by man. It is argued that unless such laws exist and can be known by man that man's carnal nature is such that his desire for sensual gratification and immediate pleasure will be so overwhelming that he will seldom, if ever, make moral choices that are in his long-range interest. Were this latter conclusion valid, this article simply would never have been written. Let me explain.

The writer is a poor, but badly addicted golfer. As he writes this paper he is keenly aware that a lush, challenging golf course, only a five-iron shot from his room, is available and enticing. When he is on campus in Southern California his work, his family and myriad other annoyances prevent him from golfing more than once a week. Then he has to scramble for a starting time, poke around a course waiting for beginners to get out of the way, and play in whatever weather a Friday afternoon brings. Here in Spain, however, his teaching is concentrated on week-ends. So his week days are free and his family has not yet joined him. The nearby course is beautiful, it is almost deserted, the cost is half of what it is at home and the weather is ideal. If immediate pleasure and sensual gratification are so overpowering, why then am I sitting in my room struggling to organize my thoughts when my heart is elsewhere?

The answer, of course, lies in the recognition that I have faced similar choices in the past and have learned from the consequences of previous decisions. For many times I have ruined a round of golf by rationalizing that I could finish the speech or article I was working on by thinking about it while I played. That is to say, I have learned from experience that such decisions produce neither good speech or articles nor good golf. So I ask myself which decision is likely to bring me the greatest lasting satisfaction, to play golf or to write the paper I have promised to do? When I put the matter this way, it is at least a bit less painful to sit and write. For I realize that five years from now I'll likely never remember the number of rounds of golf I played in Spain, but an article published may still be in print. Satisfaction, like pleasure, has an emotional component but unlike pleasure, it has a long-range intellectual component as well. Since writing is a skill I value even higher than golf and since an article written will be remembered (if only by the author) while a golf game played will likely be forgotten, I choose the momentary distress of writing because it brings the more lasting satisfaction.

Still, the critic will ask, will the theory work with the immature? It may possibly work with the adult who has a rich experiential background upon which to draw, but how about the immature? The answer to this query lies in recognizing that a "rich experiential background" can only be built up through experience. It does not consist of a reservoir of advice passed on by others. I can be told I should put business before pleasure, but I can only come to know it after I have experienced the desultory results of trying to play golf when my mind is on other matters.

Guidelines

From the above analysis several guidelines, but no absolutes, can be deduced:

1. *The moral act is the intelligent act.* The old adage, 'stop and think,' makes sense. Whenever one is confronted with a choice which significantly affects the lives of others -- i.e., a moral choice, -- it is wise to weigh the consequences which will likely follow if one opts for one course rather than another.

2. *Moral behavior is most effectively taught 'in context.'* There is a difference in teaching and preaching and when a person of any age is in a moral quandary he is helped far more by an empathetic friend than by a person who is sure he has THE ANSWER to his problem.

3. *Moral behavior calls for doing that which will bring the greatest lasting satisfaction.* The position being advocated cannot be reduced to simple hedonism. To be sure, there is an emotional element, but 'satisfaction' is more than mere pleasure. It requires consideration be given to the long-range consequences of one's behavior.

The Mirage of Absolutes

The thinking reader will correctly perceive that whenever a choice is made, criteria are needed. If, then, moral behavior calls for selecting between alternate sets of consequences each of which contain both desirable and undesirable elements, does it not follow that some criteria that are absolute -- i.e., which 'stay put' because they are universal and unchanging -- are needed? This is a fair question which deserves a straightforward answer. And the answer is NO. Criteria, to be sure, are required, but absolute criteria are not needed. The reasons they are not can be illustrated by an analogy.

Consider the case of a person who is confronted with the problem of which car to buy. To be sure, he is not faced with a moral dilemma, but his need for criteria is analogous to that of the man who is. Would anyone seriously argue that the only valid way to reach a decision is to compare each make and model of car to an unchanging, universal, and perfect conception of a car and then select the existing model which comes the closest to it? Surely not, for we recognize that the criteria change by which cars are evaluated. A youth might select his wheels for pick-up, speed and a sporty look while a middle-age man with a family might most desire safety. During a smog and pollution crises, a man might select a car that emits the fewest pollutants while a retired man on a fixed income might want the vehicle which gives him the best gas mileage. Unchanging criteria are neither needed nor are they desirable for they can be had only at the price of refusing to learn from experience and from failing to recognize the differences in contexts in which decisions are made.

It is easy to understand man's desire for absolutes for if unchanging moral laws existed and if they could be known with certainty by man, his decision-making would surely be simplified. But desire may not be an adequate base for belief for only in fantasy will 'wishing make it so.' It seems quite likely that there simply is no ultimate or cosmic reason why one set of consequences or criteria is to be preferred to another. (3) But since absolutes are neither necessary nor desirable, we need not belabor the point. Sufficient it is for us to follow the advice of the poet who wrote,

> Do what thy manhood bids thee do,
>   From none but self accept applause;
> He noblest lives and noblest dies
>   Who makes and keeps his self-made laws. (4)

Documentations

1. Ciardi, John, "Manner of Speaking: The Courage of his Confusions," Saturday Review of Literature, p. 9. June 2, 1962.

2. The author realizes that his philosophical biases are showing at this point, but such is the risk any philosopher must take when he exposes his thought processes to public scrutiny.

3. The author could make this point clear but that would take another chapter and he has only been invited to write one.

4. Burton, Richard Francis, The Kasidah of Haji Abdu El-Yazdi. VIII, 37.

CHAPTER IV

ENHANCING VALUES WITH A BIOLOGIC MODEL OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

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An experimental course in human engineering has been taught for the past three consecutive semesters at Arizona State University as a general studies elective for non-engineers. Its primary objective is to show students that application of a biologic model of man can decrease one's interactive troubles with others and thus improve one's "set of values."

Much of the trouble that one experiences in a lifetime comes in the form of anger, fear, slight or envy triggered by the behavior of others. One who learns to keep these emotional reactions within the currently fashionable limits of frequency and intensity is likely to be described as having a "good set of values." This report deals only with this one particular denotation of the catch-all term "values," and the many other denotations and connotations are explicitly excluded.

In the most recent version of the course, instruction began with subjective descriptions by instructor and students of some of their own past reactions to insulting remarks. A question was then asked as to why we human beings react this way, and the students volunteered the usual "pop-psychiatric" explanations involving basic human impulses as catalyzed by traumatic experiences of the distant past.

The instructor then invited the group to become a bit more scientific and consider a neurophysiologic model of human behavior: each of us is a unique individual in the absolute sense of being a one and only; the behavior of each is determined by a central nervous system that consists of a unique configuration of individually unique neurones; and the system has been programmed by the unique set of experiences that each has had through a lifetime. This model was then acknowledged as showing so much variation between individuals as to be of little use in explaining why we human beings react as we do to insults or in predicting how we will behave.

The instructor next introduced a biologic model to explain human behavior: each of us is a human mind in an automatic animal body ("mind" is used here only as the name for internal events of awareness of self, awareness of sensory perceptions and awareness of memories -- those completely private events that are subjectively demonstrable but intangible and inexplicable); commonplace actions (e.g., walking, talking, driving, eating, etc.) are mostly controlled by the animal autopilot with only occasional reasoned decisions; the human mind does not have nearly enough decision-making capacity to directly control even our simple actions such as walking or writing, which require hundreds of precisely timed contractions of muscles in opposed pairs, (demonstrated by having students try to write with the other hand); the animal autopilot is programmed to handle many emergency situations quickly, for example, the jerking response when one touches a hot stove accidentally; dangerously threatening situations can be handled automatically by the animal autopilot through a physiological response known as the fight-or-flight reaction which is essentially identical in dogs, cats, rats, baboons, people and other familiar animals; peck-order struggles and other forms of status-seeking are automatic responses among most species of social animals, with the tactics varying only in details between species such as pigeons, people, baboons, hyenas, etc.; however, we of the species Homo sapiens differ from all other species of animals in at least one important respect, in that they are apparently on autopilot continuously whereas we have a choice -- the reasoning mind of the human being can willfully override many of the automatic responses (including emotions) of the animal body.

In the course of a lifetime, a human being faces many situations that are best handled by reasoned decisions of the mind and many others that are best handled by emotional decisions or other automatic responses of the animal body. Above the animal survival level with respect to food, shelter, clothing and companionship, the quality of human life depends largely on how clearly the two kinds of situations are recognized and acted upon appropriately. For example, most crimes, obesity, drug addiction, alcoholism and interpersonal conflicts (including divorces and second-degree murders) arise directly from emotional overreactions in situations requiring rational decisions.

The remainder of the course consisted of consideration of many real-life examples of troubles created by people who have erroneously interchanged rational and emotional decisions. Many such troubles involved automatic but inappropriate reactions to words and other symbols, and a detailed study was made of these semantic pitfalls and how to avoid them.

It would be pleasant to be able to report that the experimental course was a demonstrable success. According to student responses as evaluated subjectively by the instructor, it appeared to be. Unfortunately, no method is available for evaluating objectively the only variable of serious interest -- what effect the instruction will have on behavior of the students in the real-world outside the classroom. Lack of such a method creates a barrier that has prevented productive research on the improvement of curricula, courses or teaching methods in higher education. Thus the present experiment is crippled in the same way as have been all previously reported similar attempts.

CHAPTER V

THE IMPACT OF TEACHERS ON STUDENT VALUE DEVELOPMENT

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A discussion of student value development as a goal of the educational process typically generates the view that education ought to be limited to the discovery and transmission of knowledge. Such a posture, itself a value judgment, ignores the evidence that, at all levels of the educational endeavor, teachers are inextricably involved in the process of value development.

Early schools, sponsored by religious institutions, clearly fostered emphasis not only on subject content, but the moral use which the student should make of knowledge. Public institutions have been historically less willing to prescribe, to emphasize the "ought" of behavior. Perhaps this unwillingness has been due to several factors, which appear to fall into three categories.

Whether to Teach Values

The basic philosophic question, so easy for the church school to answer, is whether values ought to be a focus of educational activity. The public institution, by contrast, seeks to serve all who come to it, from whatever moral persuasion and previously-held value set. Our value of separating church and state and the nature of our pluralistic society coalesce as streams of prescription to resist, or at least impede, attempts to recognize that teaching of values takes place, notwithstanding our plan. Other practical considerations add to the problem:

> --the normless "scientific approach," so successful (by the pragmatic test of results) in research, is often emulated in other fields, notably the social and behavioral sciences;
>
> --knowledge that value development often takes place outside the classroom appears somehow anti-intellectual, due to the in-class, out-of-class dichotomy we continue foolishly to embrace; and
>
> --our current existential modality, with its corollary "do your own thing" inanity, tends to ridicule any normative postures as not "with it."

Whose Values to Teach?

Our pluralistic society also offers no single model, no clear or consistent model of whose values to teach. Yet recognizing that valuing takes place in the educational framework, teachers and the institutions they make up would do well to consider alternative philosophical pegs on which to hang an approach to teaching of values.

Value Development for Task Formation. The evolution of identity and the fulfilling of its correlate tasks of ideology and intimacy have long been recognized by Erik Erikson as essential to both individual and collective development. The teacher or educational institution which can maintain sensitivity to these developmental tasks and recognize that students come to us in varying stages of having fulfilled them, not only achieve a framework for ordering a philosophy but go a long way toward understanding certain student behaviors.

The role of the teacher in this regard cannot be overestimated.

> . . . good parents also feel a need to have teachers who can be trusted. For nothing less is at stake than the development and maintenance in children of a positive identification with those who know things and know how to do things. Again and again in interviews with especially gifted and inspired people, one is told spontaneously and with a special glow that one teacher can be credited with having kindled the flame of hidden talent. Against this stands the overwhelming evidence of vast neglect. (1)

Value Development for Coming of Age. A similar but analytically distinct set of goals may be born from joint individual and societal needs to come of age, to pass into membership in the dominant culture. This assimilation process, frustrating throughout history, and currently source of the phrase "generation gap," is nonetheless essential.

> . . . every society depends on the succession of generations, and adults usually assume that this means that their values and life style should be transmitted to the young. (2)

Survey data which report the remarkable assimilation of political and social values by today's young people could serve to lessen the fear that such an approach to value development is fraught with problems. (3)

Value Development for Self-Direction. Perhaps the most articulate spokesman for student development as a means toward assisting individuals to become self-directing is W. Harold Grant. An outline for institutional concern with this goal includes: assessing already developed behaviors; formulating behavior objectives; programming to accomplish objectives; fostering development within a cultural context; devising environments most conducive to individual development; modifying behaviors which block development; developing values that enable the student to judge the worth of behaviors; recording developmental progress; and facilitating post-institutional, lifelong development. (4)

Value Development as Reflection of Personality. Many educators may wish to examine still another justification for value development involvement: that of providing an arena for personality development.

This goal, which transcends vocational preparation and even social development, sees the school as agent of formation of personality.

Values thus developed become standards for decision-making and components of total belief systems. (5)

How to Teach Values

The student comes to the institution in various formative stages of value development. For some, the family has had a profound influence. The church, as our primary moral institution, has affected many. For others, a sense of purpose may come from peers, from other primary groups, from a sense of patriotism. What remains for the teacher is more than a capstone role, or one as arbiter of competing value inputs. Indeed the teacher, like it or not, may serve as the catalyst which spurs commitment to a fairly well-defined value system.

This activity is accomplished in one or more ways.

Individual Modeling. Teachers are more than individuals with various levels of content-oriented expertise. They have attained high levels of competence in their respective disciplines, but they also assist, through modeling, the development of values. Learning can take place without a model, but value development typically is facilitated by modeling. In the various roles as instructor, advisor, facilitator, the teacher is at all times a model.

Social Modeling. Interaction with practitioners in the field, the mainstay of teacher education itself, ought to be emulated by other disciplines interested in providing social models for students. Internships, field study, practica, all serve to enable the student to observe behaviors appropriate for future roles.

Discussion Emphasis. Professional schools such as medicine and law long have been as concerned with the moral/ethical use of the knowledge acquired as with the knowledge dissemination itself. When one travels over a bridge, one hopes that the faculty which trained the engineer stressed the ethical practices as well as economies of construction of engineering. The implication for all teachers is clear: discussion in class ought to emphasize the possible uses of the particular knowledge and their effects on both the learner and others.

Institutional Value Climate. Were the institution and its practices to be inconsistent with its own stated values of purpose, students would be the first to identify the hypocrisy. Policies on retention and treatment of students as well as retention and rewarding of teachers reveal a great deal about an institution's value characteristics.

Promotion of Group Activities. Research results are clear that value development occurs significantly in groups. The faculty role in promotion, implementation and development of group activities is important, and should be regarded as more a value learning laboratory than an additional administrative chore. (6)

Seeking Potential in the Student. All students are not created equal; the teacher who can believe in the student who has not demonstrated significant value development in the past may very well provide needed assistance for this individual's future development. The teacher who can spot potential, particularly when no one else can, helps the individual grow.

Teachers have a profound impact on the value development of their students. The question is whether this impact shall be acknowledged and programmed for the greater benefit of the student and, perhaps, the society which brings the teacher and student together.

> From the stages of life, then, such dispositions as faith, will power, purposefulness, competence, fidelity, love, care, wisdom -- all criteria of vital individual strength -- also flow into the life of institutions. Without them, institutions wilt; but without the spirit of

> institutions pervading the patterns of care and love, instruction and training, no strength could emerge from the sequence of generations. (7)

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CHAPTER VI

THE CONTEXTUAL RELATIONSHIP OF VALUES AND EDUCATION

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The growing interest in values and their clarification can be traced directly to the shattering events of the last few years. On closer examination, one can detect an attempt, by some, to close the gap between what we do value and what we should value; an attempt, in essence, to relate descriptive and prescriptive value connotations. Consider, for example, the economic system of the United States. Ostensibly, we value the capitalist system, or, in more simple terms, an unplanned economy. However, many economists and lay people strongly argue that in order to ward off another depression it becomes imperative to control the economy vis-a-vis governmental planning efforts. If this is an accurate assessment, what then, do we and should we value? It may not, in the long run, be the capitalist system that is valued, as much as it may be economic stability. Capitalism is the descriptive value, while stability denotes prescription. It thus becomes evident that we are confronted with two distinctly different types of values: one instrumental and the other intrinsic.

Instrumental values serve, theoretically, as means to gaining intrinsic values, or ends. To illustrate this relationship, note the increased use of job charts found in many of the open classrooms around the country. Job charts are devices through which children are assigned specific work routines such as sweeping the floors, feeding the animals, and setting up the juice. The jobs usually rotate on a daily or weekly basis and each child has responsibility for something. An anticipated outcome of this activity is that the child will begin to understand his or her importance in the group and how the group depends on individual efforts to keep order in the class. Responsibility in the classroom is a value to be internalized. If individual responsibilities are not carried out, the group suffers, and if the group suffers, so do all the individuals within the group. However, the classroom, or the school for that matter, does not exist in isolation. They are related to society in various ways, and these relationships are by no means clear. What is clear from the preceding example is the hope that by having children internalize the value of responsibility within the classroom, this value will be retained and activated in society.

There is an assumption, then, that if children learn to value the routine chores of the classroom in terms of responsibility to the group, they will understand and value their responsibility to society as they interact more frequently with the world outside. Responsibility to the classroom group (what we say we do) is the instrumental or descriptive value which is assumed to lead to responsibility to society (what we should do), and becomes the intrinsic or prescriptive value.

Just as there are types of values, there are, also, levels of values. Although the three levels presented here do not pretend to represent the universe of categorical possibilities, they do represent a large portion of it. I propose that values can be analyzed within three contexts: the personal, the institutional, and the socio-cultural milieu. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that the popular value clarification techniques can effectively deal with the institutional and socio-cultural levels. In fact, there is some question whether this technique can even clarify personal values.

The most widely known work in the area of values clarification is exemplified by Louis Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney Simon in their book, Values and Teaching. (1) It is, perhaps, the best statement to date on this relatively new field of study, but they may be presenting more difficulties than solutions. Raths, et. al., delineate a process of valuing which, they claim, defines a value. (2) The seven steps in the process are, (a) choosing freely, (b) choosing from among alternatives, (c) choosing after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative, (d) prizing and cherishing, (e) affirming, (f) acting upon choices, and (g) repeating. The trick is to get beyond the first step in the process, choosing freely. For in each of the steps, there are unresolved assumptions, some of which are not well founded and therefore unacceptable. What does it mean to choose freely? I suspect that it depends on the information given and who is giving it. The mistake of this approach is to assume that man can choose freely given the social, political, cultural, and economic contexts within which we all must live. Can we really choose freely? Taking a purist view, I think not. The autonomy of the individual is not a well established fact, liberal rhetoric aside. If we do accept the assumption, we fall into the trap of opposing 'indoctrination' which liberals in education have had a love affair with for the past fifty years. The difficulty has been that the conservative element of society has been far more successful in 'teaching' values than the liberals. By taking the stand of individual autonomy and freedom to develop values, one is unwittingly playing into the hands of those who would indoctrinate. Individual autonomy cannot be considered outside of the appropriate institutional and socio-cultural contexts. Only when these interrelationships are explored will a valid technique of values clarification be possible. Only when we work toward the ideal of choosing freely, instead of assuming its existence, will we be on the true road in the process of clarification.

Schools, teachers and the curriculum itself are, more often than not, assuming cause and effect relationships between the instrumental values they knowingly or unknowingly subject children to, and the intrinsic societal values we hope they will exhibit as adults. The discussion that follows will explore the various connections between values and the educational contexts in which they exist.

Schooling and Values

As in any inquiry into schools as institutions it is both dangerous and confusing to present one institutional design as a representative model. Generalizations cannot account for the exceptions. Yet, pluralistic model analysis, while taking account of the exceptions, do not always provide us with prescriptions for the future. On the one hand, therefore, we are confronted with a single model of schooling, such as the factory system assumed in the Jenck's analysis, (3) and on the other hand, we are faced with varying models of schooling, as exemplified by the alternative schools movement. (4) Each approach has its merits, but an either/or position is not helpful. The analysis presented here is based upon the assumption that all models of schooling, in terms of their institutional design, can be categorized under a finite number of values and it is the valuational efficiency of schools, rather than their bureaucratic efficiency, that should be analyzed.

The problem with social science methods is that they tend to assume models of schooling and proceed to analyze schools according to the derived model. The usual response is to either accept or reject the analysis, while the real question is whether the assumed model should or should not be accepted. The reader, therefore, is cautioned to keep in mind that my analysis also depends on an assumed model of schooling which is, accordingly, subject to acceptance or rejection.

Schools, as institutions, can be viewed as either developing instrumental or intrinsic values; the school is seen as the means toward some external end, or it is seen as an end, in and of, itself. Educational philosophy has treated schools as means, whereas educational practice has, in many cases, treated schools as ends. Educational philosophy and educational practice do, however, share common grounds; that is, they both operate as if the school were at least partially capable of changing or maintaining the status quo. This mutual belief provides the framework for a valuational analysis of schooling.

Let us begin with the premise that schools do stand for certain values, which may be found among the various contextual environments in which the schools exist. Politically, for example, the school might value democracy. The valuing of democracy, however, is meaningless unless it exists within some context. Therefore, the school must make a choice depending on its contextual analysis of the political arena of the country. It can assume that democracy does exist and proceed to inculcate the political thought and practice that is currently operating within society, or it can make the judgment that democracy does not exist, but should, and proceed to inculcate political thought and practice that should be operating within society. Thus, the former judgment argues for maintenance of the status quo, while the latter espouses change. Very often, though, schools shy away from making value decisions, and this is often a result of the unclarified value systems of the school's constituency. Turning back to the brief discussion on values clarification techniques, it was pointed out that the method rarely takes account of social imperatives, among others. If, however, individual value decisions are made within the framework of the institution of schooling, existing in some defined contextual environment, clarification techniques become much more meaningful.

The valuational analysis of schooling depends, therefore, on the individual and societal value standards, and on the institutional meta-values of change or stability. It is only when the descriptive and the prescriptive analysis of values merge that the school will operate with full valuational efficiency.

The nature of schooling is dependent upon value considerations and, it follows then, that its nature will come into focus only as we explicitly state its values. Any other analysis simply assumes the values in order to describe the nature. That is why we still hear about the ills of the factory models of schooling; models which, in effect, objectify a subjective construct of humanity.

It should be clear, therefore, that the nature of schooling depends, to a great extent, on its investment in either one of two values, change or status quo. Furthermore, no matter what model of schooling is assumed, the overt decision as to which of the two values are internalized will determine the context for any evaluation. The hypocracy of our school systems seems to lie, unfortunately, with the public relations personnel who verbalize both the status quo and change, depending upon what they think the public wishes to hear at any particular moment. In an era of confusion and defensiveness, the public relations aspect of schooling not only adds to, but heightens, the belief that schools are getting worse and must be purged. Indeed, the belief may be well founded, but certainly not if it is based on public relations arguments. If we are having trouble describing schools, we are certainly not in a position to evaluate them. To repeat once more, the description will remain beyond our reach until we begin to cope with value descriptors in lieu of bureaucratic trappings. The hope of this shift, however, is tempered by the renewed emphasis on business-oriented techniques of evaluation. This emphasis has surfaced as competency-based education and, if anything, will move us further adrift from the real problems facing our educational institutions today and in the future.

Teaching and Values

As most people are aware, the teaching role is not value-free. Teachers are not a special breed who are trained to resist the natural search for personal values. Nor are they of such character as to be able to hide their personal value system behind the guise of professional objectivity. Allport, when commenting on personal values as categories, noted that

> The most important categories a man has are his own personal set of values. He lives by and for his values. Seldom does he think about them or weigh them; rather he feels, affirms and defends them. So important are the value categories that evidence and reason are ordinarily forced to conform to them . . . As partisans of our own way of life we cannot help thinking in a partisan manner . . . Such partisan thinking is entirely natural, for our job in this world is to live in an integrated way as value-seekers. Prejudgments stemming from these values enable us to do so. (5)

The teaching role is pervaded by values: personal, institutional, and socio-cultural. Teaching is relatively comfortable when the three levels of values are integrated. As is often the case, however, there is conflict among and between the three levels and this conflict carries over into the classroom and no doubt, leaves its mark on the students. The partisan nature of valuing precludes any other consequence. What should not be overlooked, in any case, is the fact that integrated or conflicted levels of values pervade the classroom through the teaching-learning process.

With this perspective, it is increasingly important that the educational profession pay more attention to the actual values taught and learned in the classrooms. Some may make a distinction on the grounds that values are not taught; rather, they are learned. (6) This is not really useful, because values somehow and in some way are learned, and teaching probably plays some role in this. But, the process of teaching and/or learning values may not be as important as the knowledge of the actual values being formed in the classroom. Political socialization studies represent an important effort in this direction, as does Lawrence Kohlberg's work on moral development. Needless to say, we need to know more about the teacher's personal values in relation to the institutional and socio-cultural values. It would then follow, that an analysis of the value relationships, within the framework of integration or conflict, would pave the way to a better understanding of what values we do transmit and ultimately to an awareness of the convergence or divergence of transmittable descriptive and prescriptive values. I suggest that the analysis of values becomes, in reality, an analysis of the curriculum development process. This assumes that personal, institutional, and socio-cultural values are implicit in the process. Therefore, since the curriculum has been historically defined as the catch-all for the knowledge, ideas, skills, attitudes, values, etc. that are transmitted, learned or experienced by the students, it seems that it would be profitable to look at the process with a far more critical eye than we have in the past.

Curriculum Development and Values

The history of curriculum development in the United States is a history of changing values. (7) Since 1918 to the present, theories of curriculum development have been based on the attempt to relate the three levels of values we noted throughout this discussion. Suffice it to say, universal acceptance of any one theory is not on the horizon. However, the various elements in the curriculum development process are, more or less, accepted by most educators working in this field. They would also probably agree that each element in the process is defined largely by the values of the developers. It is within this context that analysis must take place. I propose that the following eight elements describe the curriculum development process: (a) aims of education, (b) principles and procedures for selecting the subject matter, (c) principles and procedures for ordering the subject matter, (d) curriculum evaluation, (e) curriculum change, (f) types of curriculum organization used, (g) participatory roles in curriculum development, and (h) curriculum dissemination.

The important characteristic to note is that each of these elements are underpinned by value decisions. For example, principles for selecting subject matter may be derived from among the following: child interest, adult activity, significance to an organized field of knowledge, timeliness, and patriotism. These are just a few of the many value alternatives available. The final choice depends, ideally, upon the appropriate interpretation of any given educational philosophy, which, in its own right, is chosen partially according to axiological considerations.

In short, all the elements in the process of curriculum development are interrelated and bound together by values. Too often, however, the values implicit in one element are in conflict with those underlying another element. How many times have we verbalized an educational philosophy only to set it aside when it becomes inconvenient. This is known as developing curriculum in a void. In other words, curriculum, in order to be meaningful must be developed within the framework of various contexts, and each and every context assumes value connotations. Evaluation of the curriculum, therefore, as with the evaluations of schooling and teaching, must take into account the values underlying it. As discussed previously, a valuational analysis is called for in terms of internal consistency and external validity.

Conclusions

An important new book, edited by James J. Shields and Colin Greer, has recently been published containing the following description of the state of education:

> Faced with the charge that there is something terribly wrong with the schools, professional educators usually fall back on the consumption syndrome as a defense. Inevitably, the cause and the proposed solution offered for educational problems can be reduced simply to the word more. The sky could be completely papered with the articles written by educators about the need for more. (8)

Given this declared state of the art, the editors proceed to argue that

> . . . more money and more schooling within the

> context of our existing society is not the answer. Yet, most school reform efforts fail to face this reality. The answer is not to be found in new ways for schools to do their job better; instead, the task is to reorient schools away from an exploitative social structure and turn them around so that they function to promote tension in their relationship with other societal institutions. (9)

The significance of their remarks rest with the acknowledgment that schools (an element in education) exist within contexts. The contextual relationships are analyzed in valuational terms and found to be destructive. Evidently, they could only proceed to categorize the various articles, included in the text, into appropriate contexts after going through a valuational analysis.

There is no proposition here, that valuational analysis of education within its many contexts is ready to be packaged and sold. However, it is hoped that more educators will begin to look at education through different colored glasses. If we expect the education profession to gain respect, integrity, and credibility in the public eye, we will have to stop adopting and promoting business values and begin to cultivate and utilize human values. Our future can afford nothing less, and in actuality, our professional ethics demands nothing more.

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CHAPTER VII

VALUING: AN ADMINISTRATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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Does value have an ultimate definable nature? Is value a property, relation or quality? Is it objective or subjective or are both of these aspects always present? Surely aesthetic tastes are more subjective than ethical principles which are also more subjective than religious principles. Does the objective element increase as one ascends the scale of values? While we expect a judge to resist personal inclinations and preferences and to act "objectively," is even a highly skilled professional capable of divorcing him or herself from physiological, psychological, social and political influences? Does something become valuable because we value it, or do we value something because it is valuable? Are some values relative while others are absolute? While these are interesting philosophical issues which one must defer to the philosophy department, all university administrators are challenged from time to time to call upon some general guidelines related to the valuing process.

Student Affairs administrators seem to be challenged in at least three respects pertaining to valuation -- one as it relates to the broader aspects of the university community and its relationship to the greater society, another as it relates to groups and organizations within the university, and a third which deals with the teaching process as it relates to the individual student.

The modern university is changing. It is now involved to varying degrees in nearly every corner of our society. Today's campus is no longer the independent entity insulated from the practical and political issues of the social system. Its students come from every geographical, social, economic, political and cultural environment. They bring with them widely varying cultural and ethical norms. Quite naturally, the community expects the university to live within society's guidelines. Oftentimes, these expectations are in conflict either with individuals or group members of the university community. Administrators generally, and perhaps student affairs administrators specifically, need to be sensitive to these value conflicts.

Communication between students and the community at large is often limited. The importance of establishing respect among leaders of the outside community, the faculty and the student community is imperative. This obligation extends beyond fraternization. It includes not only an understanding of the various normative backgrounds, but an acceptance of them as well. Acceptance should not be confused with approval -- a concept which is not easily conveyed to the community at large.

For the general university administrator, perhaps the most complicated value conflict arises when one is called upon to arbitrate between the public's demands for controlling the university, or groups or individuals within it, and the professional educators' demand for autonomy. The administrator must defend both the public's right to participate and the university's right to run its own affairs. Ultimately, the responsibility of the public university and those who run it is to society, and beyond society to the truth. But just as the university needs to understand public opinion and the social order, the public needs to comprehend the nature and purpose of the university. A persistent problem faced by the university is its absence of a clearly defined, explicit and commonly accepted purpose for the academic enterprise. While educators have the right to determine the best means of educating, the public has the right to know to what ends those means are directed.

Once this matter has been resolved between university and community, it is time to turn inside the walls of the academy. First, one must recognize the competing objectives of those who are the university. Faculty members are concerned about the search for truth, acceptance within an academic discipline, the dissemination of knowledge, research, professional and personal advancement and sometimes service. For the most part students place emphasis, as they should, on their own individual development. Ideally, administrators should have the same faculty and student emphases, yet sometimes are overwhelmed by other commitments. Such priorities as securing appropriations and placating public critics cause some to lose sight of the legitimate interests of both students and faculty. At this point, the establishment of a value hierarchy by the administrator becomes a balancing act. Repetitive issues such as defending academic freedom, explaining alleged permissiveness of student behavior, tolerating unpopular causes, and responding to infringements upon community norms compete with more worldly matters such as gaining or maintaining public support and career survival.

At times, student affair administrators must step aside from their administrative role to help students attempt to work out their own system of values. This includes the process of self-identity as well as assisting a student in understanding and accepting his relationship with his family, his peers, the university and the greater society.

One of the basic conflicts which university students experience is a lack of understanding that value change does not necessarily mean the deterioration of one's basic value system. Accordingly, parents need to recognize that the influence of one's contemporaries, at least temporarily, displaces the reliance upon parents or adults for advice and guidance. For young people this phenomenon often causes guilt and produces anxiety. It implies a breakdown in values because they no longer share many of the common beliefs or attitudes of their parents. However, despite the challenge, the basic core of values developed over the years through the guidance of family, schools or church remain basically intact.

Peer influences are particularly noticeable on the college campus, in the residence hall or fraternity house and within the wide variety of student organizations. They provide a forum for the various issues of the day whether related to environmental concerns (such as pollution, transportation, and population density), to equal educational and employment opportunities, to poverty, government or corporate business, or to politics, politicians and justice. This is the time for social and political awareness and for students to challenge institutions and society.

For the university administrator the challenge is one of accepting and recognizing this assimilation and adjustment process while not placing oneself unnecessarily in an approval-disapproval relationship. The administrator must recognize that the process of valuation is complex and changing. Its factors are neither homogeneous nor simple. They are influenced by both prior and simultaneous experience. They must recognize that students may gauge their decision-making on what pleases someone else rather than what is most appropriate for the particular individual as the necessary part of the growth-exploration process. An administrator should be reminded that difficult problems are best resolved in an atmosphere of cooperation, receptivity and objectivity rather than concession. Also it is important to be aware that personal values may not be congruent with existential realities. When such conflict is irresolvable, the individual is forced to choose between personal, professional and practical implications.

The university should afford each student the opportunity to develop the skill to select, evaluate, question, analyze, criticize, scrutinize and ultimately to make the logical decision. Ideally, this emergence into a state of independence completes the process of developing the personal value system that enables a student to choose appropriate goals and to accept accompanying responsibilities. This process began as an attitude that values are something that is convenient or comfortable or popular. At some time it was recognized that values do have a hierarchy and finally the awareness that there are problems and consequences associated with the criteria one uses for value choices. When a student accepts this responsibility as well as the commitment to stand behind that which he believes he has completed the valuing process.

If one were to prescribe a position for the student affairs administrator in dealing with one-to-one relationships, it would underscore the importance of allowing the individual to choose for himself, but with some reservation. Just as one would not allow a 4-year-old to experiment with playing in the street or a first year pharmacy student to dispense pharmaceuticals, it should not be expected that carte blanche endorsement be given to college students to navigate their way through the university experience either in or outside the classroom. Student behavior norms are expected to conform with standards as prescribed by various university and public constituencies such as faculty governing boards, legislators, and parent-tax payers. This position is not a pleasant companion for those who suggest that policy should be established based entirely upon the will of the majority.

While it is a fundamental right in our society that the individual has a voice in political and social affairs, it is a fundamental tenant that the right of one may run counter to the privilege of another. When such conflict arises between one student and another or between a student-faculty-administrator or outsider, student affairs administrators may suddenly become arbitrator and negotiator and sometimes referee.

Value conflicts arise between the university and the greater community when these later responsibilities are carried out with professional commitment. It is at this point that value conflict occurs both within and beyond the university walls. The administrator carries the burden of institutional defense as the public demands a voice in university governance at the same time that the faculty is demanding immunity from outside intrusion. The value conflict is complicated further by the demand of students for self-governance, legislators for control and parents for more supervision of their sons and daughters.

The university community is unique. Although there are those who would be disinclined to admit it, the members of the faculty and the administration are public servants. Their responsibilities include not only the preservation of the past, but the protection of the unpopular and the exploration of the unknown.

CHAPTER VIII

U. S. A., 1970's, WITH SEMI-APOLOGIES TO JOHN DOS PASSOS

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From *Meester Veelson*

Wilson became the state (war is the health of the state), Washington his Versailles, manned the socialized government with dollar-a-year men out of the great corporations and ran the big parade

of men munitions groceries mules and trucks to France. Five million men stood at attention outside their tarpaper barracks every sundown while they played *The Star-Spangled Banner.*

War brought the eighthour day, women's votes, prohibition, compulsory arbitration, high wages, high rates of interest, cost plus contracts, and the luxury of being a Gold Star Mother.

If you objected to making the world safe for cost plus democracy you went to jail with Debs.

With the help of *Almighty God, Right, Truth, Justice, Freedom, Democracy, the Selfdetermination of Nations, No indemnities, no annexations,*

and Cuban sugar and Caucasian manganese and Northwestern wheat and Dixie cotton, the British blockade, General Pershing, the taxicabs of Paris and the seventyfive gun,

we won the war.

Dos Passos, Nineteen Nineteen, p. 211.

Moynihan tries to cast Nixon as Disraeli; Kissinger would like him to be Metternich; Nixon himself yearns for Woodrowfication.

Wills, Nixon Agonistes, pp. 534-535.

Woodrow Wilson, reelected in 1916 because 'He Kept Us Out of War,' took the nation into war just one month after his second term began. In this short time he traveled all the way from nonintervention and official neutrality to complete dictation of the terms for surrender, for peace, and for the postwar organization of nations. Mencken thought this 'conversion' a cynically staged thing. Others fasten on one or other point in the process as, admittedly, 'expedient' -- e.g., Richard Hofstadter shows how carefully the first 'neutrality' was framed to be neutral *against* Germany.

. . . True, an international Covenant would be needed (Wilson, proud of his Presbyterian background, descended from Scotch Coventers, liked the biblical majesty

> of the term *Covenant,* and insisted on its use for the founding document of the League of Nations).
>
> Wills, Nixon Agonistes, p. 417.

> He (Nixon) has not been a convincing moralist, he does not have the preacher airs of Woodrow Wilson; but he is notable for his belief in preachers -- not only in Billy Graham and Dr. Peale, but in the Horatio Alger tracts and maxims of his youth. He believes in the moral reward for effort, the spiritual quality of success -- all that disappearing ethos he appealed to and is trying to resuscitate.
>
> Wills, Nixon Agonistes, p. 394.

On June 17, 1972 the Watergate breakin occurred and with it the arrest of the burglers; thus began the unraveling of a presidency. In the complex of scandals associated with what is known as the Watergate Affair not the least of the scandals has been the ignominy of lawyer involvement in a battery of alarming situations: some illegal, some professionally unethical and many highly questionable. As a consequence of the aftermath of the Watergate burglery I have become fascinated with the area of legal ethics or "professional responsibilities of the lawyer."

The field of legal ethics bears some very interesting relations to the general field of ethics, to the problems of the enforcement of professional norms and to the problems of imparting or teaching professional responsibilities to any licensed, certified or legally recognized professional group. All of these aspects involve valuing, evaluation and the teaching of vocational values to graduate students. Professional ethics for lawyers and the attendant problems of fostering and maintaining them have wider dimensions in terms of the parallels, analogies and contrasts with the problems of professional behavior in both medicine/health fields and in education.

These questions arise: What differences exist in the professional codes for lawyers, for health personnel, for teachers? How do the different fields -- law- health, education -- go about training people within these different fields in the specific areas of professional ethics? What are the underlying values in the legal profession, the health careers, and the teaching professions?

The undone President who was to resign ultimately was not only a lawyer himself, but an admirer of Woodrow Wilson who enunciated most articulately the concept of the person of the president by virtue of his office as being the inevitable and inescapable moral leader of the nation exercising a quasi-ecclesiastical role in delineating the moral aims and voicing the spiritual aspirations of the nation and filling a role of teaching values by word and deed to his people. Richard Milhouse Nixon envisioned his presidency as a Wilsonian one. History remains the supreme ironist. This association with Woodrow Wilson is an especially revealing one. Wilson, like Nixon, was not only a product of the legal profession's traditions; he was, besides being a product of the teaching profession and the president of a great university, also a product, like Nixon, of a profound religious background in which Scotch "Presentism" paralleled the "inner light" mystique or Quakerism.

In my conversations with judges and lawyers a recurrent notion that arose was that a lawyer by virtue of his profession should lead an exemplory public life and at least an official private one which would offer moral example to the community. This notion has its roots deep in American history. Professional people -- lawyers and teachers and preachers and eventually even medical doctors -- were the leaders of their community and the chief upholders of the establishment inasmuch as by and large they were the establishment and the chief benefactors of the system. This is reflected in the code of professional Responsibilities and Rules of the Supreme Court Pertaining to Discipline of Attorneys as Adopted By the Arizona Supreme Court 1971. The first Canon contains this provision:

> EC 1-5 lawyer should maintain high standards of professional conduct and should encourage fellow lawyers to do likewise. He should be temporate and dignified and should refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct. Because of his position in society, even minor violations of the law by a lawyer may tend to lessen public confidence in the legal profession. Obedience to the law exemplifies respect for the law. To lawyers, especially, respect for the law should be more than a platitude.

Members of the teaching profession were probably held accountable for the minutia of niceties of decorum longer than any other professional group.

In looking at the three professional fields certain distinguishing features of law must be recognized. One can practice various fields of medicine without being a member of a medical association or health organization but the lawyer to practice law, except in the field of copywrite-patent law, must be a member of a bar association. The bar associations have legal status uniquely connected to the court system and it is to the bar that the discipline of members is assigned although the court (Supreme Court) may ignore the recommendations of the bar committees. (The legal profession is more actively engaged in policing itself than other professions.) The consequence of all this is that membership in the professional organization is a virtual prerequisite to earning a livelihood in law. In contrast, a medical doctor not only may not have to belong to a medical society, he may even practice medicine and earn a living in county, state and federal facilities without being licensed to practice, while a teacher without certification may find employment in private schools or as a tutor. To practice medicine when one is not licensed still does require a valid diploma from an accredited institution whereas legally anyone can set up shop and "teach."

In this regard concerning the closeness of the professional organization with the agencies of the state, (a matter that singles out the legal profession), there is a facet which makes aspects of the Watergate affair very painful. One of the reasons that the lawyers' involvement in the affair as it transpired into a major crises had such unsettling ramifications is that the legal profession is so inextricably entwined in our government. One whole branch of government, federal and state, is exclusively the domain of lawyers -- the judiciary. A preponderant member of legislators in Congress and the state houses are lawyers and in addition legal qualifications are a must in many positions of the executive branch while being extremely desirable qualification in others. In recent years the private sector has seen increasing members of corporate top brass drawn from the legal profession.

The Anglo-American system of jurisprudence has a fundamental feature which is of decisive import to questions of professional ethics as well as to the field of general ethics and which reflects a basic value judgment. This is the adversary nature of our system. So entrenched is this value judgment embedded in legal thinking and so pervasive in legal practice that it is difficult to get lawyers to concede the possibility that recent developments such as no fault insurance and divorce are at all indicative of a movement away from an exclusively adversary stance. Elliott E. Cheatham exquisitely elucidated the adversary nature of our law and the faith in its workings.

> The method for settling unresolved controversies is a competitive one -- the adversary system of administration of law under which lawyers zealously represent their respective sides. The method involves a formidable paradox --

the use of partisan representatives to bring out the truth and to achieve equal justice under law. So partisan representation must be enlightened if the method is to attain its end.

What springs to my mind immediately are the numerous harpings of Harold J. Laski on the subject of the contradictions between an acquisitive economic system and a formal political democracy. The formidable paradox pointed out by Cheatham reflects the contradiction between the ideal of a value -- justice, equally administered under law -- and the numdane realities of the "quality" of zealous representation being a variable with a startlingly high correlation to economic power that enables one to purchase with quite excellent odds representation that will win a desired verdict for the side with the most money at its disposal.

Far reaching consequences to ethics result from any adversary system. Any educator who has watched the consequences of acute competition, the salient value of which is winning, upon not only scholastic achievement but upon educational values as a whole can predict the likely outcomes. Any educator who has watched what happens to a physical education program as a consequence of intramural competition -- the perversion of physical education to athletics and sports -- can not be surprised at the likely consequences to the valued ideal of equal justice under law in an adversary system. Competition "works" in jurisprudence, in athletics, in schooling; but hardly ever to the consequences that a moralist might desire.

The legal profession can not be faulted for its efforts in examining and codifying ethical strictures. The canons of the American Bar Association and the state bar associations now replaced by the Code of Professional Responsibility are more detailed and explicit than the codes of professional ethics of any other group. One fascinating feature of these formalized rules and regulations is that there is the delineation made between what must be done and what should or may be done and what should not or may not be done. In addition there exists the codified opinions and rulings on the canons or codes. A further feature of the legal profession's punctilious concern is that of the lawyer, uncertain of the appropriate ethical course, having recourse to professional advice from his peers in that he may formally refer a matter to a constituted committee to decide upon the issue.

Of central concern to the legal profession are the problems of conflict of interest. Here enormous effort has been expended and produced an extensive body of rulings that delineate the proper role of the attorney. No other profession has so exhaustingly searched out the ethical nuances of conflict of interest. (Few opportunities arise for other professional people to co-mingle funds, for example.) It is not unusual that a judge at any level should disqualify himself from a case on grounds of conflict of interest which might prejudice him in his court role.

Alas, lawyers in executive branches of government and in legislative roles do not follow suit and exercise the same touchiness that they do in the judicial area. It may be argued judiciously that a legislator who grows cotton may himself better represent the interests of a cotton-growing district or state because of this personal stake inasmuch as he will more "zealously" represent the interests of the district where these interests are at one with his own personal ones. But what of the public interests over and above the special ones? This is a matter one might expect a lawyer to be particularly alive to thanks to his professional sensitivity to matters of conflict of interest.

Once again the touching faith on the adversarial system manifest itself. If all special interests are zealously represented the public interests will emerge out of the fair competition of Madison's factions. The Invisible Hand at work! How much of the moral thinking and value structures and the process of valuing on the part of Americans does place an ultimate trust in some Invisible Hand. Emerson's "Compensation" and Galbraith's counter veiling power are but two expressions of the belief in the Invisible Hand. With respect to the national scene and the conflicts of interest among Congressmen, the majority of whom are lawyers, often the public is kept unaware of the special interests of their representatives in the absence of full disclosure of sources of income, ownership holdings and partnership arrangements. Surely one could expect a body predominantly of lawyers to at least opt for full disclosure. An example of undue personal involvement was brought to Phoenix in a 1974 speech by Representative John Vanderveen who won the special election in Michigan in President Gerald Ford's old district. He related that the first day he got to the United States House of Representatives he was approached and asked if he had been in service. An affirmative answer brought forth the urging that he join a reserve unit. As a congressman in a reserve unit every day he spent in Congress would count as a day in the active reserves. Double pay for the same job and double retirement in time, if he could keep getting reelected. There are 113 members of Congress who are active members of a reserve unit. Anyone sanguine about conflict of interest matters should be urged to look at the voting record of these 113 on defense related matters.

How are the rules of the game taught to the lawyers? How are the strictures of legal ethics "infused" so that lawyers are supposed to have a sense of the values that undergird the criteria of what is professionally ethical and what is not? There are courses in law school on professional responsibilities which vary as one would expect in the estimation of law students from the helpful to the profunctoral and useless. Formerly, some states required such courses to be taken as part of legal training, and some law schools required such a course. Others made such a course optional as an elective; in such cases reliance was placed by the schools on the student picking up a sophistication about professional responsibilities along the way as incidental or concomitant learning as just part of the various law cases being dealt with in the process of general learnings as ethical issues might have arise. Coincidental with Watergate in all schools approved by the American Bar Association a graduate must have completed a course in professional responsibility. Recent moves have been made to include continuing education as part of maintainance of bar membership. In the backwash of Watergate it will be interesting to see if increasing emphasis will be placed upon seminars on current problems of professional conduct.

Lawyers probably learn the codes of professional responsibility and acquire valuing criteria that lie behind the codes in the course of their survival. Since serious infraction of the code carries a very heavy penalty even to the extent of the loss of a livelihood in such a situation the imperative is to shape up quickly or ship out. Inasmuch as a good many lawyers enter into partnerships there is the peer influence to teach and reinforce a standard of behavior commensurate with the collective image of the group.

For those students of ethics and didactic instruction who maintain that modeling is decisive in imparting values and teaching criteria of valuing there are vivid media images and stereotypes that parallel the experiments of Bandura. What more Olympian image to any neophyte group of would-be professionals has ever been depicted than in the film The Paper Chase?

Medicine today is caught in a particularly acute crises. Widespread dissatisfaction exists concerning the delivery of health care. Traditional "free medicine" although buttressed by extensive health insurance programs seems vulnerable to some form of nationalization or to being "socialized." Inflationary pressures have pushed medical costs to the point that the prospect of meeting the bills of a major illness dismays most citizens. Internally, the medical profession may be altered drastically by the incursion of a significant number of women as the new feminism assaults professions and specialties that have been traditional bastions of male domination. There is even the prospect that in the future there may be large numbers of women surgeons. These and other problems are causing concern as the public's traditional regard for the physician is altering. As with other professions medical practitioners are concerned with the public image of medicine and medical ethics reflects this.

Some of the points that arise in connection with the professional ethics of physicians have a bearing upon problems of professional responsibility of the educational profession. As medicine threatens to become increasingly public with the restructuring due to Medicare, Medicaid and national health insurance so will the pressures of public scrutiny increase and there is likely to be a rising clamour for increased accountability. Both medicine and education are professions committed to service to humanity. In both instances these services are directed to the particularly vulnerable segments of humanity: the ill in one case and the young and immature in the other case. Ethically both medicine and education as professions have the duty to safeguard themselves and their publics to insure that review and accountability are done under conditions in which the cause of health and the cause of education are primarily served and that politicalization are not the actual end of the process.

Both the medical profession and the educational profession share a commitment to truth and to the advancement and efficient utilization of research and knowledge. Section Two of the Principles of Medical Ethics enjoins physicians to exert effort to improve medical knowledge and skill and to propagate these for the public benefit. The Preamble of the Code of Ethics of the Educational Profession stresses the educator's overriding commitment to seeking truth and fostering scholarship. Both professions have a long history of fostering continuing education as part of any sense of professionalism.

The two professions face different problems in relation to such commitment to truth and knowledge. Public pressure has generally been upon the medical doctor to immediately utilize the latest well-publicized medical miracle whether it be a new drug or an innovative technique. Unfortunately it often takes time to evaluate and perfect and adjust to the radically new and dramatic and perhaps merely chic in medicine. Such a situation demands of the physician wisdom, experience and ethical sensitivity in the matter of acceding to or resisting the pressures resulting from the debatable and highly publicized latest "cure." He may have to offend and even lose as a patient the dedicated reader of Time Magazine or The Reader's Digest who may have gotten a garbled or overstated report of an experimental technique or some drug supposedly producing dramatic effects and recoveries.

In contrast to the plight of medicine in this regard large segments of the public resist and thwart the experimental and innovative in education. Ethically the educator in a commitment to advancing truth and utilizing experimental findings may find himself in a confrontation with a hostile public. A compelling obligation of the educator is to persuade the public to accept an experimental attitude toward educational change. There is need to convince the public that practice in education must be aligned to practice in science and in technology both of which demand a willingness to experiment and to become comfortable with the risk inherent in innovation.

The third section of the Principles of Medical Ethics constrains physicians to "practice a method of healing founded on a scientific basis. . ." and advises the physician ". . . he should not voluntarily associate with anyone who violates this principle." Organized medicine is committed to the tradition of western civilization that places its faith in a reliance upon intelligence operating within a structure of controlled disciplined research and empirical investigation to solve problems and to advance the healing art. In Arizona it is conceivable that medical doctors working with Indians might be involved in situations fraught with ethical considerations should they cooperate with a tribal shaman or medicine man. Given the academic acclaim accorded Carlos Castinado any adverse pronouncement of a pedestrian medical committee might very well appear at best stodgy and at worst self-serving and persecutory. In this connection a sophisticated sceptic might well demand to be enlightened as to the scientific basis of acupuncture.

Situations in a related vein in education raise questions about the various "trips" and educational tours -- guided and otherwise -- of the counter-culture. Educational philosophies -- Perennialism, Essentialism, Progressivism and Social Reconstructionism -- have been in various degrees committed to the primary values of rationality and intelligence with education conceived as entailing intellectual discipline within some kind of rational tradition. The decade of the nineteen-sixties presented a challenge to this tradition. The challenge came in the many forms, fads, fashions and movements that collectively make up the counter-culture. In educational philosophy an apology for such 'materialized' in the amorphous philosophy known as "The New Progressivism."

What should an educator's stance be toward any of the various "intuitionists" and to the blatantly non-rational, Dionysian panaceas? How should educators regard the students' intrigued and absorbed interest in drugs, witchcraft, the occult, astrology, etc., etc., as well as all the various mystery cults lately and belatedly imported from the Orient? All of them promise some sort of wisdom transcending mere hard thinking. What should be the educator's commitment to the cold hard light of reason as against the "light shows" of subjectivity and semishadows with their hope of vivid flashbacks? Educators in the fields of the humanities are likely to have quite different strategies in regard to counter-culture formulations of "knowledge" and "wisdom" as opposed to the positions of educators in the fields of the natural and social sciences.

In the Principles of Medical Ethics Section Six lays down principles regarding conditions of offering of medical services which are designed to insure free exercise of professional judgment and which maintain quality of medical care. The elaboration of this delineates conditions under which a physician's services involve an institution such as a clinic or a hospital.

The teaching profession operates within an exclusively institutional setting and the Code of Ethics of the Teaching Profession under Principle IV devotes a separate section to the ramifications of the idea of commitment to professional employment practices. Section Eight deals with the problem of outside employment and the problem of the exploitation of students. This may become a vexing problem in regard to music teachers, for example, and difficulties of supplying their students with instruments so that it is necessary for the teacher to be involved as an agent in an enterprise where he has vital interest.

A knotty concern in the medical profession arises in regard to the ethical disposal of drug samples given to physicians by detail men and those samples mailed by drug concerns. It is regarded as unethical to resell these to firms that solicit them for resale. In education there seems to be no prohibition or objection to teachers selling sample textbooks which have been unsolicited. To what extent are these situations comparable?

In conclusion it would seem that self-policing among the professional groups has been most rigorously pursued by lawyers and that professional concerns of an ethical nature have been least focused upon among teachers. It would seem desirable for educators to explore the reasons for this state of affairs.

Inasmuch as the legal profession has utilized formal courses for fostering professional ethics it might be productive for both medicine and education to explore with law the effects and the means of improving professional concerns with professional responsibilities.

Appendix A

Code of Professional Responsibility Preamble and Preliminary Statement of the American Bar Association

Preamble.

The continued existence of a free and democratic society depends upon recognition of the concept that justice is based upon the rule of law grounded in respect for the dignity of the individual and his capacity through reason for enlightened self-government. Law so grounded makes justice possible, for only through such law does the dignity of the individual attain respect and protection. Without it, individual rights become subject to unrestrained power, respect for law is destroyed, and rational self-government is impossible.

Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship with and function in our legal system. A consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct.

In fulfilling his professional responsibilities, a lawyer necessarily assumes various roles that require the performance of many difficult tasks. Not every situation which he may encounter can be forseen, but fundamental ethical principles are always present to guide him. Within the framework of these principles, a lawyer must with courage and foresight be able and ready to shape the body of the law to the ever-changing relationships of society.

The Code of Professional Responsibility points the way to the aspiring and provides standards by which to judge the transgressor. Each lawyer must find within his own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his actions should rise above minimum standards. But in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of his profession and of the society which he serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate sanction. So long as its practitioners are guided by these principles, the law will continue to be a noble profession. This is its greatness and its strength, which permit of no compromise.

Preliminary Statement

In furtherance of the principles stated in the Preamble, the American Bar Association has promulgated this Code of Professional Responsibility, consisting of three separate but interrelated parts: Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. The Code is designed to be adopted by appropriate agencies both as an inspirational guide to the members of the profession and as a basis for disciplinary action when the conduct of a lawyer falls below the required minimum standards stated in the Disciplinary Rules.

Obviously the Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules cannot apply to non-lawyers; however, they do define the type of ethical conduct that the public has a right to expect not only of lawyers but also of their non-professional employees and associates in all matters pertaining to professional employment. A lawyer should ultimately be responsible for the conduct of his employees and associates in the course of the professional representation of the client.

The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the general concepts from which the Ethical Consideration and the Disciplinary Rules are derived.

The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive. They constitute a body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations.

The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action. Within the framework of fair trial, the Disciplinary Rules should be uniformly applied to all lawyers, regardless of the nature of their professional activities. The Code makes no attempt to prescribe either disciplinary procedures or penalties for violation of a Disciplinary Rule, nor does it undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct. The severity of judgment against one found guilty of violating a Disciplinary Rule should be determined by the character of the offense and the attendant circumstances. An enforcing agency, in applying the Disciplinary Rules, may find interpretive guidance in the basic principles embodied in the Canons and in the objectives reflected in the Ethical Consideration.

Canon 1

A Lawyer Should Assist In Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession.

Canon 2

A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available.

Canon 3

A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing the Unauthorized Practice of Law.

Canon 4

A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client.

Canon 5

A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client.

Canon 6

A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Competently.

Canon 7

A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law.

Canon 8

A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the Legal System.

Canon 9

A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety.

Appendix B

Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association

Preamble

These principles are intended to aid physicians individually and collectively in maintaining a high level of ethical conduct. They are not laws but standards by which a physician may determine the propriety of his conduct in his relationship with patients, with colleagues, with members of allied professions, and with the public.

Section 1

The principal objective of the medical profession is to render service to humanity with full respect for the dignity of man. Physicians should merit the confidence of patients entrusted to their care, rendering to each a full measure of service and devotion.

Section 2

Physicians should strive continually to improve medical knowledge and skill, and should make available to their patients and colleagues the benefits of their professional attainments.

Section 3

A physician should practice a method of healing founded on a scientific basis; and he should not voluntarily associate professionally with anyone who violates this principle.

Section 4

The medical profession should safeguard the public and itself against physicians deficient in moral character or professional competence. Physicians should observe all laws, uphold the dignity and honor of the profession and accept its self-imposed disciplines. They should expose, without hesitation, illegal or unethical conduct of fellow members of the profession.

Section 5

A physician may choose whom he will serve. In an emergency, however, he should render service to the best of his ability. Having undertaken the care of a patient, he may not neglect him; and unless he has been discharged he may discontinue his services only after giving adequate notice. He should not solicit patients.

Section 6

A physician should not dispose of his services under terms or conditions which tend to interfere with or impair the free and complete exercise of his medical judgment and skill or tend to cause a deterioration of the quality of medical care.

Section 7

In the practice of medicine a physician should limit the source of his professional income to medical services actually rendered by him, or under his supervision, to his patients. His fee should be commensurate with the services rendered and the patient's ability to pay. He should neither pay nor receive a commission for referral of patients. Drugs, remedies or appliances may be dispensed or supplied by the physician provided it is in the best interests of the patient.

Section 8

A physician should seek consultation upon request; in doubtful or difficult cases; or whenever it appears that the quality of medical service may be inhanced thereby.

Section 9

A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in the course of medical attendance, or the deficiencies he may observe in the character of patients, unless he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community.

Section 10

The honored ideals of the medical profession imply that the responsibilities of the physician extend not only to the individual, but also to society where these responsibilities deserve his interest and participation in activities which have the purpose of improving both the health and the well-being of the individual and the community.

Appendix C

Code of Ethics of the
Education Profession

Adopted by the NEA Representative Assembly, July, 1968
Amended June, 1972

Principle I - Commitment to the Student

The educator measures his success by the progress of each student toward realization of his potential as a worthy and effective citizen. The educator therefore works to stimulate the spirit of inquiry, the acquisition of knowledge and understanding, and the thoughtful formulation of worthy goals.

In fulfilling his obligation to the student, the educator -

1. Shall not without just cause restrain the student from independent action in his pursuit of learning, and shall not without just cause deny the student access to varying points of view.

2. Shall not deliberately suppress or distort subject matter for which he bears responsibility.

3. Shall make reasonable effort to protect the student from conditions harmful to learning or to health and safety.

4. Shall conduct professional business in such a way that he does not expose the student to unnecessary embarrassment or disparagement.

5. Shall not on the ground of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin exclude any student from participation in or deny him benefits under any program, nor grant any discriminatory consideration or advantage.

6. Shall not use professional relationships with students for private advantage.

7. Shall keep in confidence information that has been obtained in the course of professional service, unless disclosure serves professional purposes or is required by law.

8. Shall not tutor for remuneration students assigned to his classes, unless no other qualified teacher is reasonably available.

Principle II - Commitment to the Public

The educator believes that patriotism in its highest form requires dedication to the principles of our democratic heritage. He shares with all other citizens the responsibility for the development of sound public policy and assumes full political and citizenship responsibilities. The educator bears particular responsibility for the development of policy relating to the extension of educational opportunities for all and for interpreting educational opportunities for all and for interpreting educational programs and policies to the public.

In fulfilling his obligation to the public, the educator -

1. Shall not misrepresent an institution or organization with which he is affiliated, and shall take adequate precautions to distinguish between his personal and institutional or organizational views.

2. Shall not knowingly distort or misrepresent the facts concerning educational matters in direct and indirect public expressions.

3. Shall not interfere with a colleague's exercise of political and citizenship rights and responsibilities.

4. Shall not use institutional privileges for private gain or to promote political candidates or partisan political activities.

5. Shall accept no gratuities, gifts, or favors that might impair or appear to impair professional judgment, nor offer any favor, service, or thing of value to obtain special advantage.

Principle III - Commitment to the Profession

The educator believes that the quality of the services of the education profession directly influences the nation and its citizens. He therefore exerts every effort to raise professional standards, to improve his service, to promote a climate in which the exercise of professional judgment is encouraged, and to achieve conditions which attract persons worthy of the trust to careers in education. Aware of the value of united effort, he contributes actively to the support, planning, and programs of professional organizations.

In fulfilling his obligation to the profession, the educator -

1. Shall not discriminate on the ground of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin for membership in professional organizations, nor interfere with the free participation of colleagues in the affairs of their association.

2. Shall accord just and equitable treatment to all members of the profession in the exercise of their professional rights and responsibilities.

3. Shall not use coercive means or promise special treatment in order to influence professional decisions of colleagues.

4. Shall withhold and safeguard information acquired about colleagues in the course of employment, unless disclosure serves professional purposes.

5. Shall not refuse to participate in a professional inquiry when requested by an appropriate professional association.

6. Shall provide upon the request of the aggrieved party a written statement of specific reason for recommendations that lead to the denial of increments, significant changes in employment, or termination of employment.

7. Shall not misrepresent his professional qualifications.

8. Shall not knowingly distort evaluations of colleagues.

Principle IV - Commitment to Professional Employment Practices

The educator regards the employment agreement as a pledge to be executed both in spirit and in fact in a manner consistent with the highest ideals of professional service. He believes that sound professional personnel relationships with governing boards are built upon personal integrity, dignity, and mutual respect. The educator discourages the practice of his profession by unqualified persons.

In fulfilling his obligation to professional employment practices, the educator -

1. Shall apply for, accept, offer, or assign a position of responsibility on the basis of professional preparation and legal qualifications without discrimination on the ground of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin.

2. Shall apply for a specific position only when it is known to be vacant, and shall refrain from underbidding or commenting adversely about other candidates.

3. Shall not knowingly withhold information regarding a position from an applicant or misrepresent an assignment or conditions of employment.

4. Shall give prompt notice to the employing agency of any change in availability of service, and the employing agent shall give prompt notice of change in availability or nature of a position.

5. Shall adhere to the terms of a contract or appointment, unless these terms have been legally terminated, falsely represented, or substantially altered by unilateral action of the employing agency.

6. Shall conduct professional business through channels, when available, that have been jointly approved by the professional organization and the employing agency.

7. Shall not delegate assigned tasks to unqualified personnel.

8. Shall permit no commercial exploitation of his professional position.

9. Shall use time granted for the purpose for which it is intended.

Documentations

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CHAPTER IX

SOME QUESTIONS OF VALUE FOR EDUCATORS

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The question of values and the teaching of or for values in our schools has long been with us. It has largely focused on the issues of whether or not public schools have the right to teach values and what these values should be. In practice educators have tended to view values in the normative sense of ought/should and have concentrated on such "values" as character development, appropriate behavior, proper dress and hair styling, or on the nature and quality of text and reference materials, controversial aspects of content, and a host of other similar issues.

While recognizing the persistence of these concerns and the legitimacy of them, I would like to suggest that there are many other questions relative to values and valuing that deserve our attention as educators, whatever our role or position, our level of functioning or our subject area specialization. It is to such questions that this discussion is directed with the fervent hope that some of us will ponder the answers to them and the implications for our practices.

Greater awareness and analysis of the following questions would help us recognize the intricate relationship between values and actions, a relationship that often eludes us. For example, how often do we acknowledge that our behavior as educators is revealing of a value system, of some set of values (whether set in the sense of a collection or set in terms of bias/direction)? How often do we analyze our decisions relative to school organization, the nature of content, personnel arrangements, and instructional strategies in terms of the values they reflect, some of a positive, supportive, enhancing nature or others that tend to inhibit, block or restrict? How often do we view ourselves and our educational arrangements -- physical, sociological, psychological, logistical, et.al. -- as models that are perceived and interpreted directly by our clients (students and parents/public) or dimly, subconsciously by them? How aware are we that the process of education itself, its practice and polemic, is a complex, intricate representation of the values, beliefs, judgments of the people participating in the various decisions essential to the enterprise?

How often then have we overlooked the significant relationship between values and action as we more readily concern ourselves with teaching about values -- through social studies, language and scientific content or through student confrontation with and analysis of values and beliefs whether by discussion, case studies, critical incidents, films and tapes, and various other techniques? It is with the broader more invisible world of values as reflected in educators' behavior and actions and decisions that I want to urge consideration. It is not my purpose to provide easy answers or argue particular dogma but rather to raise questions and suggest directions and make tentative recommendations.

How Do We View Values?

Any inquiry about the place of values in education must begin with delineating our meaning and clarifying the role of values in the educational process. For the concept of values that we accept and our perception of their role determines our decisions and our actions.

Meaning. For purposes of our exploration let us accept a definition of values as beliefs or views reflecting the importance we attach to ideas, persons, acts, things, conditions, and the like. Included in this concept of values are parameters of appreciation, acceptance, and judgment. The importance we attach to person or thing reflects an appraisal, an assessment, a judgment resulting in our placing a value on the idea, person, or thing involved, a value that is relative and part of a priority system, a hierarchy. Put another way, one must realize that approving, liking, admiring, appreciating, believing, et.al. convey certain feelings about someone or something, just as appository verbs convey differing feelings. It is important for educators to acknowledge this dimension of judgment and appraisal and to understand its relationship to their behavior and actions in various aspects of education.

Absolute Relative Dichotomy. Another dimension needing clarification is our view of the permanence and absoluteness of values. Do we view values as absolute, normative, standard, and permanent or as dynamic, relative, changing, and pluralistic? The implications of our answer to this are obvious. A commitment to permanent and absolute values -- the eternal verities appropriate for all at all times -- may be reflected in a tendency to view curricular content as fixed, grade level norms as appropriate and desirable, and teaching as a relatively sterile process of imparting knowledge. On the other hand, an acceptance of values as relative, changing, and pluralistic is more likely to lead to continuous adaptation and modification of content, to non-graded and individualized organizational patterns, and to a view of instruction as consisting of a wide repertoire of strategies, tactics, and resources.

Although the above analysis is over-simplified and over-generalized, the basic premise deserves attention and consideration. How insightful are we ragarding our own concept of such aspects of values? How perceptive are we about the relationship of such commitments to our own educational functioning? How consistent and coherent is our commitment to one position or another or how rigid and inflexible? Do we hold some beliefs as fixed and unchanging while others are transient and dynamic? Are some of our beliefs to be applied to all while others are relative and applicable to some and not others? Is consistency essential or is awareness of inconsistency sufficient?

External/Internal Dichotomy. Another dimension of values might be described as the external/internal dichotomy. Do we tend to view values as always overt, easily observed, expressed largely in verbal form, almost external, outside ourselves, beliefs that can be directly and relatively easily modified through training, probably of a stimulus-response type? Do we view values then as a discrete entity, something separate from, outside of the other characteristics and dimensions of personality?

Or do we view values in an internalized existential sense, as beliefs and commitments that become a part of the person, of the total structure of the human being? Do we conceive of values as being frequently deep-seated, unacknowledged, even hidden, difficult to identify, let alone change, intricately related to various other aspects of the human psyche? Do we view values in terms of perceiving, behaving, becoming -- as an integral and constantly evolving part of human growth?

Although such a view is perhaps too polarized and extreme, let us accept it as a helpful framework within which to examine related questions. For by highlighting extreme positions we can explore the possible relationship between acceptance of a given orientation and consequent perception and action vis a vis various educational matters. Does acceptance of the first or "external" orientation lead to further beliefs: (a) that values can be dealt with impersonally through intellectual analysis of them unrelated to personal individual student value commitment; (b) that values can be changed by doing something to someone; (c) that acquisition and modification of values can be measured through the usual testing procedures -- quantitative and standardized? Is it likely that such an orientation is directly related to a relatively narrow concept of the purposes of education and to a generally behavioristic approach to process? Can such an orientation lead to attempted indoctrination or result in a clever con game played by students who readily see through our machinations and maneuverings and learn to beat the system in a variety of ways?

On the other hand, might acceptance of the second "internalized" existential orientation result in a different emphasis involving doing with, working with students at a personal, individualized level, including helping them to identify, assess, appraise, and analyze their own beliefs and values and the origins of them? Is this position related to a broader concept of purposes of education, including a commitment to the optimum development of each individual in all of his attributes? Does such a position result in a high degree of interaction between teacher and students as well as between students and students? Does it not view values education as a continuous, probing, interactive process focused on emerging self-knowledge? Would not such an orientation relate to a humanistic approach more genuinely educative, than that of indoctrination or training?

It may be worth noting that both views of values involve a directness of approach, but in different ways. In the more external -- behavioristic, if you will -- view there is direct attention to values as ideas and beliefs outside ourselves, even impersonal, to be analyzed, argued, dissected, it is true. In the more internalized orientation there is also direct effort but effort to help students identify, clarify, probe and analyze their own personal values and through direct personal involvement to relate these values to the broader context of values in others and in society as a whole, which are also examined in clarifying fashion.

It is perhaps this concern with self-examination and self-understanding that most clearly distinguishes the two orientations. For many, it is the unexamined, unacknowledged belief or value that is the potentially harmful or dangerous one, both for the individual and for society. This concern with examining and clarifying for oneself leads to another important question for educators -- what are our own values, as persons, as citizens, as professionals? I suggest that an understanding of them is essential to our effectiveness as educators.

What Are Our Own Values?

If, as educators, we are to be concerned with value clarification and development with our students, it is imperative that we have some understanding of our own values and the ways in which they get reflected in all aspects of the educational process. For example, what are our beliefs about ourselves as persons and as educators? What values do we have relative to society and the cultural milieu in which the school exists? How do we view our role as educators? Indeed, what values do we hold regarding the nature and purpose of education, the school as a social agency, the process of teaching? Whom do we value -- as colleagues, as clients, whether students or parents/public?

Values About Ourselves. Perhaps further exploration of these areas will help clarify their importance in the practice of education. Let us examine first of all the values we hold about ourselves as individuals and as educators -- whether teachers, counselors, administrators, or others. Without going into detail, it should be apparent that one's own self-concept, one's understanding of personal strengths and weaknesses, one's awareness of one's own attitudes, beliefs, biases and prejudices are revealed through our functioning as educators. Whether or not we are fully conscious of the fact, it is true that our performance as educators reflects and reveals much about our self-image and our value system. The extent to which we are aware of these attitudes and beliefs has much to do with the effectiveness of our functioning.

However, it is with one's values as a professional that I urge even greater concern. How do we view our role as teachers, for example? To what extent do we understand ourselves as role models for our students, models that are sometimes consciously accepted, emulated, ignored or rejected; or more often as models whose beliefs, attitudes and values are absorbed indirectly, subconsciously, almost by osmosis? How much do we really know about what is actually being "learned" by students through their prolonged exposure to our behavior?

What model is presented to them -- that of guide, counselor, friend, showman, martinet, director, authority figure, one who seems omniscient and omnipotent? The possibilities are many and readily recognized as we think about our educational performance and practices. The important point is that in our concern with the artifacts of education -- organizational patterns, content, processes, materials, etc. -- we should not overlook the powerful influence of the role model we present to our students and their parents and the public in general.

Views About Our Clients. As for these clients of ours, how do we view them? Whom do we value? How conscious are we of our attitudes toward various ability levels, diverse competencies and skills, wide ranges of environmental background, differing value systems of families and other groups? Do we favor one type over others? Do we value one kind of learning more than another? How extensive is our own acquaintance with various segments of our pluralistic society or how provincial is our experience? Do we tend to prefer to teach those already educated by home and community and well motivated for continuous learning or are we willing to undertake the difficult task of helping all move from illiteracy to literacy, from immaturity to maturity, with or without the help of various supportive agencies, persons, institutions, even our clients themselves?

Our Views of Society. Or let us look at our views of society in general -- the broad context of complex intricate relationships within which and for which the agency of the school exists. Do we tend to view society as highly competitive, even cut-throat, ambition-driven with selfish motives and goals or do we tend to see society as having a high degree of cooperation and trust, with limitless opportunity and some altruistic motivations?

Recognizing again the simplified nature of such contrasts and the existence of a wide range of views in between, one cannot overlook the relationship between one's general view of society and one's behavior as educators. Valuing the competitive emphasis over the cooperative can result in significantly different practices in our schools than would be the case were the reverse valuation to be the case. Similarly, do we tend to stress the bureaucratic, hierarchical, organizational aspects of society or do we try to highlight the opportunities for expression of individuality and a high degree of personal autonomy along with the potential for independent action?

Again in relation to schooling do we tend to view society as "life out there," as something future-oriented and adult-centered or as the present environment in which our students are growing -- both the relatively limited environment of their own experience and the broader social environment that so profoundly affects them as they grow into adulthood? One's values along these lines, too, have much to do with one's attitudes and practices relative to education. Do we argue that something must be learned because it will be "needed" at some future date? Or do we try to relate content to the here and now, in individual and societal terms? Do we postpone consideration of the complexities, conflicts, and controversies of our society until students "are old enough to understand them" in some indefinite future or do we try to help children and youth cope with the manifestations of such problems in their current lives at whatever level of comprehension of which they are capable?

Our Views of Our Profession. Even more deserving of serious analysis and study are our attitudes toward ourselves as educators and toward the educational process and schools themselves. For example, do we have a high degree of self-respect as professional educators, do we value our careers, do we take pride in our work, do we view it as a worthy contribution to society? Or do we tend to denigrate education, to see it as the least of several evils in terms of careers, perhaps as a way station on the road to other destinations, to compare it disadvantageously to more "glamorous" careers in medicine, law, engineering, government?

As educators do we believe that we have learned everything once we have been awarded our degree(s) or do we see the need for continuous study, growth, and development in an effort to keep up-to-date with theory, research, experimentation? Do we resist faculty meetings, conferences, and workshops designed to deal with substantive educational matters or are we curious and inquiring, alert to new developments and willing to examine, analyze, and test?

In fact, how do we view the educational field itself -- as a dynamic, controversial, ever-changing, interpersonal enterprise or as a relatively safe, static, secure, unchanging field in which content, processes, and purposes can remain the same over long periods of time, if not throughout one's career span? How do we view the school itself -- as a place or an agency, a building or an environment, a dynamic setting for interaction with ideas and people or a sterile alignment of cells, isolating faculty and students from themselves and each other?

What do we value in the process of education? Do we attach priority, undue emphasis to the symbols of achievement -- marks and norms and promotion or to the process of learning and the varied evidences of it? Do we favor standardization, homogenization, the molding of all in one image or do we value human variability, individuality, diversity? Are we concerned with diminishing, even eliminating differences among students -- in interests, skills, competencies, goals, etc. in our efforts to prod and pull them toward norms and standards and possibly eventual mediocrity? Or do we value the enhancement of differences, the encouragement of growth in individual potential, the challenge of excellence in its glorious multiplicity?

Indeed how do we view excellence? Do we perceive it in a limited sense of "academic" accomplishment as reflected in a focus on the fundamental skills and the accepted quadrivium of "respectable" courses in our typical curriculum? Do we value excellence only in the more professional fields of achievement through acquisition of degrees and certificates and in terms of financial reward? To use current educational terminology do we tend to favor excellence in the cognitive realm while neglecting its manifestation in the affective and psychomotor domains?

Or do we agree with John Gardner (1) that

> In the intellectual field along there are many kinds of excellence. There is the kind of intellectual activity that leads to a new theory, and the kind that leads to a new machine. There is the mind that finds its most effective expression in teaching and the mind that is most at home in research. There is the mind that works best in quantitative terms, and the mind that luxuriates in poetic imagery.
>
> And there is excellence in art, in music, in craftsmanship, in human relations, in technical work, in leadership, in parental responsibilities.
>
> Some kinds of excellence can be fostered by the education system, and others must be fostered outside the educational system. Some kinds -- e.g., managerial -- may lead to worldly success, and others -- e.g., compassion, may not.
>
> There are types of excellence that involve doing something well and types that involve being a certain kind of person. There are kinds of excellence so subjective that the world cannot even observe much less appraise them. Montaigne wrote, "It is not only for an exterior show or ostentation that our soul must play her part, but inwardly within ourselves, where no eyes shine but ours."
>
> A conception which embraces many kinds of excellence at many levels is the only one which fully accords with the richly varied potentialities of mankind; it is the only one which will permit high morale throughout the society.

What is our view of intelligence and its manifestation? Do we see it as readily recognized, easily measurable, relatively unchanging, of limited definition? Or are we willing to consider Bernard Iddings Bell's (2) concept of intelligence when he wrote

> The word intelligence comes from inter (between) and legare (to choose), and means ability to discriminate.

> It is the faculty by which one knows the beautiful from the ugly, the permanently valuable from the transient, the good from the bad, the better from the merely good. Intelligence is the power to survey things and one's relationship to things with objectives disinterestedness, undirected by prepossession or prejudice. By exercise of intelligence one learns to see things as they are rather than as for the moment they are esteemed to be by the crowds which shout mass-judgments at us.

I suggest that as educators our views of these many areas and aspects of education determine our fundamental approach to the educational process. Our beliefs, attitudes, and values determine whether we view education as something to be done _to_ people in certain limited ways with an emphasis on the artifacts or as a dynamic interactive process to be engaged in _by_ people, _with_ people and _for_ people -- students, faculties, and parents, perhaps a genuine _con_ducation.

How Are Our Values Reflected in Our Actions?

With what values _are_ we concerned? With what values should we be concerned? Do we place a high value on unquestioning obedience, conformity, competitiveness, information acquisition, testing procedures, grades and norms, _et.al_.? Or do we value highly decision-making, cooperation, self-direction, self-understanding, acceptance of responsibility, sharing and service, creativity, uniqueness, and the like?

Our priorities along these various lines are readily and overtly translated into our actions. A current and disturbing (to some) example of such a relationship between values and practices is the wide interest in behavior modification techniques. An undue concern with order and obedience in our classrooms and with student readiness to perform as teachers demand has led to controversial "experiments" with the use of drugs with hyperactive students in some classrooms. Aside from the many questions of propriety, ethics, human rights involved in such usage, are we not basically dealing with symptoms only when we resort to such temporary and dangerous methods of coping? Would we not better use our energies and money in probing the causes and the more complex aspects of individual human behavior, attempting to guide hyperactive and other children to positive fulfillment of potential and drawing upon many resources in our efforts -- psychologists, social workers, sociologists, internists, the clergy even?

How often do our priorities, our values result in ludicrous or misguided practices? One has only to reflect on the frequent attention to relatively superficial external values, many examples of which often find their way into the news media. A case in point is that of the five-year-old boy who was suspended from kindergarten in Houston because his hair was too long. (3) What does such an extreme concern with hair lengh in five-year-olds and strict dress codes at various ages reveal about our value priorities? In this particular case it is interesting to note that the boy's parents let his hair grow because of a misshaped head in order to protect him from embarrassment. The continued insistence of the school administration on conformity to the "standards" for appropriate hair length in spite of this factor says much about our misplaced emphasis and values as educators.

How congruent is our practice with our beliefs in other ways? Do we verbalize a commitment to critical thinking, self-direction, inquiry strategies, yet in our daily and weekly planning, tell students what to do, how to do it, and when to do it? Or do we provide opportunities for choice, for making decisions, for accepting responsibility and the consequences of one's decisions? Do we preach cooperation and effective human relations yet function in a highly competitive fashion, even authoritarian, with few opportunities for students to learn to live and work with others in their school environments? Do we advocate democracy yet function more in terms of authoritarianism?

In short, what kind of model do we provide as individuals and as institutions in terms of our actual behavior, performance, and practice -- not in terms of our verbalizing?

How Can We Cope With Conflicting Values?

The sharpest challenge to education lies in coping with the complex realm of conflicting values. To what extent do we acknowledge and understand the nature of such conflicts? Three kinds deserve our attention -- the generational conflict in values, the conflicts inherent in a pluralistic society, and the professional-lay conflicts relative to education.

The Generational Conflict. So much has been written and spoken about the value conflicts between generations that only an example or two need be cited. Perhaps the most wide noted characteristics of young people today are their cynicism, their disillusionment with and distrust of established institutions, their feelings of hopelessness. How to cope with, let alone counter, such attitudes is indeed a challenge. However, trying to understand various aspects of causes and sources is a start. For example, reflecting on the societal-environmental setting in which these young people grew up is helpful. As Tom Wicker reminds us, (4) "There are thousands of young voters today who have never known a President they did not hate or scorn or suspect, or a Government they believed they could trust, or an American of whose role in the world they thought they could be proud."

Similarly these young people have grown to maturity in a time of increased emphasis on consumerism, of the environmental movement, of growing awareness of potential health hazards everywhere, including our drinking water. Such developments and concerns result in a vastly different outlook than that of an older generation that did not face directly such threats and problems but tended to view much of life through relatively rose-colored glasses.

What are the implications of such differences for us as educators? How do we help students understand other eras in American history, other leaders, help them understand, if not accept, the idealism that has been a persistent part of American life? Do we not also have an obligation to help students confront directly the differing values of the generations in an effort to reduce conflict?

Conflicts of a Pluralistic Society. Then there are the many conflicts in values growing out of our society that is pluralistic in so many ways -- ethnically, religiously, economically, among others. How do we cope with problems of conflicting pressure groups? How do we provide opportunities for strengthening the self-respect of various groups, whether Chicano, Indian, women, or others? How quickly do we modify curricula and introduce new text materials to reflect our concern with pluralism?

Professional/Lay Conflicts. In another direction conflicts between professional educators and lay citizens exist and are too well known to document further. Developments of the past few years suggest that the role of lay persons in many, if not all, aspects of educational policy and practice will continue to grow. The ways in which professionals and public identify our differences, clarify confusion, and attempt constructive solutions will again reflect important beliefs about the relationship of school to society. Issues of this kind need to be studied in our school curricula by children and youth, not only as aspects of current life but also in order to educate future citizens and parents about the intricacies and complexities of the educational process. If there is an important neglected area in the curriculum of schools today it is that of education itself.

Deserving far more attention than it has yet received is the conflict in values within our profession itself. It is apparent that each person brings to his work as educator his own unique congeries of values derived from many sources, not least of all his college experience, especially that in teacher education. Attitudes toward one's role as teacher, toward one's students, toward the nature, purpose, and functioning of schools have become a profound part of one's being. These attitudes often differ markedly from one person to another, possibly also in broader terms of institutional, societal, and geographic background. Certainly it would be impossible to erase such differences and undesirable to attempt any homogeneity of value system for educators.

However, what would be desirable is an increased understanding of these value differences, greater clarification of the value framework out of which each of us functions, and perhaps even some effort at a greater degree of consistency in given schools and given situations. A continued lack of attention to the vastly differing views and priorities espoused by educators can only result in continued confusion for the students and the public. Certainly we should be more conscious of the differing orientations that professional personnel bring to their tasks --whether the extreme commitment to subject matters as absolutes and paramount or the priority given to student needs, interests, skills, and competencies, whether the advocacy of extreme specialization or the belief in a general education approach, whether the tendency to conform to tradition and the status quo or to jump on whatever bandwagon of innovation is passing in review.

The list is endless but deserving of serious study. There is an obvious need for more effective communication among teachers, administrators, guidance personnel, et.al. in order to understand each other's value system, professional orientation, attitudes and beliefs. For only through such understanding can we work toward greater coherence in the educational process and away from the highly fragmented, unconnected, even dysfunctional character of too many schools and systems.

What Can We Do?

Although a few suggestions have been scattered through the above discussion, I should like to conclude with some specific suggestions for action. Some relate to formal post-secondary preparation of educational personnel, whether at the undergraduate or graduate level. Others refer to in-service growth and development.

Formal Post-Secondary Preparation. There are some obvious areas of study relative to preparing personnel more effectively to understand the value component of education. In addition to the usual basic requirements in teacher education, surely, it is not too much to ask that all prospective teachers study the philosophical foundations of education and have some formal contact with the fields of human relations, group dynamics, and counseling techniques. In addition, I would urge some direct attention to processes of value clarification and to self analysis procedures. Whether the latter should take the form of some direct, though brief, therapy experience, as some would advocate, is debatable. However, some experience with encounter and consciousness-raising sessions would be desirable.

For graduate students preparing for more specialized roles, the above study and experiences should be provided if lacking at the undergraduate level and supplemented and extended when already provided for earlier. Observational student teaching and internship experiences should provide ample study of values teaching as well as intensive analysis of the relationship of educational practice to the values reflected.

At some point at every level of formal study -- undergraduate, master's and doctoral degree work -- provision should be made for all candidates regardless of area or level of specialization to share a common experience in a seminar or course that examines broad problems of educational practice and policy. The typical approach of relatively specialized degree programing -- of subject area, level, or role -- leaves much to be desired in its neglect of exposure to differing points of view, orientations, and values. Some kind of coordinating seminar for all candidates at each degree or certificate level would provide opportunity for interaction, challenge, and the probing of ideas and for developing much-needed insights into each other's thinking.

In-Service Growth and Development. In terms of one's professional work life there are many opportunities to deal with questions and issues posed above. Workshops, institutes, and conferences are frequently held and deserve to be more widely used for exploration of values and their relationship to practice. Also we need to re-examine the nature of our regular school meetings, faculty and departmental and others, and our use of meeting time. Instead of focusing on the immediate and often trivial matters frequently found on the agenda of such meetings, we should give priority to sessions in which values are shared, issues clarified, views communicated, questions raised, alternative solutions and actions probed and evaluated.

Obviously there must be willingness on the part of school personnel to engage in such continuous, comprehensive, and freqnently confrontation-type of scrutiny and analysis. It is all too apparent that such interest is not universal in our profession. Overcoming this lack is one of the most formidable tasks facing both professional educators and practitioners. For even more important than handling administrative and instructional paper work, however necessary it may be or developing sterile statements of philosophy for the inevitable accrediting agencies is the need for school faculties to spend time analyzing policy, practice, process, performance, and purpose in terms of the beliefs and value systems that these various aspects of education reflect.

Such rigorous analysis might do more to point toward ways of improving the educational process than any amount of money or any particular motivation, no matter how creative or worthwhile it might be. For unless money and ideas are used in a context of coherent understanding of the totality of the educational process and of the values out of which it functions, they can be little more than temporary, disconnected, and rootless efforts. As such they must inevitably fail of achieving long-term reformation, renaissance, or reconstruction of educational practice.

Documentations

1. John W. Gardner, Excellence, N.Y., Harper and Brothers, 1961, pp. 127-28, and 131.

2. Bernard Iddings Bell, "We Lack Leaders -- Is Education at Fault," The New York Times Magazine, January 18, 1948.

3. News item in the Los Angeles Times, March 6, 1974.

4. Column by Tom Wicker in The New York Times, November 5, 1974.

CHAPTER X

THE SYSTEMATIC TEACHING OF VALUES: A LOOK AT SOME PRESUPPOSITIONS

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The teaching of values represents one of the greatest challenges in education. It sounds the depths of the teacher's person, knowledge, understanding of values and skill as a facilitator of learning. It represents the most profound goal of learning for the student as a human being since value beliefs and actions are the stem of life, the basic outgrowth of personhood. Finally, because of the confusion of values in our ordinarily more slowly altering institutions, we find serious conflict in our society as well as in ourselves. In post-classical Greece, unprecedented cultural change and the consequent strain in individual lives prompted Socrates to raise the challenge, can virtue (read values) be taught in an explicit way? His answer was a tentative yes. And so it remains today: a challenge we pursue in the spirit of hope.

Values, as most perceive them today, represent founded beliefs about what we ought to do, that eventuate in concrete action. The emphasis upon action represents the commonality of understanding of all who work seriously with values in the context of education. For some, such as Lawrence Kohlberg, action follows necessarily from value belief. For others, such as R. S. Peters, "rational passion" (a learned desire to pursue a course in life congruent with belief) must be developed along with value beliefs, to bring about right action. For still others, as evidenced in the writing of Louis Raths, the meaning of value lies in consequent action upon belief. The act of valuing, then, finds its necessary terminus in action.

The reference of values to action in human life, through belief and knowledge, is what Socrates meant by "virtue." Thus, action is the crux of values teaching as the challenge to education. It is, I am convinced, what teachers mean, too. But there are as deep differences among the modern advocates of the teaching of values as there are among teachers with respect to the relative force of value content, knowledge, articulation, affect and the strategies of teaching to productive effect in the lives of students. On the last point, strategies, the deepest and probably the cumulative perplexity lies for teachers, and it determines whether and what they will commit themselves to in the systematic teaching of values.

Before confronting what I estimate the perplexities, and even objections, of teachers are when confronted by the challenge to teach values systematically, I should like to expose a few of my own presuppositions concerning the strategies of value teaching. Fundamentally, I discover that I am governed in my thinking by the genetic actualities of learning that Alfred North Whitehead articulated.

With his concern for students' real lives and the utility of learning, he distinguished among the natural progression of the romanticism of young children, to the precision of early adolescents, and finally to the generalization of later adolescents. In general, the rhythmic sequence, not exclusive at any stage, is from an enthusiastic, uncritical, ingathering of facts, ideas and beliefs; to broader concepts with a concern for their practical implications and logical relationships; to consideration of their significance in the broadest terms for their lives, a point where generalized, vital knowledge has bearing on their intellectual, aesthetic and moral lives. I see a strong parallel between Whitehead's rhythms and the position of the three advocates of values teaching strategies noted above: romanticism to Raths', precision to Kohlberg, and generalization to Peters.

With my principal presuppositions stated, I wish to raise a note of caution and one further explanation concerning them. My presuppositions are just what they are logically taken to be: starting points in a limited exposition which will not be justified or defended further in this paper, though I am committed to more ultimate assumptions. What this entails is that I am not making the further assumption in this exposition that Raths is somehow simplistic in his approach while Peters is sophisticated in his; both, along with Kohlberg, are complex inquirers into the strategies of values teaching. What I am saying is that there are, at close focus, cycles within the larger rhythms of learning that could, in turn, be styled romantic, precise and general; and that further, again with Whitehead, the rhythm of generalization leads to still other more elaborate cycles of romanticism and so forth in adulthood. Aside from the applicability of the strategies of Raths, Kohlberg and Peters to ages to students, in schools there is an inferred progression for teachers' understanding and utilization of values teaching strategies when they are unfamiliar with it. The sequence of reading, instruction and experimentation by teachers with values teaching, which I recommend, proceeds from Raths' to Kohlberg's to Peters'.

So much now for presuppositions. Let us examine the objections, apprehensions, and possibilities of teachers when confronted by the challenge of the systematic teaching of values.

Perhaps the most zestful challenge that a protagonist of the systematic teaching of values has posed, is that of subtle resistance to the entire notion that values can be taught. It rises from a number of perceptions concerning value teaching, long at the core of inquiries from Socrates' day to our own. "I have not right or responsibility to teacher values; that is the job of the family, and of the church or synagogue" is the central reaction of some preparing to teach. We'll call this the *non-interventionist* attitude.

Another response arises out of ideals, embraced steadfastly from the romantic and existential literature on education that has an avid readership among undergraduate candidates for teaching. The ideals sought involve a warm, open relationship to children to facilitate learnings pupils desire to pursue out of their own curiosity and creativity in exploring their world. Aside from a gentle nudging to develop the fundamental skills, the *personalist* teacher is solicitous to safeguard the child from routinization, authoritarian demands and indoctrination whether personal or institutional. There is a positive self-concept to be lost if reinforcement is aversive; there are subcultural values that may be submerged by an insensitive teacher. If in the multiplicity of value systems in our culture, the child has already been imbued with certain norms and habits by home, church or ethnic group, so be it. Who is to say, given our cultural pluralism, such values are not the equivalent of the teacher's in some general way, and the superior, given the child's life situation. Authenticity of the person is striven for. The teacher will accept the child in nurturent wonderment if only their consciences may touch. In the end, every child has an integrity deserving respect and further development, not inference. The ideal I-Thou relationship is accepting, so long as the student's self-concept is enhanced through a genuine relationship.

The next attitude, the *cognitivist*, is more likely to be encountered in fairly experienced teachers of a highly cognitive and logical subject such as mathematics. Math instruction is perceived to lend little or no opportunity for the teaching of values. Certainly the enterprise is seen as forwarding intellectual goals, and as mathematical insight, careful attention to appropriate logics, and even rationality and accuracy. Students are motivated on the basis of aroused curiosity, possible utility in further studies and concern, and in a few instances the authentic essentially private, pleasure of harmonious on the operation and insights. However, such instrumental or consumatory values are principally viewed as motivation to learn mathematics, means to the end of mastery. The mathematics teacher perceives values, then, as restricted primarily to the cognitive.

A somewhat similar cognitivist outlook is discovered among science teachers with the added objective of pursuit of truth about the world as it is. Truth is established by scientific method about environmental facts and laws, not about persons. Perhaps there is an added exhortation to use science in the service of mankind, to advance the progress of civilization. Nonetheless, the truth is held to be objective and not man-made; about things and not society. Science speaks about the world, not in total abstraction from it as does mathematics despite the latter's applications. The science fields are thus intellectual or cognitive at core, leaving the usual teacher no opportunity or justification to pursue value teaching. Values are better left to others who teach "soft" (a pejorative) subjects -- an attitude which is a disvalue in itself.

Among the most experienced teachers is to be found the teacher who is sure of his values, verbalizes them occasionally as norms for his students, and maintains that they are basically caught, not taught. Values are taken to be the obvious standards of solid thoughtful people of which he considers himself one. Common sense combined with forthrightness will do; teachers and schools make an impact in a straight-forward, though mostly indirect way to his mind. Reference to moral behavior is appropriate at times, but for the most part, students model themselves on significant persons like teachers quite unselfconsciously. This is about all that teachers and schools can or need do, so the conventionalist maintains.

Such seems to be the range of attitudes and strategies of those who are opposed to, or reticent about, the systematic teaching of values. The span runs from opposition to systematic values teaching because the school cannot claim justification to do so on non-interventionist or personalist grounds, to reticence because values in the comprehensive sense are not the chief responsibility of the teacher whose goals are construed to be cognitive or because values are transmitted unselfconsciously through modeling and institutional press. The span of attitudes appears to have a correlated run from teaching candidates to the experienced older teachers. On reflection, then foregoing attitudes do not seem to be exclusive of one another, but rather to be predominant in certain persons or subject fields probably somewhat more typical of secondary teachers than elementary. But they are not universal.

A new breed of teachers, seared by the moral social conflicts of the past decade, have joined the profession. They have experienced these conflicts in their lives and are seeking to work their way through [illegible] existentially and to help their students do likewise. For the most part, these teachers have been influenced by the ferment in the humanities and the social sciences and some have made note of the efforts of Raths, Harmin, Kirschenbaum, Simon, Kohlberg, Newman, Oliver, and others. They wish to confront values teaching directly, comprehensively and sustainedly, convicted of the significance of the values dimension of society, schools and developing persons. Emphasizing almost exclusively cognitive objectives and techniques is insufficient; the effective and values realms cannot be avoided. Persons and society are numb to humane values since the rational is overstressed in the political, economic, and business worlds, and even the schools. The goal is to change the balance from the cognitive to the humane. Rational objectivity does not define the human person; rather the emotional, affective, subjective, and personal do. Traditional teachers have truncated life within the schools; let a new breed restore its integrity and personhood through sensitive ways of teaching values by helping persons confront their internal conflicts, and to define themselves as centers of belief and action, say the new teachers.

Thus we have the list of attitudes complete: a spectrum of value avoidance to enthusiasm for value inquiry, albeit the latter may have deficiencies. Analysis and prescription are in order for holders of each of the five attitudes described. The analysis hinges upon the presuppositions or assumptions about the nature of values, their learning and especially the strategies for value teaching. No attitude is without presuppositions, some defensible and some not.

Presuppositions have a primary logical significance as starting points with respect to any inquiry, whether they be axioms in mathematics or fundamental beliefs in theology. They also represent the direction and extent deductive or inductive inferences will go in that inquiry. However, in the context of the systematic teaching of values, presuppositions have other normative functions to fulfill. They determine whether and how value inquiry and action will be approached as a part of teaching. For example, if only cognitive goals are taken to be the proper concern of the school -- a functioning presupposition of many teachers -- then values teaching has no place in instruction except incidentally, since instrumental norms are required for the orderly pursuit of knowledge. Even then instrumental norms do not have to be understood or accepted, only obeyed. Thus, any comprehensive teaching of values is ruled out of the school. In sum, strategies of values teaching are pursued, modified, or avoided altogether, depending upon the explicit or implicit presuppositions made concerning the nature of values, including the strategies of teaching them.

Now let us reconsider the general attitudes toward the teaching of values previously mentioned. We will examine certain leading assumptions and their implications.

The advocate of non-intervention of the school in values teaching views the home and church as the sole spheres of the development of values, primarily because values are construed as moral norms, which cannot be taught separately from religion. Hence the operating presuppositions are threefold: values are limited to moral principles; they are inextricably bound to religious life; the norm of separation of Church and State forbids the teaching of religion (though perhaps not about religion).

On the practical level, the advocate of non-involvement generally is implicitly making other assumptions. The business of efficient cognitive learning does not go forward without instrumental norms for student behavior. Knowledge is a means for citizen participation in society, government, and careers, the usual aims of schooling. There may even be an aesthetic pleasure in the pursuit of knowledge. What this does come down to, when pointed out to the advocate of non-intervention, is that he is actually willing to teach, probably unsystematically, instrumental values and certain aesthetic values under the labels of school rules, of preparation for citizenship, and of enjoyment of learning. He is presupposing, implicitly, that values denote only ends in human life, that moral values are not practical or instrumental, and that aesthetic values have no bearing upon religious commitment.

Though I am convinced by experience that exposing the presuppositions the advocate of non-intervention does in fact make often becomes the impetus for deeper reflection upon values and values teaching, I wish to point out three other of his presuppositions I endorse. One is that the individual rejects authoritarianism in his value teaching, by not infringing upon students' values with respect to acknowledged end values. Another assumption is that teachers in public schools do not have the right to denigrate or disestablish the familial and religious values of students. He makes as assumption of open-endedness about value inquiry in practice, if not in explicit terms. This is a presupposition which I believe ought to operate in the systematic teaching of values, especially as they relate to religion, morals and social issues.

The keynotes in teaching of the personalist are freedom, joy in learning, positive self-concept, authenticity, and the building of an I-Thou relationship with each student. These are values for which he strives with artlessness as a theme; he rejects the notion of a project of value teaching. Presuppositions concerning the nature of values include relativism -- no values are universal to time, place, or person -- as regards their content. Values are individually subjective, being validated in authentic choice; they are essentially private and are most likely to be in opposition to commonly held institutional values. Furthermore, values are to be chosen in freedom with the pupil growing in self-direction. Understanding one's self increases as one reflects upon choices. With respect to the teaching of values, the personalist assumes his role to be limited since he has only the right to evoke, through his personal encounters with students, the conditions for authenticity. Non-interference is his primary presupposition; he rejects "strategy" or "systematic" as personal or intellectual manipulations. Feelings of the student are to be directive in the self-development of values.

The personalist's approach, and it is one despite his probable denials, does have presuppositions both as to content, e.g., authenticity, and to the manner of teaching values. He is active in the teaching of values, contrary to disclaimers. However, limited presuppositions narrow the consideration to personal values, when social values require attention also. Objective and universal attributes of values are foreclosed without sufficient reason. Nonetheless, the personalist respects the freedom of the student and does quite correctly begin where the student feels and perceives he is, to build outward. Along with engagement and challenge for the student, these presuppositions represent defensible starting points for a system of teaching values, but are not, taken along, sufficiently comprehensive. As we shall see later, the Raths approach can be faulted for similar shortcomings.

The cognitivist teacher rejects the personalist themes though he acknowledges openly the scientific and civilizational values inherent in his discipline. He assumes the universal and objective status of the limited scope of values he teaches have a non-personal authority in social and consequently individual decision making. The validation of values, such as the directive force of analytic and scientific truths, is interpersonal and rooted in reality external to the human mind. The rational accommodation of man to the laws of the universe is presupposed to be the chief obligation of human beings, particularly in an ecologically precarious and energy short era. There is no meaning, other than the expression of feelings or the commending of courses of action, in personal or social value utterances. Against these presuppositions it is difficult to understand the directional value of science in a set of presuppositions that turns what is into what ought to be. Nevertheless, the maintained non-relevancy of values teaching is actually conditional: knowledge does have directive force, value, but only the kind of value base the proponent chooses to give it. The presupposing that at least a limited number of values are universal, objective and rationally established deserves consideration rather than rejection by the systematic teacher of values, as does the tandem relationship of intellectual achievement and moral progress. Kohlberg makes this assumption as we have seen.

The *conventionalist* is ambivalent concerning certain presuppositions. It is not clear whether he maintains that values are universal and objective, or culturally relative. The presupposition of his actual teaching points to the former since he maintains authoritatively that primary values are stable, e.g., that literature is an established good in human life and a measure of the quality of a culture. Subsidiary values are perceived to be fluctuating. He presupposes that values are validated in our individual and collective modes of intuitive knowing. Though subsidiary values may be relative, the authoritative traditions of scholarship and of literary-artistic pursuits are assumed. However, the *status quo* is open to elaboration and a sort of limited progress, he presupposes. Thus there is a dynamic dimension to the learning of values. He also assumes that he has the right to introduce a broad spectrum of values into his teaching and can do so in an authoritatively intellectual manner while literature and history provide emotional complementarity, by provoking insight and intuition. Thus, he presumes that intellectual, personal, social, religious, and aesthetic values are open to his and his students' exploration, despite the ofttimes foregone conclusions they must draw. The only values upon which the advocate of the status quo will explore but not press for commitment are religious values, since he assumes a conscientious freedom grown out of the conventional wisdom of public education. It is on limited presuppositions of conventionality, a certain ultimate possibility of students, and the dubious trust of intellectual intuition that this position may be faulted. The strength of the presuppositions for systematic teaching of values lies in the broad spectrum of values explored and in the attempt at their intellectual articulation.

The *new breed* of teacher has his greatest strength in encouraging students to experience the valuational process as thoroughly as possible. He presupposes that the maximum self-conscious involvement in valuing is the integrating motive and aim of education for the student. In a world of conflicting values, he assumes that all values are relative, subjective, and personal; he starts and expects students to end on these assumptions. Values are learned in the freedom from imposition of specific material beliefs of the teacher. Values originate internally to the person and reach outward to the worlds of others as the student matures his inquiry. The approach must involve the feeling of the student in two ways: that he feel good about himself and that he feel good in choosing and acting upon each of his values. Unlike the advocates of non-intervention of cognitivism, the new teacher will challenge end values; and he can do it without hesitation since he presupposes the personal relativity of values -- he makes no judgments except on his own values. Privacy of values is assumed along with freedom and relativity, thus openness is limited norm in the teaching strategy. The shortcomings of this position are the bias toward value subjectivity of the most used methods of values clarification and the avoidance of more powerful and incisive rational methods. The realms of knowledge are not sufficiently appreciated as sources for logically relating values and for supplying the crucial minor premises in valuation. The new teacher, though, on the basis of certain positive assumptions and commitments to systematic values teaching, represents the farthest advance into a learner centered strategy. He can only be faulted on his statements about growth for more growth. On this he must raise his perceptions and horizons.

As the foregoing examination of the presuppositions of five commonly held attitudes about values teaching shows, there has been some ambivalence in shifting between generalized positions and real persons who hold one or more of the attitudes. People, who have manifested these attitudes, have been encountered in educational philosophy courses and human relations workshops, both pre-service and in-service teachers. The attitudes were examined to uncover probable presuppositions as individuals verbalize their positions on values teaching and describe what they do in the area to understand at a deeper level what they are about. All of this is based upon the notion that clarity of intent will enhance practice as teachers reflect on their own work and as they explore possibilities with collaborators. Unless foundational beliefs are explicated, teaching strategies are likely to be deficient and the claim of students and society to sound values teaching probably cannot be fulfilled.

When fundamental beliefs of teachers are finally exposed, they should be scrutinized comprehensively with respect to the logic of values as well as to the learning and teaching of values. This is of considerable importance, though not always the most appropriate place to begin for a given teacher or group of teachers. Somehow the philosophy of values (axiology), as represented in Peters, has to be pondered critically to assure that values teaching is systematic in the broad sense, i.e., that values learning by students can eventually reach the upper limits of the affective domain. Generally, for those not conversant with values teaching, Raths, and his followers such as Harmin and Simon, is the best place to begin reading and discussion.

The Raths group, after straightforward explanations of values, gets into the strategies of "values clarification" very quickly, and so can the unconversant teacher. The strategies start from where the student perceives himself to be on a value challenge; moves toward clarification in response to the questions of the teacher, peers, or eventually himself; verbalizes his decision; and then acts upon it, presumably to higher levels of self-confidence and effectiveness as a person. The teacher is non-judgmental in the varied exercises; the student acts out his own conclusions, though he may claim privacy. Valuing originates intrapersonally and a sure outcome is feeling good about one's self. A positive creative note is struck throughout the learning situation whatever the exercise. Though the Raths approach can be faulted for its facile relativism, its incomplete exploration of the affective domain, and for its deficient axiological base, the approach has the strengths of getting into a difficult area of teaching with enthusiasm for teacher and student, and for its possibility for open, relevant engagement on a personal basis.

But there are deeper challenges in the systematic teaching of values. Kohlberg represents the next stage. His approach looks to a psychological and especially logical deepening of the learners' organization and characterization of values. He has divided moral thinking into three levels which have, he contends, clear psychological and axiological sequencing. These levels subdivide into empirically and rationally superable stages called "orientations"; they are the punishment and obedience, instrumental relativist, interpersonal concordance, law and order, social-contract legalistic, and universal ethical principle orientations. Each stage has its characteristic argumentational structure in moral reasoning; each one is an improvement motivationally and logically upon the preceding. The teacher who learns these structures insightfully and the methods of confronting students with dilemmas will advance along with students over the Raths possibilities. Chiefly, both he and his students will move toward precision and systematic values teaching. A caveat should be entered here: Kohlberg does restrict himself to moral values and needs supplementing in the areas of social and aesthetic values.

Beyond Kohlberg, a sound axiologist like R. S. Peters is recommended. It is my assumption that there is an ethical responsibility that is assumed in all teaching, and most especially upon the systematic teaching of values. For example, there are psychological theories and applications that cannot be entirely justified ethically -- operant conditioning in many of its assumptions and ramifications is probably one. Peters is capable of launching one into this critical area of reflection.

Finally, Peters' stress is upon language analysis; he can be the surest guide into the presuppositions made by the other two investigators mentioned. That is, Peters can be a source of critical inquiry for the teacher himself and, in turn, for penetrating students beyond what the questions raised by the methodologies of Raths and Kohlberg suggest.

To conclude, I have presented an expansion of the Whitehead parallel noted at the outset: for romance it is Raths; for precision, Kohlberg; and for generalization, Peters. Reading, discussing and relating all three sources should bring one to a surer understanding of systematic values teaching and a broadened set of practical approaches. I leave it to you to respond to the challenge of grasping still more firmly the nature of values and the assumptions concerning the strategies of the systematic teaching of values. The principal assumptions I have been making have been that it is necessary to avoid simplistic relativism as a working presupposition, to leave open the possibilities of functioning religious beliefs students possess, and to respect the freedom of students as broadly as possible. You can carry on the quest by ferreting out the other presuppositions I made in this exposition, particularly the ones that may constitute my "hidden curriculum."

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CHAPTER XI

MORALITY: A COURSE OF STUDY

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There is a new public consciousness regarding morality. It is once again intellectually respectable to speak of morality and even virtue as desirable outcomes of education. Until recently, the teaching of morality was conceived of as tantamount to indoctrination, an anathema to the political and intellectual freedom of the individual, and an undesirable interjection of subjective bias in the continued progress of objective science.

From time to time, the inherent moral structure of scholastic institutions and the moral teachings that inescapably occur therein were recognized but usually to assert the importance of not moralizing to the young. At the same time, the moralizing that went on, indeed, is going on in the schools was justified as the will of a democratic society reflected by its institutions. Thus, morality as a scholastic phenomenon was simultaneously condoned and condemned, but rarely examined as a viable school subject worthy of careful curriculum development and well-planned instructional processes.

The purpose of this paper is to deal with morality in educationally cogent ways. Basic to this undertaking is the belief that morality can be the subject of public school teaching without being transformed into indoctrination. This clearly must mean that the conclusions of studying morality must be in the hands of the students. It also means that the questions of "goodness" and "right acting" must be the central subject of study.

The sixties saw the dawning of a renewed interest in morality brought, rather obliquely, into the educational context under the guise of "Values Clarification." It is not easy to say what actually spurred this renewal. The challenges to traditional values were not merely numerous but part of the basic weave of that decade's history. There was the painful and increasing awareness that industrial progress was dictating rather than serving basic decisions regarding the quality of human life; there was the Kennedy-Johnson rhetoric of social justice and the grandeous though brief effort to improve the standards of living first of the Blacks, then of other minorities, and then of all the poor; there was the reality of public school desegregation; there was the guilt of the Viet Nam war; there was Vatican I and Vatican II. In sum, there was a confusing cross-section of values and countervalues building up into decisions which each one of us had to make personally. We tottered under the burden. Our educational background had prepared us to be objective observers, superficially knowledgeable, but relatively passive citizens, following moral paradigms we had never examined closely.

"Values Clarification," as developed by one of its foremost proponents, Louis Raths, (1) offered a way of meeting, scholastically, this very personally-felt need to decide what was really right, without, however, confronting the questions of "goodness" and "right acting." Its goal is to help young people develop their own coherent set of values. It is not concerned with the content of people's values but rather with the processes by which each individual can engage with reflectiveness and consistency in acts of valuing.

In "Values Clarification," the abstract concept of valuing is given practical form via seven processes in which individuals do, or, at least, ought to engage while valuing. These are: (a) prizing and cherishing, (b) publicly affirming one's values when appropriate, (c) knowing the alternatives and choosing from among them, (d) choosing with knowledge and consideration of the consequences, (e) choosing freely, (f) acting on the basis of one's values, (g) acting consistently (i.e., according to a pattern) with one's values. Instructionally, the seven processes are posed as personally-oriented questions which students are asked to turn to repeatedly as they consider a wide variety of events and issues: "Am I proud of what I believe?" "Have I taken a public stand?" "Have I considered the alternatives?" "Have I examined the consequences sufficiently?" "Have I made my choice without undue pressures or influence?" "Have I acted in a way reflecting my values?" "Have I continued to act in ways consistent with my values?" (2)

Pedagogically, the list is very useful. As an analysis of the behavioral processes which comprise valuing in a practical or "real world" sense, it is somewhat lacking. In its omissions, it makes the assumption that the values present in a situation are easily discernible and/or distinguishable from each other. (3) This is not the case. There is often present in a situation a mixing of values and a hiding of values behind confusing circumstances to such an extent that it is necessary to make a concerted effort to seek out the values. This process, which could be called a "values search," needs to be recognized, explicitly, as an important part of valuing.

Raths' list of processes presents another omission which tends to lead to still another unwarranted assumption that all values are of the same importance. As a category, prizing and cherishing could lead to the question of what is prized and cherished more. However, the relative importance of values is not and ought not be determined merely by the extent to which an individual cherishes something. The analyses of consequences would obviously be helpful in the determination of importance, but according to what criteria would such a determination take place? For instance, the world is confronted with a food shortage and the United States, which has a diminished supply of food, is faced with the decision of whether or not it ought to export significant quantities of foodstuffs that would give subsistance to many millions but would also increase the cost of food on its domestic market and thereby effectively lower the standard of living of its own poor. By what criteria will such a decision be made? In other words, developing criteria for determining the relative importance of values ought to be a process of valuing receiving significant consideration in any set of instructional methodologies geared toward value clarification.

Even with the addition of these two processes, i.e., values search and determining the relative importance of values, Raths' approach remains essentially amoral as well as asocial. Societal considerations are held in a peripheral position dependent for inclusion in the school program upon the personal interests and concerns of each student. In the words of Raths, Merrill and Simon: "The development of values is a personal and life-long process." (4) Anything prized by the individual may be the object of study though such study will lead only incidentally to the consideration of what makes a value decision a morally "good" one. Indeed, in its original form, the approach is not even directly concerned with the relative importance of values. The addition of this concern to the list of processes does not, however, assure that the set of criteria developed will be anything more than a set of personally-felt requirements; a consideration of societal needs and of the good of humankind may occur because of the innate humanness of the students; for that very same reason (but due to the egocentric characteristics of all men) such a consideration may occur too infrequently to achieve a behavioral pattern of thought.

The major pedagogical contribution of "Values Clarification" to the study of morality lies in its thrust toward the clarification of those values held by each student. Left in this state, it is also its major drawback. The student is encouraged to question alternatives, consequences and the consistency of actions with his values. These processes do help to achieve an accurate description of what is as perceived by personally-oriented, rational analysis. However, any active search on the part of students for more adequate or "better" sets of values is relegated to incidental activities that might occur when consequences and consistency are described. The stance of objective amorality embodied in the approach and combined with a totally personal orientation would appear to successfully control the indoctrination of values that has so often comprised the teaching of morality. It does so by purposefully avoiding the largely social and fundamentally moral questions of our times.

While Raths and his students were devising strategies to involve youngsters in acts of valuing, Lawrence Kohlberg of Harvard was developing his now well-known schema of "Levels and Stages in Moral Development," (5) which is a psychological analysis of six forms of thinking related to three levels of moral judgment. Unlike Raths' approach, it is directly concerned with the quality of people's moral and social activities, though it, too, has a fundamentally personal orientation and is little concerned with the actual content of such activities. Table I presents this schema of moral development in its totality.

Kohlberg suggests that the same sequence of stages in moral development exists in an invariant way in all cultures. (6) While the assertion is far from proven, having been only limitedly examined in a few divergent cultures, it does parallel the observations and conclusions of Piaget, (7) Bruner (8) and others which indicate that the child's intellectual development follows a universal sequence leading toward the acquisition of abstract thought. Given such a sequence, there would appear to be good reason to believe that the development of moral analysis, fundamentally an intellectual undertaking, might follow the universal pattern of intellectual development. However, Kohlberg's stages of moral thought extend beyond the age sequences observed in the acquisition of abstract intellectual powers well into mature adulthood. His studies have led him to believe that many individuals never reach stages 5 and 6. (9) This suggests that, at least in part, the stages do not describe a universal sequence programmed into the nature of man, but rather reflect a set of conclusions about the best ways of engaging in moral thought. These conclusions may have been reached independently by a number of societies and, as such, are extremely worthy of consideration as patterns of thought we would like our young to achieve. However, to say, as Kohlberg does, that there is, " . . . no Stage 6 without a previous Stage 5," (10) is to freeze our perception of moral behavior, among the most complex, multi-dimensional intellectual behaviors engaged in by mankind, into a simplistic linearity that is poorly sustained by our own cultural experience.

Kohlberg alludes to this complexity while discussing the uselessness of teaching a "bag of virtues." (11) He notes that cheating is an activity engaged in by almost everyone at one time or another, that cheating in one situation does not mean the same individual will cheat in another situation, that an individual's expressed moral posture toward honesty reveals little about how he will act in a cheating situation. (12) The results of one of Kohlberg's experiments confirms the non-linearity of moral thought. In this experiment, 75 per cent of the 6th grade

Table I. Levels and Stages in Moral Development

Levels	Basis of Moral Judgment	Stages of Development
I.	Moral value resides in external, quasi-physical happenings, in bad acts, or in quasi-physical needs rather than in persons and standards.	Stage 1: Obedience and punishment orientation. Egocentric deference to superior power or prestige, or a trouble-avoiding set. Objective responsibility.
		Stage 2: Naively egoistic orientation. Right action is that instrumentally satisfying the self's needs and occasionally others'. Awareness of relativism of value to each actor's needs and perspective. Naive egalitarianism and orientation to exchange and reciprocity.
II.	Moral value resides in performing good or right roles, in maintaining the conventional order and the expectancies of others.	Stage 3: Good-boy orientation. Orientation to approval and to pleasing and helping others. Conformity to stereotypical images of majority or natural role behavior, and judgment by intentions.
		Stage 4: Authority and social-order maintaining orientation. Orientation to "doing duty" and to showing respect for authority and maintaining the given social order for its own sake. Regard for earned expectations of others.
III.	Moral value resides in conformity by the self to shared or shareable standards, rights, or duties.	Stage 5: Contractual legalistic orientation. Recognition of an arbitrary element or starting point in rules or expectations for the sake of agreement. Duty defined in terms of contract, general avoidance of violation of the will or rights of others, and majority will and welfare.

Table I (continued)

Levels	Basis of Moral Judgment	Stages of Development
		Stage 6: Conscience or principle orientation. Orientation not only to actually ordained social rules but to principles of choice involving appeal to logical universality and consistency. Orientation to conscience as a directing agent and to mutual respect and trust.

youngsters who had not reached stage 5, according to the moral judgment interview, cheated while only 20 per cent of those who had reached stages 5 or 6, cheated. (13) While the differences between 75 per cent and 20 per cent is obviously significant, the fact that 20 per cent of those who had supposedly reached the highest levels of moral development did cheat is equally significant. Furthermore, if we hypothesize that the same individuals will not always cheat nor always be honest, the 20 per cent figure could probably be extended to include a far greater proportion of the population having reached the highest levels of moral development.

The point of this discussion is not to invalidate Kohlberg's schema, which offers six conceptions of thinking that could be very valuable in estimating moral development and in establishing teaching goals, but rather to place it in a balanced perspective with regard to how it may be used. In all probability, it is a culturally subjective tool which, especially in the last stages, takes a position about what is the best kind of moral thought. Nevertheless, if it gives us a "handle" on estimating a youngster's moral development, it is an extremely useful tool. If, on the other hand, it is to dictate the sequence of thought processes believed necessary in order for a youngster to achieve the principled level of moral judgment (stages 5 and 6), it could become a detrimental instrument by imposing a fixed linearity upon moral teaching.

It is more reasonable to believe (though this, too, remains to be proven) that various stages of moral thought may be engaged in by the same individual during the same situation. At this point, it is important to note that the first group of Kohlberg's stages comprise the only kinds of moral thought of which we are capable in the early years of childhood. What we learn of right and wrong is both unreasoned and powerfully developed at gut level. These "learnings" might be labelled, "value feelings." As we grow more mature and more capable of abstraction, our forms of moral analyses become more complex and liable to be in conflict with our earlier "value feelings." Nonetheless, we do not shuffle off these gut level ways of making moral judgment typifying early childhood; rather these would seem to exist simultaneously with the more reasoned levels in a state of continuous tension, resolved from time to time in acts of valuing that are not necessarily consistent with each other. It may be that circumstances of a situation recall more strongly than other situations our childhood modes of judgment and lead us to act at a level of judgment and in ways that we would not were the circumstances different. For example, if an individual is brought up in the Catholic Church and then, in later life, after reasoned evaluation of his religious position, determines to leave the church, he is still likely to feel certain obligations in a moral way when finding himself inside a church, such as bowing before the altar or praying even when his reason has told him it is meaningless.

Built into Kohlberg's schema, if used as an instructional vehicle, is the educational goal of achieving within each student the capacity of principled moral judgment. Awareness of the stages and their repeated use in the analysis of various events could help to build a highly moral way of thinking without dictating the moral conclusions of any single event. It gives the individual a qualitatively-oriented algorithm for determining the moral quality of his values and actions as well as indicating the intellectual directions that may be taken to achieve a more adequate or higher level of moral judgment.

While Raths' seven processes (expanded by this author to nine) suggest overt activities that can draw forth and make explicit what a youngster's values actually are in terms of expressed beliefs and behaviors, Kohlberg's schema leads to an introverted inspection of the quality of the moral judgment involved. The former is primarily descriptive, the latter primarily evaluative. Both emphasize the personal orientation, although Kohlberg includes at every stage social considerations (i.e., "deference to a superior power," "orientation to approval and to pleasing others," etc.) which bear implicit social references. Essentially, the two conceptions can be conceived of as complementary pedagogical tools that may be profitably brought together in the same instructional plan. Raths' approach offers the clarification of values, Kohlberg's the improvement in the quality of moral thought with regard to values.

Combining the two into one basic instructional methodology would necessarily limit the values and activities dealt with to those that may be considered as bearing moral implication, that is, as being right or wrong, or somewhere in between. In other words, a personal value such as, "I love this doll because her nose is broken," would have no real place in this combined approach for it has no moral implication of right and wrong (or, of good and bad). It would, furthermore, encourage students to question the quality of their moral judgment as reflected in the value decisions made and could thus help to achieve higher levels of moral thought. Figure 1 is a diagrammatic summary of the proposed instructional methodology.

The efforts of Kohlberg and Raths, both singly and as a combined pedagogical approach, are representative products of the educational reform movement of the sixties. Typically, they emphasized involvement in the processes of knowing and coming to know and tried to

FIGURE I. RATHS/KOHLBERG COMBINED PEDAGOGICAL APPROACH

Phase I:

Description of a moral valuing process and related actions.

Phase II:

Evaluation of the Moral Judgment contained in the description.


considering alternatives
prizing and cherishing
acting in a pattern consistent with values
values search
acting on the basis of values
choosing freely
considering consequences
taking a public stand
determining relative importance of values

What level(s) of moral judgment is reflected?

What stage(s) of moral thought are apparent?

(Note: a non-sequential order of the above processes is intended.)

reflect, via the processes, the nature of the content without, however, specifying what that content was to be. So long as the content was assumed to be a discipline such as mathematics or physics, the curricular ambiguity regarding content was a welcomed "opening up" of what had been rigidly structured sets of facts leading, primarily, toward passive memorization. However, as the reform movement reached the social studies, where the very vastness of the content areas had already created considerable curricular ambiguity, the tendency not to deal with what would be studied was taken to mean it did not matter what was studied so long as students were involved in the processes. The processes and accompanying instructional strategies were to be the content. "Values Clarification," which may be scholastically placed in the social studies, is an example of the willingness to deal with the processes involved in a concept and with the strategies for achieving student involvement while paying little heed to the range or depth of content to be dealt with.

Similarly, Kohlberg's schema is oriented toward an analysis of the thought processes involved in moral development but leaves guidelines concerning the nature, range and depth of the content about which moral judgments are made to conjecture. (14) Kohlberg does state that the only legitimate form of moral education in the public school is justice. (15) He universalizes the conception in the Platonic sense, but he does not come to grips with the "real world" areas of justice that might be treated in the classroom. In other words, justice about what? Moral thought about what?

Certainly, the willingness to let content develop from the experiences of students contributes importantly to the limiting of indoctrination, a tendency always present in the relationships of adults and children. However, both logic and experience tell us that what we choose to study and think about makes a vital difference with regard to how well we are able to deal with problems of our times as expressed in those experiences that are uniquely of our history. In more concrete terms, let us take an individual who is very creative with regard to the operations of an adding machine. Even though much of this creativity may transfer to his use of a computer, the diverse characteristics of the computer and the differences in its outputs will pose significant problems to him if his experiences have been limited to adding machines. It makes a difference what we deal with as we become competent in the processes of knowing and conceptualizing.

Given the broad, complex sweep of moral questions, it is not sufficient to deal with whatever comes to the minds of the students who happen to be in the class (or, for that matter, of the teachers who happen to be teaching). The Raths/Kohlberg format moves toward the achievement of a more rational, higher quality of moral thought and toward a clearer picture of the values held, but it does so at the individual level while leaving those questions of morality that are general to society waxing aimlessly in the background. The emphasis upon personal moral development, if taken too far, risks transforming all moral questions into affairs of mere personal judgment while allowing the activities of society and government to remain unexamined and unmeasured against a well-thought-out set of moral criteria. Indeed, the activities of government and/or society might prove immoral and unacceptable to the individual were his attention and efforts guided toward consideration of them.

In our society, where the participation of citizens is a necessary quality for the continued survival of a democratic form of government, it is vital that the young be asked to deal with morality and to develop moral positions at the broadly social/governmental level against which they may measure the quality of actions taken. It is also clearly important to the survival of a democratic society that this be done with a minimum of indoctrination.

That we have tended to avoid specifying the nature of the content to be dealt with in studying moral questions would seem to be an outgrowth of the persistent relatively in our life styles that has dominated this century. The rapidity of change and our increasing willingness to accept new modalities of living so as to assimilate the changes, the pervasive effort to achieve scientific objectivity with regard to the events of our times and the accompanying openness toward the revision of any belief in the light of new circumstances have all created a mind set of relativity, a feeling that there is neither good nor bad in human living but simply shifting circumstances and perspectives.

In the seventies, this stance has brought us to the brink of social indecision, rendering us less than capable of acting in constructive ways toward desired ends. While the struggle to gain control over a better quality of life goes on with increasing fervor, we continue to perceive of all values as relative. By not accepting certain ways of living as "better" (or, good), we are also rejecting mankind's ability to plan a better existence for mankind. How can we, as a society, work toward a better life, if "better" is only relative to circumstances and to the unique perspectives of every individual?

With regard to values, we seem to have misconstrued the concept of relativity on at least two counts. First, confronted with significant lacunas in our ability to determine "goodness" and "good acting" in a broadly social sense, we have made a logically indefensible leap that is tantamount to saying, "since we do not know all we need to know, and cannot, therefore, judge with certainty what is a better life for all, societal 'good' and our moral judgments concerning 'goodness' are relative." Obviously, there is a tremendous chasm between not being able to judge what is best because the criteria are lacking, and assuming that there is no best. It is the difference between continuing to search for basic principles of morality by which one may improve judgment, and giving up the search for such principles on the assumption that all ways of acting are equally good depending upon the perspective and the circumstances. This latter position would deny to mankind the ability to plan a truly better life.

Secondly, with relationship to morality, we have not made an adequate distinction regarding the comprehensiveness of values. There are values we hold which are comprehensive of only ourselves; they concern the relationship of self to self and of self to intimate life with others. Moving along on a continuum of comprehensiveness, there are values which are comprehensive of the relationship of the self with social groupings and with government. Still further on, there are values which are comprehensive of the relationship of the self, mankind, this planet and the universe. There are no sharp lines of demarcation distinguishing one state of comprehensiveness from the other but rather a continual overlapping and reaching outwardly. It is nonetheless possible to say that those values which comprehend primarily the self and its intimate relationships and which offer guidance toward "goodness" for personal ways of acting and believing that do not interfere with the ways of acting and believing of others are part of a personal morality that does, indeed, bear the mark of relativity. Though, for instance, each person's religious beliefs are held to be comprised of moral absolutes by him, it is reasonable for society to hold them to be relative to each individual. If, however, mankind is to work toward a better life for mankind, those values which bear generally upon society, government, this planet and the universe cannot be thought of as relative, even though their form of greatest goodness may not yet be known.

A course in morality must deal with the questions of relativity and comprehensiveness. It must further deal with the development of criteria to determine, both in the broadly social/governmental/universal sense and in the personal sense what "goodness" and "good acting" is for mankind. There needs to be a curricular plan which insures that this range of moral concern will be adequately confronted while indoctrination of the individual is held to a minimum. (16)

At this stage, it is important to point out that it is a viable and productive educational practice to have students engage in the development of an axiomatic system, i.e., a system that posits a set of absolutes not subject to proof but generally agreed upon. Such an activity would involve students in the processes of determining basic values. It must, however, also be noted that it is a frequent and often useful practice in modern mathematics to apply the concept of relativity even to axiomatic systems. This is done by not requiring that axioms correspond to intersubjectively understood phenomena of the real world. "Given such and such, then it follows . . . ." Theoretically, it does not matter what axioms have been given or how false they are agreed to be. What matters is that the given axioms are developed into theorems or propositions that are logically demonstrable in terms of the axioms. Axiomatic relativity in terms of human social values has already been discussed as an unproductive approach. It is the Euclidean approach to axioms that is being recommended here. The Euclidean model premises that axioms are not arbitrarily chosen but reflect common sense understandings of real world phenomena. Historically, some of these common sense understandings were found to be fallacious or inadequate. Nevertheless, the establishment of axioms was an effort to reflect irreducible (nonprovable) aspects of the real world. In other words, it is hoped that students would work toward a system of irreducible values.

Any conception of a non-relative morality implies an axiomatic system of moral values in the Euclidean sense, which is to be held basic to the achievement of greater "goodness" and a better way of life. This, however, does not mean that students would necessarily follow some predetermined mold for developing such a system. While this paper has suggested that there is an axiomatic system of morality (a set of absolute human values) to guide us toward the greater "good," it has also suggested that each individual is bearer (or ought to be) of a personally-oriented axiomatic system of moral values which is largely dependent upon his perceptions and experiences. It has further been suggested that the assumption of the existence of a set of non-relative moral values having general import to humanity does not mean that these basic values are fully known or understood. In other words, there is a true need for the active involvement of individuals in the clarification of basic moral values and the accompanying axiomatic system. There is also the need to relate, in effective ways, personally-oriented axiomatic systems of morality to the set of basic moral values necessary for the achievement of mankind's "good" and "good acting." Just as mathematicians modify their axiomatic systems when the operations derived from their systems prove fallacious or insufficient, so, too, is it necessary to examine continually the axiomatic systems of moral values operating at both the personal and general levels.

Since the students themselves would be expected to engage in the development of axiomatic systems of morality, there would necessarily be a period of data collection, which, to some extent, would be dependent upon individual experiences, and, to a much greater extent, upon observations and analyses of the broader relationships that human beings have to society and government, to this planet and the universe. Cases of the moral problems arising in each of these areas of human relationships would be explored and evaluated according to the previously outlined Raths/Kohlberg format, and would comprise the introductory sequence of the proposed course in morality. Figure 2 suggests the kinds of issues that might be specifically treated under each category. Certainly, other issues could be as valid. It is the range of moral issues that is being emphasized as well as the depth of treatment.

FIGURE 2. CURRICULAR PLAN FOR A COURSE IN MORAL STUDIES

Instructional Methodology: Moral Value Explorations via the Rath/Kohlberg Format

Questions of Moral Concern	Hypothetical Cases
Issues of Personal Concern	
1. When should I seek help? (When is it right for me to ask help from others?)	1a. I was ashamed to take up his time by asking him to explain again; I hate to be asked the same thing over and over again.
2. When should I give help? (When am I really being kind to others?)	2a. Though they needed the money very much, they refused to take any from me; I watched a woman in a supermarket buy lobster with food stamps.
3. What do I hope to achieve in ... (life), (this class), etc.? (Are some achievements better than others?)	3a. My applications to law school were all turned down; Having children may mean I will have to give up many of the comforts I have now.
4. How much should I expect to earn as a good living wage? (Is it right to expect to be paid more than others are paid?)	4a. All of my friends are earning more than I will even after I get my teaching certificate; Teaching gives you more security than many jobs.
5. Should it really make any difference how I dress? (Does dress carry moral implications?)	5a. They think I am a "hippie" because my hair is long; It shouldn't be anyone's business how I dress.
6. Is marriage really necessary? (Is marriage a moral issue?)	6a. Some of my friends are living together without getting married; Birth control has really reduced the number of illegitimate babies.

FIGURE 2 (Continued)

Issues of Broader Social and Governmental Concern

Moral Value Explorations via the Raths/Kohlberg Format

1. What are the obligations of voters in a democratic form of government? *(What are my obligations?)	1a. Only half of the eligible voters voted; Many voters don't know anything about candidates -- they just vote the straight party ticket.
2. What kinds of punishment should be used against criminal offenses? Is "punishment" an acceptable way of dealing with an offender? *(What would I want if I were the victim?)	2a. A mass murderer is on trial in Texas; Detroit has one of the highest mugging rates in the United States; A shoplifter receives two years in prison and Vice-President Agnew receives a commuted sentence.
3. What kinds of protection should a government offer its citizens? *(Should I be forced to use a seat belt, even if I don't wish to on the basis that it is protecting my life?)	3a. The obligatory seat belt interlock system may be repealed; Punishment for the use of marijuana can be one year in jail.
4. What kinds of non-governmental organizations should be allowed? *(Why is it illegal for me to join the Communist party?)	4a. Members of the Ku Klux Klan have often engaged in illegal, violent acts but there is no movement to make the Klan illegal; The FBI watches many student organizations like the Students for Democratic Action very closely.
5. When ought laws be disobeyed? *(If I believed the Viet Nam War was morally wrong and even illegal, should I allow myself to be drafted anyway?)	5a. Former President Nixon believes that Viet Nam Draft Dodgers should not be given amnesty; John Erlichman believes that "breaking and entering" is justified in the interest of national security;

FIGURE 2 (Continued)

Moral Value Explorations via the Raths/Kohlberg Format

Issues of Broader Social and Governmental Concern (continued)

	Nelson Rockefeller thinks former President Nixon has suffered enough and should not be prosecuted.
6. What is justice? *(How does justice operate in my life?)	6a. Some say that the impeachment proceedings against former President Nixon were unjust; Millions of middle-income citizens pay more taxes than many millionaires.

*Note: These personally-oriented subquestions are intended to help students examine the interaction of personal and broadly social values.

Issues of the Relationship of Mankind to the Planet and Universe

1. Assuming that human life would not be endangered, does mankind have any obligation to avoid polluting the world and the universe?	1a. The United States is considering "dumping" nuclear wastes into outer space.
2. Ought genetic manipulation of cellular life (including the creation of new kinds of cells) continue?	2a. A group of scientists recently gave up their genetic research because they could not predict the outcomes and were not certain whether they were capable of controlling whatever they produced.
3. Are other living species as important as mankind?	3a. Whales are on the verge of becoming extinct as a species and mankind is to blame.

FIGURE 2 (Continued)

Issues of the Relationship of Mankind to the Planet and Universe (continued)

4. If there is life on other planets which is inferior intellectually or technologically to us, should we try to use it for the benefit of mankind?	4a. Many scientists believe that there is probably some form of life similar to ours in the universe.
5. Should the resources of the world be divided evenly among all men?	5a. There is a serious threat of world wide famine with many millions expected to starve to death.
6. Should the seas' and all of earth's resources be controlled by an international code of law?	6a. Columbia and other South American nations claim a much larger area of the sea surrounding their borders as belonging to them than does the United States.

The curricular sequence following these exploratory (and data collecting) discussions would attempt to establish a general understanding of such concepts as "morality," "valuing," "axioms," "axiomatic system," "Euclidean axioms," "goodness," and "good acting." As opposed to the active input of students using themselves as primary resources in the Raths/Kohlberg format of moral values explorations, this sequence is perceived of as a period of intellectual absorption during which students would deal with a variety of documents concerning the problems of definition and of application contained in the set of concepts. The major objective of this phase would be an increased comprehension of established theoretical meanings and "real world" complications within a relatively brief scholastic period.

The third curricular phase would again involve students actively as primary resources. Beyond the planned curricular experiences developed in moral value explorations, students would be continuously encouraged to analyze the value models they have personally experienced in their home lives as well as vicariously through literature, T.V., art and the like. In the light of all their moral value explorations and with the increased conceptual understanding of axioms, axiomatic systems and good acting, students would be asked to establish a personally-oriented set of axiomatic morals by which, in their opinions, they could estimate the quality of their personal actions. They would be expected to specify, either by writing or by tape recording, the axioms of their personal systems and, where possible, to give some demonstration that they had tried to develop some reasonable correspondence between their axioms and the real requirements of human survival and/or essential characteristics of existence. In other words, students would be asked to develop a Euclidean system of personal morality.

Following this personally-oriented effort, there would be a teacher-led, group effort to achieve a general axiomatic system of basic moral values. The qualification of "teacher-led" is limited to the assurance that a moral system covering the range of human activities in a social, governmental and universal context will be developed. If, for example, students were to reduce their system to one basic axiom such as, "Do to others as you would have others do to you," or "Justice must be sought for all living things," it would be the teacher's function to press for the theorems of this basic axiom applicable in the following categories of human activities:

(a) in the relationships of people to social groupings,
(b) in the relationships of social groupings to each other,
(c) in the relationships of people to government and governmental institutions,

(d) in the relationships of social groupings to government and governmental institutions, and

(e) in the relationships of people to this planet, the solar system and the universe.

Since the moral value explorations of the Raths/Kohlberg format are organized somewhat along these lines, students could return to the cases of their earlier discussions and ask themselves how their basic axioms might apply. Of course the final statement of moral value would need to be sufficiently general so as to be inclusive of the activities usually contained within the category.

There would doubtless be some compromise among group members all of whom have already worked out a personally-oriented axiomatic system of moral values. This process of compromise is considered a necessary part of the experience of bringing the personal and the broadly human together in some viable way so that society can work rationally toward its own "good" as well as toward that of individuals and of the universe.

The last phase of this course in morality is planned as one of current event analysis and subsequent moral judgment. Students would be asked to describe value models that they perceive operating, without formal acknowledgement, in the world around them. Literature, T.V., etc. would be included as current event sources of such models. Examples of sources might include the well-acclaimed movie, The Sting, with its heroic depiction of "con" artists and the highly unpopular strike of NFL football players. After a careful description of the situation and of the values implied, students would apply their personally-oriented axiomatic systems as well as their general axiomatic system of basic moral values to ascertain the consistency of these current event value models with their own. If strict rationality is followed both at the personal level and at the broadly human level, it may well be that contradictory judgments will be the outcome. In other words, the heroes of The Sting may be judged as acting well from a personal perspective but not from a broadly human perspective, or vice versa. Students may feel the need to modify their systems to achieve greater consistency between the personal and the broadly human; they may come to believe that some aspects of their systems cannot be perfected until they have achieved greater knowledge and understanding of human activities; it is up to them. In any case they will neither be trapped by an over emphasis on moral relativity nor by the school's traditional tendency to indoctrinate morality while avoiding the more difficult moral questions of current events.

Though this curricular plan has been treated as a single course in morality, its outline could easily and profitably bridge several years of moral studies. If extended over this longer period, there would naturally be greater likelihood that the clarification of moral questions, the rational enalyses of current events in their moral consequences and possible alternatives, the involvement in developing basic moral values and the effort to act consistently with these values would become an intimate part of our way of living as individuals, as members of society, and as a species of the universe.

Documentations

1. Louis Raths, Harmin Merrill and Sidney Simon, _Values and Teaching_, Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1966.

2. This listing has been paraphrased from: Sidney Simon, Leland Howe and Howard Kirschenbaum, _Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies for Teachers and Students_, New York: Hart Publishing Company.

3. In a few of the instructional strategies suggested this objection is, to some extent, met. It is, however, left to instructional strategy rather than curricular planning.

4. _Op. cit._, Raths, Merrill, and Simon, p. 37.

5. Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Education in the Schools: A Developmental View," _School Review_, Spring, 1966, p. 7.

6. Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education or Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View," in _Moral Education: Five Lectures_, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 75.

7. Piaget, Jean, _The Language and Thought of the Child_, New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co.

8. Jerome S. Bruner, _The Process of Education_, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960.

9. _Op. cit._, Kohlberg, "Education for Justice," p. 75.

10. *Ibid*., p. 77.

11. *Ibid*., p. 11.

12. *Ibid*., p. 63.

13. For instance, Kohlberg's treatment of "cheating" as an immoral act does not actually make the case that "cheating" is immoral. It assumes that it is so and uses it to talk about immoral behavior. Thus, morality itself is not explored in depth.

14. *Op*. *cit*., Kohlberg, "Education for Justice," p. 67.

15. This author acknowledges that some limited forms of indoctrination are probably unavoidable given the dependency of the young on the more mature, and the nature of public institutions.

16. Shirley H. Engle, "Exploring the Meaning of Social Studies," *Social Education*, Vol. 35, No. 3, March, 1971, pp. 280-288 + p. 344.

CHAPTER XII

VALUE-TALK IN TEACHER EDUCATION

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There are those in teacher education whose primary involvement is with the precision of methods; and there are those whose major effort is to work at elucidating the relevance of various abstractions, value for example, which keep bobbing up in their minds. In an in-between state, there are those who avoid the pressure of immediate concrete problems by writing about Education in the year 2000. While we can wonder about the utility of such effort, we can indulge the genre by suggesting a mild analogy. The twentieth century can feel like a football game going into the final quarter. Who shall win -- Civilization or Disaster? Analogous to a brilliant forward-pass we can imagine the forces of Civilization executing a value-revolution similar to that which the Founding Fathers pulled off in the last quarter of the Eighteenth. It has been fashionable for some time to think in terms of "society's need" to reconstruct its values. This essay shall not recommend or clarify a comprehensive set of values needing reconstruction. Rather it is limited to one specific problem: How might value-talk function in teacher education?

"Value-talk" is a half-way sort of term: it denotes that which is mid-way between values-felt and value theory. I take the position that all three of these concepts should operate meaningfully in what I term the academic communications of teachers. Academic communication is that which is manifestly theoretical -- i.e., theoretical per se -- not theory as seen in concrete practice. Academic communication is foundational for all other professional performance. It is also a matrix in which a working knowledge of value theory can flourish.

When we know a value we know it in our thinking and feeling as some thing or some state of affairs having value or being of value. The object of valuing is that which is deemed worth wanting whether or not it is existing in actuality. More precisely, it is valuing that we know directly in our consciousness; when we communicate the valuing we know we do so, ordinarily, in terms of values, i.e., we abstract the experience in terms such as "achieving," "loving," "harmony," or to use an example of a more specific description, "discovering a new insight while rewriting an essay." Such abstraction is more convenient than to try to describe precisely the existential flow of valuings through our subjective minds. Thus values are the conceptualized objects of our valuings. The meaning carried by a particular value depends upon the particular circumstances. For example, the value of "freedom" has very clear meaning for a political prisoner; it is likely to be less clear for a teacher cogitating over the need for better classroom discipline or for a student feeling compulsive about pleasing his professor. When one reports values-felt such reporting is value-talk, the reporting of valuing-felt. Value-talk (or valuing-talk) is necessarily an approximation of values-felt. To conceptualize valuing is to take on a task of representation which is perhaps inherently the role of the artist. In a group situation the degree of approximation is likely to be even greater. For example, a study group inquiring into "the better social values" which schooling should reenforce is even further afield than in the approximation of any particular group member's valuing. To put it yet another way, "values-felt" (or valuing-felt) means the awareness of good which characterize the flow of consciousness. Value-talk is values-felt put into words. Such value-talk provides a primary source of data for the construction of value theory. But before value theory can be constructed, values-felt need be communicated. Intelligent consideration of valuing is of a level of abstract complexity distinct from feeling, but we hasten to say that one's "values-felt" (i.e., feelings) about intelligence are distinctly relevant.

Ordinarily, everyone has some trouble knowing how to express what he feels, and our language conventions complicate even dedicated desires to share values-felt. Also once feelings are even firmly known, there is the matter of what is politically wise or safe to express. If value theories are to reflect values-felt selection from among the latter is necessary. Which values-felt are worth communicating (i.e., being rendered into value-talk) is everyone's problem. Even our fantasy life can be relevant to our interest in reconstructing our social values. Intelligence is a function of taking into account all the values we know we hold and trying to reconcile the differences through creating new values which provide the best compromises among the older ones; the Hegelian doctrine of a conceptual synthesis is pertinent. However, this is not a matter of complex esoterics. Creation is not solely a function for a God setting forth to mastermind a seven-day work/rest schedule. Creation can describe the conceptualizing of values; this can be a matter of finding fresh expression for a good we have been long familiar with or for one which feels relatively new.

Any choice can be analyzed in terms of the values it implies. Making a choice necessarily means that values are involved. Some choices in the history of philosophy of education are worth reporting because they feel instructive with respect to our current bags of problems. For example, William James chose to believe that a particular definition of free will he came upon in his readings was valid for him. This reported event marks a watershed between his adolescent meanderings and his confident academic life which led him into not only his well-known pragmatism but also into the basic underpinnings for our contemporary twentieth-century phenomenology. Not every choice made by teachers can lead to theoretical or philosophic conviction, but surely some of them should or we can hardly believe that teachers deserve to be known as professionals. To know the values implied and/or those which were conceivably present when we make a particular choice (or after we have made one) requires expert introspection. Although the concept of introspection as a method for psychologists is currently out of fashion, introspection has been taught and needs to be taught, especially to teachers. William James has it that every science essentially rests on some form of introspection. Introspection is clearly implied in psycho-therapy, depth counseling, and the like and it must be encouraged as a vehicle for creative writing.

Introspection is the name we give for various forms of noting or reporting the on-flowing contents of our mind. The avid interest in electronic recorders is evidence of the high value which is widely felt for the situation of getting the words just as they come from the spontaneous reflections of the speakers. Watergate is just one manifestation of this interest.

What sorts of motive might cause students of education to want to learn productive habits of introspection? Just to agree that introspection is possible is no guarantee that teachers can learn something spproximating professional habits of introspection. To put the outpourings of one's mind on paper or on tape can be to collect conceptual garbage.

There is the possibility, however, that education students shall learn to value introspection as one possibly fruitful method for acquiring a body of professional theory -- so manifestly professional that it is not a mere formalizing of the common-sense of the culture. Teachers do learn much of what they take to be their professional theories didactically, i.e., through such as lectures and assigned readings; and the point here is not to impugn such general methods in themselves. We need, however, explore the possibility that some sound theoretical knowledge can be formulated by students of education as more-or-less direct issuings from their introspections on value. This can be called a form of the discovery method, but what we explore here can be more properly described as a combination of didactics and heuristics.

When we have had a hand in making something we identify more empathetically with it than with the thing we receive as products of others. We like the cookies we bake better than those we buy; and we are very likely to admire the theories we construct as better than those we passively receive. The "discovery method" is a misnomer; a better description is the "discovery through personal constructive inquiry method" because it puts more emphasis in the hard disciplined work involved than on the "happy a-ha" feeling of "I've got it!" All this is to assert that if teachers can construct their own value theories (and in time their own learning and teaching theories) this necessarily means they are in a position to feel, think and act more intelligently concerning anything relevant to such theories.

The society-at-large understands (and we say, somewhat illogically, "the culture understands") the role of the teacher in a no-nonsense manner. While students of education can have metaphysical reservations about the possibility of values being taught (directly or indirectly), "the culture" (i.e., the average common sense) contains no misgivings. "It" wants the right values taught in the most efficient and most economical manner. It is here where a point of strict theoretical precision is very pertinent because it hinges on the motives of education students. Not only can no value be directly transmitted from one mind to another; but neither, *in a direct transmissional sense* can anything be taught. The feelings and thoughts of any person with all their value content and overtones as they occur are the exclusively and directly known events which are solely the private possessions of the holder. My thought or feeling as I know it cannot be transmitted to you even though you may be talking with me face-to-face anymore than my feeling can remain in my own mind beyond the immediate present moment. Every feeling I have begins to perish as the succeeding thought or feeling arises. (For those readers desiring elaboration we can commend the writings of William James and Alfred North Whitehead.) What does happen when I believe I know your feeling or thought? The Jamesian solution is that with the primary functioning of my *efferent nervous apparatus* I conceptually construct your thought or feeling. This is distinctly contrary to the standard cultural account that I know your mind essentially through the sensations your behavior *sends*. The Jamesian account is that I know your mind essentially with the out-going constructions I make of your behavior. I do choose the conceptions which render the outward signs of your behavior intelligible to me.

Teacher education is a matter of persuading education students to persist in cultivating their theoretical identity -- to persist in feeling that the values they feel are worth being rendered into value-talk and that just possibly that some of their value-talk shall in time be useful in constructing value theory. Just to know that the standard cultural conceptions need academic interpretation, if not drastic revision, could help education students persist in the hope of fruitful introspection.

What values have functioned in the history of education? Three abstract descriptions of value have dominated the thought of Western Man: TRUTH, GOODNESS, and BEAUTY. Of these three, it is reasonably clear that formal schooling has concentrated on the first leaving the other two primarily to churches, courts of law, the dictates of fashion, and artists. We can make a good case for our culture being "really hooked" on the belief that THE TRUTH is really there (somewhere) existing in some vaguely apprehended monistic metaphysical state -- constituting, if we can indulge the metaphor, a cow so sacred that it would be presumptuous for ordinary folk (including teachers and education students) to inquire into the evidence. Since the advent of the Puritans in the New World, SCIENCE has increasingly become regarded as the primary vehicle towards TRUTH. Because of the force of this tradition, the gut-level feeling of most teachers is to serve TRUTH rather than WISDOM. Wisdom is an abstraction denoting good judgment and decision-making; it should not connote a quality of mind describing an elite minority. The maxim: "Thou shall know the TRUTH -- which shall make you free" has had far greater sentimental value than the more-prosaic injunction: "Improve your judgment-making functions -- your methods for deciding." We can only speculate on how the history of education might have differed were Plato to have formulated CHOICE as an Absolute having equal parity with TRUTH. What can be argued very forcefully is that there has been at all levels of schooling a horrendous imbalance on education for facts (sort of baby-steps toward TRUTH) instead of education for valuing. Hopefully, there is a point of view on valuing in teacher education which shall legitimately employ the metaphor of giant steps towards JUDGMENT as a primary societal value for schools.

At one level, education students as well as a large segment of society-at-large are highly prone to value-talk. It is difficult to discuss theories of education without bombardments of pronouncements on what schools "ought" to be doing. Thus, value-talk is abundant as raw material for value theory. But such raw value-talk has to be refined and examined if it is to become a basis of theory.

All three aspects of value: values-felt, value-talk, and value theory are relevant in all phases of teacher education. This essay is manifestly value theory in that it attempts meaningful generalizings on value. In the foundational aspects of teacher education (ordinarily found in courses described as social or psychological foundations . . .) value theory is unavoidable. Value theory, as we have stated above, can be presented didactically, e.g., through lectures and assigned readings. An alternative process would be to use foundational courses as laboratories for constructing value theory employing the value-talk of students based on their values-felt. It is possible that the value theories formulated by even neophyte students shall prove to be as comparably valid as those formulated by seasoned educational theorists. Whatever the judgment of validity such writings when issuing straightforwardly out of "socialized value-talk" are apt to have humanistic value, a quality which is often lacking in formalized value treatises.

Much significant value theory has been written directly out of the deeply felt concerns of writers without explicit reference to formal doctrines of sociology or psychology. Pestalozzi's Evening Hour of the Hermit is a noteworthy example. There is no logical reason why the valuings-felt and the value-talk of our contemporary students should issue into any less significant value theory.

The social climate of the foundational course can make a difference in the quality of the various introspective efforts and the cooperative efforts in relating value-talk to projected value theory. When the foundations classroom feels like an intellectual democracy this could mean less reserve in communicating "just what one feels." Communication in candor, however, requires the understanding that the appraisal of academic performance (the course-grade) is not contingent on which value theories one holds but rather on quality and persistence in effort in putting values-felt into words and in making intelligent use of one's own data of value-talk.

The academic guidance which the education professor provides relevant to fruitful introspection can also make a qualitative difference. Students are likely to feel that the candid reporting of one's feelings is a matter primarily for the shrink -- not having relevance for the up-grading of one's academic efforts on value. They are likely to be suspicious -- even frightened -- by the invitation to assemble their personal data on values-felt. The concept of the ideal report of values-felt can become a psychological deterrent. The very concept of collecting one's personal "psychological data" is likely to be guiltily confused with an unexpressed felt-duty to first master the writings of eminent psychologists such as Freud, Skinner, Maslow and Hull before presuming to be "one's own psychologist," i.e., one who introspects his values-felt.

Ideally, discussion in a permissive social climate should be characterized by felicitous communication premised on the legitimacy and high significance of values-felt and ordered by desires to use one's value-talk in the construction of value theory. The reality is ordinarily markedly different. The discussions of teachers and would-be teachers (and their administrators) are characteristically methods-centered. Rather than discussing the "what of education" (i.e., the values to be served) they prefer to discuss "the how" (even when manifestly unclear on "the what"). A derivation of methods-talk is the making of moralistic pronouncements against corrupt teacher practices -- e.g., featherbedding (with, of course, the unspoken reservation of "present company excepted"). Various forms of "rapping" can dominate unstructured educational discussion: "American schools are inherently corrupt" (often more so if the speaker is European); "universities foster alienation of students"; or "minority groups (women or blacks) are getting unfair shakes." "Rapping" can also take the form of complaining that a very course dedicated to laboratory study of value theory does not present sufficient structured content worthy of memorizing. The anomaly is that while we dread the challenge of academic freedom we have come to enjoy our dependence on didactic hand-outs; we have a love-hate relationship with the Establishment of Academe. Because of these tendencies, if teacher education is to focus on construction of value theory using students' personal data, a structure of discipline is imperative.

It is very American to take on the value of disciplining one's efforts in trying to order one's valuings-felt by writing about them. The evidence for this is the journals of Emerson. However, this would mean a drastic shift in orientation for the student who has been indoctrinated in the belief that the only worthy objects for academic writing are the tested conclusions of hard natural science. When the student's modest beginnings are unequivocally accepted as worthy human data he is likely to feel ready to make the transition. Even a hard disposition to rap at "them who are the cause of it all" is susceptible to being sublimated into the desire to take on the role of objective scientist noting the evidence directly present in introspection. Small group discussion can, instead of indulging rapping, encourage the sharing of accounts of introspective efforts. The "natural" tendency to argue education can be sublimated into the desire to know in depth how others feel about it. In such a context the rudiments of philosophical dialogue can be introduced. Plato's Republic has the potential utility of making clear that Thrasymachus (the chap who wanted indoctrinated answers) has many a modern counterpart.

A "new" student of education is apt to be up-tight about the adequacy of his methods and consequently he is likely to want to escape from value theorizing into practical methods talk -- even in foundational study. Conceivably, he can be persuaded of the pertinency of Dewey's maxim: "there is nothing more practical than a good theory" especially if he has had a hand in formulating it. The discipline required in formulating one's own theories should serve to increase one's confidence in confronting the value-issues in the society and (especially the educational controversies within Academe itself).

An education student needs to feel that he can be his own psychologist in introspecting one's values-felt. (This is William James' conception of being a psychologist -- one who reports the functioning of consciousness.) Ordinarily, one needs extended and repeated critical reactions of a friendly supportive sort to what one writes. Such writing should not be confused with mini-term papers based on library sources. The appropriate end is to sensitize oneself to one's developing potential as a value theorist. When one has a fair collection of more-or-less pure personal value-talk (recorded in writing) the transition from "I have held these values" to "Shouldn't everyong?" is inevitable. Here it is even more important that student effort be conditioned by frequent friendly critiquing. Hopefully, the education professor shall not be just another academic taskmaster indulging his status of rank. He needs to value his (or her) role as a party to a humanistic dialogue. His role is not to disprove and correct the modest theoretical ruminations of the student. I have heard it said that one should never try to disprove offered theories but to try improving them. The student who complains of paucity of experience on which to base his value-reporting need only be reminded that he has had at least sixteen years of schooling which have conditioned his values-felt.

How shall textual sources be used? In this context they ought not be treated as repositories of definitive value theory -- even considering that the temptation to so view the products of classical writers such as James and Dewey and worthy contemporaries shall be strong. Instead they should be viewed as laboratory reports in the on-going search for more relevant value theory. The better writings are apt to be those which explicate the method leading to the theories rather than those which merely didactically adumbrate the theories, but we must avoid being dogmatic even about this distinction. Normally, a student is more ready for philosophical studies in value after trying first his own admittedly amateurish hand. He needs to be persuaded that the laboratory for value theory he belongs to in this actual foundational classroom is just as significant as the "intellectual laboratories" in which James and Dewey worked. These eminents are fellow workers in the vineyard -- not academic saints to revere.

The student needs special warning about the inherent discursiveness of educational writings. In his zeal for knowledge he looks for firm axioms and instead finds elaborate explanations. When the latter become incomprehensible, he is apt to suspect the inadequacy of his own logic rather than error in his readiness strategy or even syntactical confusion in the phrasing of the eminent writer. If we condition ourselves to write our own value theories we are apt to be avidly attentive to the efforts of eminent philosophers; we may even in time aspire to be professional philosophers ourselves even if our basic economic livelihood comes from teaching the fourth grade. To write value theory is one approach in philosophic inquiry. Plato predicted that societies would continue to be in grave trouble unless the governors become philosophers. Isn't it fair to think of teachers as governors? They are the legally constituted authorities in their classrooms.

In drawing to a close, I haven't said enough about choice. We can say that the student chooses both his value-reports and chooses his values theories, but it is likely that the really significant choice is more for persistent effort in uncovering the data of values-felt. The data, when clearly expressed shall normally imply some tentative formulations of value theory which more-or-less logically follows.

The value theory we have already implied is that the making of intellectual choices when formulating value theory shall have positive carry-over value in the actual activity of teaching. It seems reasonable to believe that an education student's having learned something of the discipline of writing his own value theory should feel comparably creative when relating to the customary *modus operandi* he'll find enshrined in the activities of hard-bitten practitioners. If there is to be a value revolution affecting the schools, hopefully a student who has had *value-based teacher education* shall play a positive role.

CHAPTER XIII

NATIONAL SECURITY VERSUS MATURE LOVE: A WAY OF LOOKING AT YOU, VALUES AND TEACHING

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I

Typically, educational articles begin with catchy quotes, poetic distillations, or intriguing bits of dialogue.

I have not done this. Purposefully. I have begun instead with an observation on the beginning of educational articles. My intent is neither to appear more (or less) clever than others, but rather to indicate early that this article will be a departure from usual form, attempting not so much to inform readers of what others have learned and experienced, but to allow them to develop their own personal observations; more specifically observations about some important elements involved in their own values and the teaching about valuing.

As a matter of fact, this article will not, in the conventional sense, be an article. I have designed it instead to be an experience, hopefully a unique experience, to assist the teacher-reader to explore his or her own perceptions about certain values, and equally, if not more, important, the implications of these perceptions as applied to teaching in the realm of values.

Because the following exploration will focus upon specific subject-matter in the area of values and because it will structure a specific approach to that content, it will require your pencil and paper commitment and cooperation as well as your intellectual commitment and cooperation if your experience is to be valid and productive. Therefore, before proceeding into the activity you will need to agree to do the following three things with me:

______1) to actively participate in the suggested sequence of activities, ALLOWING AND ENCOURAGE THE EXPERIENCE TO HAPPEN. At this point this means Do not look ahead, but take each phase in its turn.

______2) TO BE IN COMMUNION, to the greatest extent possible, WITH YOUR OWN THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS AS YOU UNDERGO THE EXPERIENCE.

______3) TO DESCRIBE YOUR THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS, as precisely as possible, in writing whenever the directions suggest you do so. (My own experience suggests you do this with a pencil, preferably one with an eraser. You may also wish to secure a piece of paper and use it because of space limitations for writing your responses in the text.)

If you now have your pencil, please indicate your willingness to accept the commitments above by placing a check-mark next to the number of each one you intend to follow in experiencing the activity. (Please take note of your thoughts and feelings as you make this decision.)

If you do not have a pencil in hand and have decided not to make these commitments, please ponder the following questions before you proceed to look ahead:

1. What happened to bring you to the conclusion not to participate?
2. What are some of the specific elements (thoughts and feelings) that supported your decision not to participate?
3. Was one of the elements you identified a fear of some kind? If so, how would you describe this fear (for example, a fear of the unknown, of failure, of trusting a stranger, etc.)? In what ways, if any, has this fear operated in your life before?
4. Was one of the elements you identified a prejudgment of the value of the experience? If so, what assumptions might this prejudgment have been based upon? In what ways, if any, have you prejudged possible experiences before? With what consequences?
5. What might be at least one value you hold (a belief about personal conduct or an ideal state of existence) that is consistent with your decision not to participate as invited? In what other ways have you used this value standard in making decisions about your behavior? With what consequences?
6. What might be one tentative conclusion or generalization you could make about this experience so far? In what ways might you use such a conclusion or generalization in the future?

If after pondering these questions you have changed your decision, welcome back! Please get your pencil and paper and begin by checking off the commitments above.

PLEASE PROCEED WITH THE NEXT ACTIVITY.

THE ULTIMATE VALUES OF AMERICANS

The Situation:

Below are statements of eighteen ultimate values (ideal states of existence worth striving for) listed in alphabetical order and containing an explanatory phrase within parentheses. These were presented [in 1968 by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC)] to a representative sample of Americans drawn from all strata of American society. Respondents were specifically asked to ". . . arrange them in order of their importance to YOU, as guiding principles in YOUR life." (1)

Directions: Please complete both steps below before turning the page.

Step One: In the column to the left of the value statements, rank-order each value listed in terms of how you would rank it in accordance with its importance to YOU as a guiding principle in YOUR life. Place a number 1 by the value you think is most important as a guiding principle for your life, a number 2 by the second most important, and so on through number 18, the least important value to you of these listed.

Step Two: In the column to the right of the value statements, rank-order each value listed in terms of how you would predict the average American in the study actually ranked them. Place a number 1 by the value you think the average American ranked as most important, a number 2 by the second most important, and so on through number 18, the least important value of those listed.

Step One: My Personal Ranking	Value Statement	Step Two: My Prediction of the Average American's Ranking
	A COMFORTABLE LIFE (a prosperous life)	
	AN EXCITING LIFE (a stimulating, active life)	
	A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT (lasting contribution)	
	A WORLD OF PEACE (free of war and conflict)	
	A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)	
	EQUALITY (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)	
	FAMILY SECURITY (taking care of loved ones)	
	FREEDOM (independence, free choice)	
	HAPPINESS (contentedness)	
	INNER HARMONY (freedom from inner conflict)	

______ MATURE LOVE (sexual and spiritual intimacy) ______
______ NATIONAL SECURITY (protection from attack) ______
______ PLEASURE (an enjoyable leisurely life) ______
______ SALVATION (saved, eternal life) ______
______ SELF-RESPECT (self-esteem) ______
______ SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, admiration) ______
______ TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close companionship) ______
______ WISDOM (a mature understanding of life) ______

II

Before proceeding to analyze and interpret your rankings and predictions take time to identify and write down some of the reactions you had and now have about doing the activity by briefly completing the three questions below. We will come back to these answers later.

1. Complete the following unfinished sentences:

    a) When I was asked to make the three commitments

    b) During the activity I

    c) My personal rankings of the values

    d) My predictions of the average American's rankings

    e) Some feelings I had while doing the activity were

    f) Some interesting thoughts I had were

    g) I was pleased by

    h) Now that I've completed the ranking activity

2. How satisfied are you [right now] about the way you have ranked the eighteen values in terms of their importance in your own life? (Circle one number below)

1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8 — 9 — 10 — 11

Extremely Satisfied		Extremely Dissatisfied

Please explain briefly why you circled the number you did.

3. How confident are you [right now] that you have accurately predicted the average American's ranking of the eighteen values? (Circle one number below)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Extremely Satisfied — Extremely Dissatisfied

Please explain briefly why you circled the number you did.

III

In order to analyze and interpret some of the important meaning of this experience for you take time now to write down briefly your responses to the following:

1. Write down one or two major results you find when you compare and contrast the data collected into Table I.

2. What are some of the important reactions (thoughts and feelings) you have about these results?

3. How do these thoughts and feelings compare and contrast with the specific reactions you identified earlier (in Section II of the article) before seeing Table I? What similarities and/or differences do you find? How might you explain them?

4. How satisfied are you right now about the way you have ranked the eighteen values in terms of their importance as guidelines in your life (circle one number below)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Extremely Satisfied — Extremely Dissatisfied

Explain briefly why you circled the number you did. Is this the same or different from the way you responded in Section II of the article? Why?

5. What are one or two useful conclusions or generalizations you would make about this total experience?

6. In what specific ways or situations might you apply or use these conclusions or generalizations in the future? What consequences might result from applying them?

Directions: Below in column 4 of Table I is listed the composite rank order of all Americans in the sample for the eighteen values. In order to more fully visualize and make comparisons, copy into column 3 below your personal rankings of the values from step one of the activity; copy into column 5 below your predictions of the average American's rankings from step two of the activity. To determine the degree of difference from the sample group do the following: (1) for each of the values place a number in column 2 which reflects the difference between your personal ranking (column 3) and the ranking of all Americans (column 4). For example, if you ranked A COMFORTABLE LIFE as 8, the difference is 2. Ignore the plus or minus nature of the number; for example, if you ranked A COMFORTABLE LIFE as 14, the difference is 4. (2) Use the same procedure as you did above to determine the difference between your predictions of the average American's ranking (column 5) and the actual rankings in the study (column 4) and put these numbers in column 6. (3) Add up all the numbers in column 2 for a total difference score related to your personal rankings. Add up all the numbers in column 6 for a total difference score related to your predictions. Column 7 showing the difference of rankings by sex in the sample is provided as additional information for you.

TABLE I

COMPOSITE RANK ORDERS OF EIGHTEEN TERMINAL VALUES FOR NATIONAL NORC SAMPLE TESTED IN 1968
(Reference: Rokeach, Milton. The Nature of Human Values. Free Press, 1973)

Column 1 Terminal Values	Column 2 Difference of Column 3 & 4	Column 3 My Personal Rankings	Column 4 Ranking of Americans in Sample	Column 5 My Predictions of Americans	Column 6 Difference of Column 4 & 5	Column 7 Rankings by Sex	
						Men	Women
A COMFORTABLE LIFE			10			4	13
AN EXCITING LIFE			18			18	18
A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT			9			7	10
A WORLD AT PEACE			1			1	1
A WORLD OF BEAUTY			15			15	15
EQUALITY			7			9	8
FAMILY SECURITY			2			2	2
FREEDOM			3			3	3
HAPPINESS			4			5	5
INNER HARMONY			13			13	12
MATURE LOVE			14			14	14
NATIONAL SECURITY			12			10	11
PLEASURE			17			17	16
SALVATION			8			12	4
SELF-RESPECT			5			6	6
SOCIAL RECOGNITION			16			16	17
TRUE FRIENDSHIP			11			11	9
WISDOM			6			8	7
Difference Score Add all figures in Column 2				Difference Score Add all figures in Column 6			

NOTE TO READER: You have now completed the activity portion of this article. What you have experienced as you ranked your own values of sample Americans, and analyzed and interpreted both your values and the process of valuing has hopefully evoked a few (possibly many) applications for you in your personal and professional life. If so, we have joined together in a win-win endeavor. I have not written in vain and you have not read in vain. Therefore, if you stop reading right now, assuming you have gained some insights, you will take away with you the "guts" or "meat" of the experience we have both engaged in and will have achieved the major outcomes I had hoped for.

Unfortunately, the media which has allowed us this opportunity to explore values, limits us to a one-way exchange. Nothing would afford me greater pleasure at this point than to sit down with you and mutually explore our feelings, insights, and suggestions about teaching. In lieu of that highly desirable state of affairs, I am offering, as an addendum, some of my personal thoughts, definitions, and feelings regarding values and the teaching of values as illustrated somewhat by the preceding activity. To this purpose, then, I have appended section IV should you elect to pursue it. Also, because I am so totally committed to mutual exchange as a means for human understanding and professional growth, I would feel greatly privileged if you as a reader chose to respond to me with whatever thoughts, feelings, and insights you gained from entering into this experience with me.

IV

The preceding activity illustrates, perhaps as best a written article can, the experiential approach to teaching (about values and most other things) that my students and I use to learn together. There are two interrelated aspects to this approach that are of special interest and I will discuss them here in relation to the activity you have just engaged in. These two aspects, although not separated in practice, are (1) the content or concept(s) being explored at a particular time, and (2) the process used to structure and direct the exploration. I've found that appropriate consideration of both aspects of this approach to teaching and learning is necessary for having meaningful experiences with my students.

The Content of the Experience

The content or concepts selected for the experience serve to direct attention or focus the exploration and provides one basis for active reflection on a specific and manageable amount of subject-matter. In the case of the activity just presented, the content selected was provided by the social research of Milton Rokeach, research which attempts, generally, to explain the nature of human values and, specifically, to identify some of the values Americans say they use to guide their life decisions. The content of the activity, then, is one important aspect of this approach and serves as one thing that my students and I talk about in analyzing and interpreting the meaning of a particular experience.

Regarding the importance of values as content, I think that most critical observers of the present social scene agree that we are presently in the midst of a value crisis. They point to increasing signs of personal alienation as evidence that individuals are experiencing a diminishing sense of what is really important to strive for or to become as persons. Thus, for me as a teacher, a consideration of values seems crucial to my understanding of social events and of individual behavior. In considering values I think it is essential to ponder such major questions as:

(1) What Are Values?

(2) What Role Do Values Play in the Lives of Individuals?

(3) Where Do Values Come From?

Milton Rokeach, in his study of human values, helped me to clarify by thinking about the first question when he defined a value as " . . . an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally and socially preferable to alternative [ones]." (1) A value, then, is a standard or a criterion that I use in making decisions about my life. When I internalize this criterion as part of my self-concept, I use the value (and I think others do too) in at least the following 4 ways: 1) to decide what behavior is most appropriate in a particular situation (for example: Is it more appropriate for me to finish this article today and feel a sense of accomplishment or to go and have a martini and watch a football game and feel the pleasure of a comfortable life?), (2) to develop and justify my attitudes towards specific objects and persons (for example: I think and have thought for a long time that owning a lot of things was not as important to me as spending my time and money enjoying and helping other people, therefore, I think I will keep my eight-year-old car longer and not follow the example of my neighbor who has the attitude that a person's success is judged by the kind of car he drives), (3) to compare and contrast myself with others which leads me to moral judgments about myself and others (for example: I think my neighbor is dead wrong for spending so much of the family's income on automobiles), (4) to provide guidance about influencing the values, attitudes, and actions of significant others in my life (for example: I would urge my loved ones to follow my example in placing family security ahead of social recognition and limiting the use of money for material things to only those things that are really needed for the kind of life we have agreed upon).

My values, although not the same thing as my behavior, are at the root of my actions, serving as the directive purposes for my decisions to strive for certain states of existence and/or to strive in certain ways. Personal values are not always specifically or overtly expressed by my students, hence, a growing concern by me and other educators for teaching and learning about valuing and for helping students and teachers clarify their own values. But clarified or not, values are nonetheless operative in the lives of individuals.

The above definition of a value implies two kinds of basic values or standards used by individuals. One is a terminal or ultimate value and takes the form: "I believe that, for me, such-and-such an end-state of existence (for example, personal salvation, a world at peace) is personally and socially worth striving for." (Terminal values served as the content for the activity presented in this article.) A second kind of value is instrumental in nature and takes the form: "I believe that, for me, such-and-such a mode of conduct or way of behaving (for example, being honest or acting courageously) is personally and socially preferable in all situations with respect to objects and persons." (A similar activity could be designed around Rokeach's eighteen instrumental values and used to illustrate that concept.)

Regarding where values come from, I believe I have come to hold my values primarily as a result of my experiences with family members, peers, teachers, and members of other social institutions like doctors, policemen, businessmen, etc. Whenever I perceive myself as a person through asking the question: "Who Am I?" I must necessarily answer it in the light of a second inquiry, "In Relation To What?" because I cannot really know myself in a social vacuum. Therefore, I view myself (as I think others do) in relation to social and psychological concepts about which I have gained some important generalizations through past experiences with others.

Building on the work of Dewey and Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg has suggested that a child, like you, me, and other adults, has certain ways of thinking about values and, thus, the proper way to view a child is as a "moral philosopher." (2) Through this process of "philosophizing" the child formulates moral ideas into organized patterns of thought. It becomes important then for we as teachers to do the same, i.e., to be conscious of our own values, the process we use in arriving at them, and the way these values influence our actions toward others. In addition, I think it important that we be aware of the value positions of others in the culture, like those in the Rokeach sample, who influence the child in the development of his values.

The Process of the Experience

If the results of Kohlberg's studies are correct, that is, that the child acts as a "moral philosopher," then it is necessary that you and I as educators understand and provide a compatible interactive process whereby that child can effectively arrive at his own value beliefs.

Such a process I believe is outlined in Diagram I entitled "An Experiential Approach to Teaching." This is essentially the process I used to structure the activity presented in this article and the one I predominantly use in my classroom. Although a complete explanation of the dynamics of this process is precluded here, a brief discussion of its phases might provide some clues for your use of it in teaching in your classroom.

This experiential process has four sequential phases. Phase I -- which I call the "What?" or activity phase -- involves engaging my students in an activity which is structured so that the student willingly commits himself to experience the selected content by actively participating in the exploration of the concept(s), and, ordinarily, this is done through interacting in some specified way with others as this exploration takes place. In section I of the activity in this article I asked you to commit yourself to actively participate according to the directions given, to tune in continuously to your reactions, and to verbalize those reactions in writing at appropriate times. Thus, I attempted to gain your commitment to experience the activity as it was

DIAGRAM I AN EXPERIENTIAL APPROACH TO TEACHING*

Dr. Gerald L. Moulton


PHASES
DYNAMIC SEQUENCE
I
"WHAT?"
(Activity)
SELECT CONCEPT
STRUCTURE AND DIRECT EXPERIENCING OF CONCEPT
II
"WHAT HAPPENED?"
(Awareness)
IS THE INDIVIDUAL AWARE OF THE EXPERIENCE?
NO EFFECT
YES
HELP SHARE PERCEPTIONS AND INCREASE TOTAL AWARENESS OF EVENT
HELP TO IDENTIFY SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE EXPERIENCE
III
"SO WHAT?"
(Analysis)
HELP TO IDENTIFY CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE WAYS TO APPLY ELEMENTS OF THE EXPERIENCE
CAN ANY OF THESE BE USED TO ENHANCE THE PERSON'S LIFE?
NO
CAN THEY BE USED IF CHANGED?
NO
FORGET IT!
YES
DESIGN NEW EVENT OR EXPERIENCE
YES
IV
"NOW WHAT?"
(Applications)
CAN HE USE THEM NOW?
NO
CAN HE USE IT LATER?
NO
YES
YES
HELP APPLY THROUGH CHANGED BEHAVIOR IN TERMS OF THE INSIGHTS GAINED
STORE IDEAS FOR FUTURE USE

*Developed in part from ideas suggested by Sue Cummings, Homer Baker and Terry Borton structured and to experience it and examine it in specified ways. For the teacher, phase I involves 1) selecting the content to be explored, and 2) structuring the exploration in a way that actively involves the student. There are a number of sources now where activities of this sort can be found and adapted to your particular situation. For example, in the area of valuing, the book by Sidney Simon, et.al., entitled Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies for Teachers contains seventy nine possible activities. 3) I am also preparing a book which will contain, in addition to some practical activities to use, a chapter on how to design such experiential activities for use with a variety of concepts.

Phase II -- the "What Happened?" or awareness phase -- involves my helping students become aware of the elements of the experience. These elements are the perceptions, thoughts, and feelings of the participants. My crucial role as a teacher in this phase is to facilitate the identifying, clarifying, and sharing of all of the important elements they may have experienced in participating in the structured activity. Guiding this interaction involves the effective use of questions designed to encourage students to allow their reactions to surface and be verbalized. I've found that three kinds of questions generally aid the interaction of this phase: 1) general open-ended questions (for example: "What happened as you did that?" or "What are your reactions at this point to what you did?" or "What else happened?") are likely to generate recall responses and do not intimate any kind of restriction on reporting personal reactions, 2) questions which focus on or ask for reactions about crucial points in the experience, especially those areas neglected in response to open-ended inquiry (for example, "What feelings did you have when you tried to do such-and-such?" -- many of my students are not accustomed to sharing feelings or considering them as relevant elements of an experience and I many times have to probe for these in the discussion to make the students aware of them), 3) questions which request clarification of what is reported and, thus, enhance the awareness of everyone about the meaning of a particular reaction (for example, I often promote clarification by using and encouraging paraphrasing, that is, restating a response in terms of what it meant to me and asking the student if that represents an accurate statement of the meaning he intended).

During this second phase, I try hard to remember the strong need of students for acceptance of what they report and the need to avoid making judgments or evaluations of their responses at this point. I often have to remind students (and myself) that the purpose of this phase is to collect data not to interpret it. The elements being reported are, after all, the "facts" of the experience, even though these "facts" may differ from one person to another. These differences of "fact" in themselves often serve as fruitful avenues to reaching important conclusions about the concept being explored. Section II of this article contains some examples of the kind of questions I would use to enhance awareness although the format here differs from what would ordinarily be used in a two-way discussion.

Phase III -- the "So What?" or analysis phase -- is essentially a period of analysis and interpretation, i.e., a search for the real meaning of the experience for each of us. We try to focus the discussion on both the content and the process of the experience and eventually arrive at some important conclusions or generalizations about this experience that has relevance for us in enhancing our lives in the future.

In facilitating the interaction of Phase III, I attempt, as I did in section III of this article, to use several basic types of inquiry questions: (1) interpretative and analytic questions which call for relating the "facts" of the experience in such a way as to arrive at some specific results, conclusions, or generalizations which seem justified by these "facts" (for example, "What would you conclude now about the use of ________?" "What inference can you make about ________?" "From your experience so far, what generalization do you think is warranted about . . .?" "What conditions must exist or process be used before such-and-such is likely to happen?") (2) application and evaluative questions which call for identifying and judging ways to use or apply the conclusions or generalizations, i.e., transferring current beliefs to new or different situations in the future (for example, "If you were faced with the following situation in the future, what do you think you would do? Is that consistent with your conclusion about what happened here?" "What might happen if . . .? or What do you think might have happened if . . .?" "What might be the consequences of doing that?" "In what ways and situations might that be useful to you in the future? How might we change it so it would be better?").

Phase IV -- the "Now What?" or application phase -- is a continuing process of the person wherein the possible actions and applications resulting from the classroom activity are tested in the crucible of human experience. My role here as a teacher is to help the student to find appropriate ways to do this testing and to provide ways for him to receive feedback on his efforts. This, in essence, is the real outcome of any learning arising from the experience in the classroom and takes the form of changed behavior or tendencies for changed behavior. My planning of additional experiences for my students and for myself will be guided by the results of this phase in the approach, thus, the circle or closed loop of the model is completed and we are back at the beginning.

When I view my own growth and my teaching with this model in mind I find my life and my work is exciting and rewarding and freeing. And a free, exciting, and achieving existence is high on my list of values to strive for. I sincerely wish the same for you and for your students!

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CHAPTER XIV

HOLES IN THEIR SOCKS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VALUES CLARIFICATION

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American teachers are being asked to ascertain how many of their pupils have holes in their socks. This request comes not from some federal agency concerned with the podiatric health of the nation's children, but from prominent educators who assert the result to be "values clarification." In the name of values clarification, teachers have been asked to quiz their students about how often they wash their hair, how much they spend on Christmas gifts, whether or not they buy sex paperbacks or believe in God. To prevent the inevitable wave of anger and ridicule, ("What did you learn in school today?" "I learned that Pete's mother doesn't darn his socks.") we should carefully examine this proposal and the rationale which supports it.

The most widely known advocate of values clarification is Professor Sidney B. Simon of the University of Massachusetts. He was co-author, along with Louis E. Raths and Merrill Harmin, of the first important book on the subject, Values and Teaching. Since the 1966 publication date of this volume, Professor Simon has co-authored two handbooks of teaching strategies and publicized the movement through a variety of lectures and articles in educational journals. The purpose of the present inquiry is a critical examination of values clarification as represented in the work of Professor Simon and his close associates. To accomplish this task, values clarification theory and practice will first be analyzed. Then a more adequate theory of value education will be suggested and the curricular techniques of values clarification will be criticized from this new viewpoint.

A definition of value in the form of seven criteria comprises the most significant theoretical statement of the values clarification movement. Initially appearing in Values and Teaching, this criterial definition has since been repeated in a variety of abbreviated and restructured formats. As originally enumerated, the criteria include: (a) A value must be a thing chosen freely without coercion. (b) A value must be chosen from among available alternatives. (c) A value must be a thing chosen after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative. (d) A value must be something we are pleased with, something we prize and cherish. (e) A value must be a thing we are willing to publicly affirm. (f) A value must be something which we act upon, which affects our life. (g) A value must be something which creates a constant pattern of repeated behavior in our life. (1)

For the advocates of values clarification, these seven criteria function as a standard, determining when a value is present. Raths, Harmin and Simon declare, "unless something satisfies all seven of the criteria . . . we do not call it a value." (2) Thus, according to their analysis, essential bodily functions such as eating cannot be said to be valued since we have no choice in such matters. We must eat in order to live. Choices about what we eat and when may reflect values, however. Further, impulsive or thoughtless choices, because they violate criterion three, are held not to lead to values. A choice which an individual is ashamed of, which he or she cannot willingly make public, would fail to qualify as a value under criteria four and five, and choices not reflected in our lives fall short of criteria six and seven. Any single deficiency is enough to disqualify something as a value.

The first four of these seven criteria concern personal and subjective conditions, and this subjectivism constitutes an important element of values clarification theory. There is ambiguity about the source of such subjective decisions. At times, value choices are held to emerge entirely from the self. Simon, in an article co-authored by Sara Massey, compares the values clarification process to an archeological expedition in which the object of study is the self. Rather than supplying possible value choices, the purpose of values clarification is to enable the student to "discover" his or her own inherent values. (3) On other occasions, however, values are depicted as being chosen from alternatives external to the self. Thus, in an interview published in Nations Schools, Simon offers values clarification as "a process kids can use to examine various value systems and then select and reject elements from each." (4) No matter which of these positions we accept, however, value choices are visualized as personal and subjective.

This subjectivism leads values clarification proponents to adopt the thoroughly relativistic position that all individual value choices must be accorded equal merit. Since values are individual and subjective, and, further, must be determined in a situation free of coercion, no one has the right to try to influence the value choices of any other person. Values clarification theorists conceive of valuation as a territory where all maps are subjective. Should you decide to locate California to the north of Oregon, I may privately admire the beauty of your map or secretly scorn its lack of symmetry. In the last analysis, however, your map is your map; mine is mine. As neither can be judged better than the other, any attempt on my part to influence the arrangement of your map must be rejected as illegitimate. In the classroom, this injunction against passing judgment on the value choices of others applies with particular force to the teacher, who must avoid "moralizing, criticizing, giving values, or evaluating." (4) To comply with this requirement, the teacher must eschew "all hints of 'good' or 'right' or 'acceptable,' or the opposites," (5) in efforts at values clarification. This restriction on teacher behavior, repeated frequently in published materials concerning values clarification epitomizes the relativism of the movement.

Anyone who attempts to found a value education program on a basis of subjective relativism must deal with the question of why it is necessary or desirable to have value education at all. If all value choices are personal and subjective, if one choice cannot be defended as superior to another, then it is as pointless to teach valuation as it is to teach cartography in a world where all maps are arbitrary and personal. If carried to its logical conclusion, subjective relativism renders instruction in values an idle pastime. While a review of the various unscored and unscorable games that constitute values clarification strategies might lead to the conclusion that an afternoon's amusement is the end-in-view, the charitable assumption is that the champions of such classroom procedures do not consider their techniques as mere entertainment. Therefore, careful attention must be given to the manner in which they attempt to resolve the problems of subjective relativism.

Since values clarification advocates have denied the legitimacy of direct intervention by teachers in the value choices of students, only two alternatives remain. Either teachers must ignore valuation as beyond the scope of education, or they must turn their focus to the methodology by which value decisions are made. The authors of the values clarification movement attempt to implement the latter alternative. As an enthusiast expressed it: "Values clarification involves a series of strategies which are not guilty of forcing one set of right values down the throats of all students. Instead the process tends to raise issues, to confront the student with inconsistencies and get him to sort out his own values." (6) Raths, Harmin, and Simon originally articulated this same principle:

> . . . we shall be less concerned with the particular value outcomes of any one person's experiences than we will with the process that he uses to obtain his values. Because life is different through time and space, we cannot be certain what experiences any one person will have. We therefore cannot be certain what values, what style of life, would be most suitable for any person. We do, however, have some ideas about what processes might be most effective for obtaining values. (7)

At first glance, this position seems to resemble that which the Australian educational philosopher, Brian Hill, calls "normative autonomism." (8) Normative autonomism is a second order ethical theory, which means that it focuses on the standards of rational ethical discourse rather than dealing directly with standards of ethical behavior. Although we may not be able to directly decide what is good and what is evil for all persons, we can, perhaps, decide what is a legitimate and what an illegitimate reason for an ethical decision and what conditions we must observe if we are to commit ourselves to rationality in our valuing. A normative autonomist argues that although every person must decide value issues privately, the standards for rational decision-making are public. Thus, we might teach cartography in our non-objective territory by focusing upon the rules of good map making, assisting our students in implementing these rules rather than presenting them with ready-made maps to be copied exactly. A normative autonomist teacher would scrupulously avoid dictating value laden conclusions to students while inculcating the standards of rational inquiry. The goal of such an approach is to enable every student to reach his or her own private subjective values by the most reasonable procedures. As an ethical theory, normative autonomism has serious weaknesses, but it can and has been used as an effective basis for value education. (9)

Many statements made by proponents of values clarification might convince the casual observer that the movement is based upon normative autonomism. However, a closer examination of both theory and practice demonstrates this conclusion false. In terms of theory, normative autonomism demands a fully developed systematic discussion of the standards of rational deliberation, an element missing from the literature of values clarification. In practice, values clarification strategies do not emphasize the process of rationally justifying value choices. A survey of the practical techniques advanced by Simon et.al., indicates that the prototypical procedure is simply to ask the student verbally to react to some question or hypothetical situation. After the students make their statements individually, the lesson ends. No judgments are passed on either reasons or conclusions.

Typical of this type of practical procedure is the strategy called "values voting." The teacher utilizing this strategy asks a series of questions beginning "How many of you . . .?" and the students indicate their response by raising their hands. Some representative questions include:

How many of you . . .

1.___enjoy watching movies on TV?
2.___go to church or temple regularly?
15.___think you are racially prejudiced?

57.___have a hole in your sock right now?
73.___think we should legalize mercy killings? (10)

Directions for this strategy suggest that the teacher occasionally pick one of the questions and ask students to state their reaction to it. This might take bravery considering the absurdity of many of the queries. Even with this addendum, however, the strategy goes no further than individual statements of belief. No attempt is made to develop methods of rational justification.

In some strategies teachers may demand reasons for student choices. Even in such cases, however, any standards of judgment introduced are entirely arbitrary. For example, in one strategy the students sit in the corner of a darkened classroom with a lighted candle at the center of the group. The teacher asks them to imagine that they are trapped in a cave with only a narrow passageway for escape. As they must exit single file, and as the passageway may collapse at any time, those who go first stand the best chance of survival. After establishing this imaginary situation, the teacher requires that each student in turn give reasons why he or she should be near the head of the line:

> Your reasons can be of two kinds. You can tell us what you want to live for; or what you have yet to get out of life that is important to you. Or you can talk about what you have to contribute to others in the world that would justify your being near the front of the line. Both types of reasons will be considered equally; the things you want to live for can have just as much weight as the things you do for others. (11)

This latter restriction on the scope of the discussion is the only contribution of the teacher to setting standards of inquiry. The authors give no reason for the elimination of such obvious arguments as "I'm the strongest of the group and will push aside anyone who gets ahead of me; I have a club to enforce my will." One of the most important value issues of the situation, whether social worth is to take precedence over personal satisfaction, is eliminated by fiat: both are to be treated equally. Yet it is impossible to know how this equality can be implemented, for although the students are asked to determine the best order of their withdrawal, they are given no guidance concerning the methodology of a rational collective decision. Within the parameters of the strategy, such a decision might as easily be reached by fist-fight as by vote.

Although the values clarification movement has spawned many other classroom strategies, none go beyond this level of arbitrary personal justification. Without the application of some standards of rationality, such a recital of private statements can hardly qualify as public discourse. Therefore, the claims of values clarification advocates that they focus their efforts on the process of valuing must not be taken to mean that they expect to improve the quality of the reasons students use to justify their value choices. The subjective relativism of the movement applies not only to the results of the valuing process, but also to the reasons advanced for value choices. Values clarification cannot qualify as a variation of normative autonomism. The proponents of values clarification must turn elsewhere to convince us that values should be of interest to the teacher.

Professor Simon and his associates respond to this challenge with the surprising assertion that, although one value cannot be judged as better than another, the mere possession of a value as defined by the seven criteria yields desirable consequences. Simon alleges that when the seven point standard is applied, "it turns out that most people have very few values." (12) If we are to believe the proponents of values clarification, "people with very few values tend to be conforming, apathetic, inconsistent and often very ambivalent." (13) The goal of values clarification strategies, therefore, is simply to lead students into the possession of a larger number of values, as the movement defines that term. Professor Simon claims amazing results for this accretive process:

> . . . students who have been exposed to this approach have become less apathetic, less flighty, less conforming as well as less over-dissenting. They are more zestful and energetic, more critical in their thinking, and more likely to follow through on decisions. In the case of under-achievers, values clarification has led to better success in school. (14)

In another publication, Simon touts values clarification as "a touchstone for living," producing "a new confidence, an internal security, a sense of potency . . . which are life giving," (15) claims which, if true, might well interest the classroom teacher.

Some inconsistencies emerge from these claims. It is not difficult to imagine that one or more of the traits that Simon and his associates seek to eradicate, conformity, for instance, or "over-dissenting," might qualify as a fully developed value under the seven criteria. In such a case, a values clarification lesson could be conceived as an effort to "depose" a student's existing value and "impose" a value judged superior by the teacher, rather than simply providing a situation where the student "exposes" his or her own values. Out of enthusiasm for their methods, Simon and his adherents seem at times to be more normative than their theory permits. In spite of such lapses, however, values clarification remains firmly rooted in subjective relativism. This position, plus the assumption that values which meet the criterial definition are intrinsically useful, provide the theoretical basis of the movement.

To this undergirding position must be added the implicit pedagogical assumption that students may be taught to conform to each one of the seven criteria in isolation from the other six. The notion that valuing may be taught in the form of seven disparate operations runs through most of the practical proposals of the movement. For example, if we allow that a raised hand in response to a teacher's question is a public affirmation, then criterion six, by itself, is easily met. The average teacher may secure such nominal affirmation easily, a fact which may explain why Simon, in a recent reordering of the roster, lists affirming prior to choosing and acting. Several clarification strategies appear solely for the purpose of securing repetition of such asseveration. Thus "values voting" is described as a "simple and very rapid method by which every student can make a public affirmation on a variety of value issues." Students are asked to practice raising their hands in response to questions such as:

> How many of you . . .
>
> 121.___have more than 5 pairs of shoes?
> 122.___think that teachers shouldn't say 'hell' or 'damn' in the classroom?
> 123.___have full polio protection?
> 124.___like to read the comics first thing in the Sunday paper?
> 125.___belong to a Christmas savings club? (16)

It is hard to imagine how the empirical fact of whether or not a student has more than five pairs of shoes, a Christmas club account, or a full set of polio antibodies could qualify as a value issue, but neither this bafflement nor the frenetic leaps between disconnected topics troubles the creators of the strategy. Behind this exercise lies the assumption that if enough drill in hand raising is coupled with strategies focused upon other criteria, students will eventually be able to combine all operations into a full complement of values.

Pursuant to this presumption, most values clarification strategies focus on a single criterion. Infrequently one meshes into another to produce some continuity. For example, "Alternative Action Search," in which students are presented with an hypothetical situation which calls for some (hypothetical) action, was presumably designed with criterion two in mind. After students write their responses, each compares the proposed action with that of two classmates. In the first "sample vignette"

> You are walking behind someone. You see him take out a cigarette pack; withdraw the last cigarette; put the cigarette in his mouth; crumple the package and nonchalantly toss it over his shoulder onto the sidewalk. You are twenty-five feet behind him. Ideally, what would you do? (17)

Following a discussion of various possible actions, from picking up the offending wrapper to accosting the gentleman and making a citizen's arrest, the students go back to their arithmetic lesson. At some future date, however, the teacher may decide to utilize the strategy designated "Consequences Search." (18) If so, the students are asked to write the alternatives produced by the earlier exercise across the top of a page, giving the result the rather grandiose head, "Consequences Grid." Then, either individually or in groups, the students list all of the consequences of each alternative, from acquiring a grimy cigarette pack in your pocket to acquiring a fat lip from an angry litterbug. Through such tenuous interconnections, an attempt is made to demonstrate relationships among the seven criteria.

The various elements of values clarification theory combine to make such classroom activities attractive to many educators. The doctrine of subjective relativism eliminates the necessity for teachers to develop defensible values of their own, for the responsibility of determining the values to be espoused by students lies, supposedly, with the individual student. Further, the itemized definition of a value is an easily remembered substitute for a well formulated valuational theory, making it unnecessary for educators to investigate that troublesome subject. Finally, the division of the act of valuation into seven simplistic processes which may be attacked in separate lessons completes the transmutation of an intractable set of ethical dilemmas into a pedagogical problem easily resolved by the application of a pre-planned classroom exercise. No matter how baffled a teacher may be by the serious problems of society -- sexual promiscuity, drug addiction, racial bigotry -- he or she may confidently utilize the "Rank Order" strategy in which students are asked to quantify their responses to each item on a list:

Which do you think is the worst?

___to become (or get someone) pregnant (unwed)
___to be dependent on hard drugs
___to date someone from another race (19)

Unable to comprehend the problems of marriage and divorce in our society, or even resolve his or her own marital difficulties, the teacher may optimistically request the class to mark their attitudes toward divorce on a continuum of choices between such polarities as: "Steadfast Stella -- Under No Circumstances" and "Multi-Marrying Martha -- at the Drop of the First Unkind Word." (20)

Unfortunately, this approach to valuation is too facile. No combination of these trivial classroom games can be of much assistance in the difficult business of establishing viable values. The entire values clarification technique recalls a stofy told by John Dewey:

> I am told that there is a swimming school in the city of Chicago where youth are taught to swim without going into the water, being repeatedly drilled in the various movements which are necessary for swimming. When one of the young men so trained was asked what he did when he got into the water, he laconically replied, "Sunk." (21)

Practice in responding to a teacher's questions, practice in listing hypothetical solutions to hypothetical problems, practice in listing the possible consequences of hypothetical actions, such procedures taken singly or collectively are not valuing. They are, instead, dry land swimming, empty activities far removed from the environment of living where values take on real significance.

Exercises such as these are the inevitable result of an incorrect and inadequate theory. Consider the main tenets of the movement: (a) Values are personal and subjective; no one may impose or even suggest what might be a valid value for another person. (b) Although no value may be judged to be superior to another by any standard external to the self, values *per se* have intrinsic worth; it is better to possess many values than few. (c) It is both possible and desirable to teach valuation by dividing a value into its component elements and approach each element separately. Of these three tenets, the first and third are false, the second merely foolish. A brief discussion of an alternative theoretical view will serve to further illustrate the dangers inherent in values clarification and point the direction toward a more adequate social approach.

The most significant theoretical error of the values clarification movement lies in its conception of a value as the mystical creation of the self acting in splendid isolation. Instead, values are social products, continuously formulated and reformulated by the interaction of the individual and his or her social environment. It is nonsense to imagine a reservoir deep within the psyche from which values may be called forth and acted upon in total indifference to those around us. Our values are constantly judged by others in terms of their social consequences. Our tolerance of offensive values in others has obvious limits, and the same applies to the limits that others place upon our own predilections. As John Dewey expressed it:

> Liability is the beginning of responsibility. We are held accountable by others for the consequences of our acts . . . . Approbation and disapprobation are ways of influencing the formation of habits and airs; that is, of influencing future acts. The individual is held accountable for what he has done in order that he may be responsive in what he is going to do. Gradually persons learn by dramatic imitation to hold themselves accountable, and liability becomes a voluntary deliberate acknowledgement that deeds are our own, that their consequences come from us. (22)

It is unrealistic and counterproductive to try to suspend, for the purposes of some classroom game, the natural judgments that we continuously make about the statements and behaviors of others. Even if this suspension were possible, it would hinder rather than facilitate the development of true values.

Values emerge from a social situation, and as the school is manifestly a social institution, the classroom is pregnant with values. One of the most vexing habits of educators is to view the classroom as preparation for living rather than a full, rich social environment. Thus we neglect values expressed before our noses in the classroom while we imagine we are preparing students to participate in valuation after they reach maturity. Even the raising of a hand in response to a teacher's question may be an act of valuation, and it behooves the practitioners of values clarification to enquire what values are actually being taught in their lessons.

Recall, for example, the exercise in which students were asked to raise their hands if they possessed more than five pairs of shoes. The stated purpose of the exercise was to provide practice in public affirmation, yet, because the act of raising one's hand in a classroom is a public act, it is committed in expectation of the response of others. According to Dewey: "Our thoughts of our own actions are saturated with the ideas that others entertain about them, ideas which have been expressed not only in explicit instruction but still more effectively in reaction to our act." (23) It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which a child would think that the open admission that he or she possessed fewer than six pairs of shoes would prove embarrassing, whereas the proclamation of an abundance of footgear might enhance personal prestige. An affirmation may, therefore, represent a deliberate lie, committed after a consideration of the consequences of truthfulness. If, a few minutes later, the child is asked about bank accounts similar considerations may induce a pattern of lies, and an exercise which sought to provide practice in public affirmation has ended in teaching the value of mendacity.

Prevarication is not the only questionable value which might be taught by such strategies. Consider, for example, the effects of the classroom use of the "Forced Choice Ladder." This device asks students to rank order eight to sixteen stereotypical situations according to strength of feeling, pro and con. Among the stereotypes presented are these:

> 10. National Guardsman -- On guard duty at a college campus a national guardsman is attacked by students and shoots at them.
> 11. Two-Faced -- A person who talks about how great integration is, but wouldn't want to live next door to a black.
> 12. Dodger -- A fellow who goes to Canada to avoid the draft.
> 13. Hard Hat -- A person who uses an axe handle and fists to knock some sense into the heads of 'long-hairs' demonstrating for peace.
> 14. Informant -- A neighbor who calls the police because she suspects the teenager across the street is using pot . . . (24)

The contrast is stark between such a classroom exercise and the actual business of living. All of the terrifying consequences of leaving one's native land rather than fight in a war one cannot support, all of the agony of a peaceful demonstration that ends in death, the alienation of a city plagued with racism, drugs and crime are reduced to the mere copying of a few words on a piece of paper. Such an exercise cannot possibly accomplish the purpose for which it was intended; instead, it quite obviously teaches the value of the use of the most destructive kind of stereotypical thinking. Those who left their country out of conscience, including thousands still in exile, are "dodgers." Anyone who wears a hard hat is a violent, mindless reactionary. The busy-body prying neighbor is always female. Much of the strife in our society results from the heedless application of such stereotypes, yet here is an exercise which actively encourages their use, offered to us in the name of values education.

A thoughtful consideration of the nature of values and their function in our lives will lead us to reject such exercises. Values are not private possessions to be acquired in isolation and admired privately. They are the glue that holds our actions together, and are therefore constantly expressed in the way we approach our everyday responsibilities, whether as students or teachers. Valuation will be taught best by a teacher who is constantly aware of the values inherent in the social situation of the classroom. Any program of value education which neglects this fact in an attempt to relegate the teaching of values to a series of contrived exercises will surely end in failure. To attain success, we must act on the advice of John Dewey:

> We need to see that . . . the term 'moral' does not designate a special region or portion of life. We need to translate the moral into the actual conditions and working forces of our community life, and into the impulses and habits which make up the doing of the individual.
>
> All the rest is mint, anise, and cumin. (25)

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CHAPTER XV

ON THE QUESTION OF VALUES

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One of the recent developments in the study and practice of education which has been experiencing popularity among educators is *values education*. However, the excitement and numerous activities carried on in its name, have not produced clarification as to what constitutes *values education* because there is little agreement on the meaning/use of the terms "values" and "valuing." (1) "About the only agreement that emerges is that a value represents something important in human experience," say some writers of the area. (2) Obviously, such a broad description of 'values' is not any more clarifying than to say 'What I want is important, what is important is a value to me.' However, to admit the difficulty in clarifying the meaning of 'values' and then say that what is more beneficial and useful to study and thus to teach the student is the *process of valuing* rather than ". . . to consider what he might find valuable at any one time . . ." (3) or to emphasize values as entities, is not to say that the *process of valuing* has avoided or solved the question of the meaning of 'values.' Saying that the *process of valuing* is "more beneficial and useful" is a suggestion of value. Moreover, employing one process of valuing and another is choosing, preferring, etc. which suggests criteria which, in turn, indicate value. If we are not clear on 'values,' on what grounds may we say that we are clear on the *process of valuing*, if one is the expression of the other? For example, when the analysis approach to *values education* is employed, valuing is conceived of as the rational process of determining the "goodness" or "worth" of phenomena. The student is encouraged to employ logical thinking and scientific investigation procedures in dealing with value issues. Clearly, this is not *merely* saying that reasoning is a mere skill, out of many skills, but it is also admitting that in teaching reasoning, there is a prior commitment to it with regard to its status as an operation of human valuing. Once a teacher decides to employ any one of the approaches to *values education* (4) he is saying that he has responded to certain values and his behavioural responses are determined, partly, by his prior value commitments. In this case, he values the analysis methodology over all other approaches because there is also a prior commitment to the values of science, its findings, its methodology, and so on. What one comes to value is the result of a valued valuing process which is necessarily employed. Most social science educators advocate the analysis approach (5) because contemporary notions of knowledge, education, schooling, teaching, etc. all value/uphold the value of rationality. But what does it mean to say: "Rationality is a value?" "We value rationality?" The prior question of what "values" is simply has to be asked. Similarly, in stressing the *valuing process* and minimizing, if not bypassing, the concept itself, what is one to do with the advice: "We should be telling the young people that their task is to recreate, rather than watch over, the ancient values continuously in their own time?" To recreate "ancient values" suggest the young people now have another set of values on which to "recreate ancient values." What is important is, not to "recreate," but to know the new set of values which is the basis for the recreation of "ancient values" or for determining new rational choices. Business, likewise, bypasses the concept "values." When it tells of the "value" of a thing, it tells its price, but the two are not equivalents. An object may be priced more than its value. Or, when stores advertise "sale days," they claim that their products are of a "given value," that is, they have the qualities/benefits they claim to have and they are priced less than they should be. The price of an object, then, is not necessarily its value. Knowing the price of an object does not help us act rationally unless we know what its value is. Knowing the price is an empirical matter; but knowing its value includes assessing its claims to worthwhileness for certain uses, under certain circumstances, its magnitude for usefulness, and so on.

The preliminary discussion shows the need for an elucidation of the concept "values." But before engaging in it, perhaps, it is instructive to look at expressions such as "science education" and "mathematics education," at this point, and inquire into their possible meanings which may help identify problems of values education.

Education, as a profession, has areas of study described as "science education," "mathematics education," and so on. Each one is distinct from one another, nonetheless, both of them share the label "education." This means that the body of propositions respectively identified as science, as mathematics, meets the requirements of the logical meaning of "education." "Education" is a class and "science," "mathematics," and so on, are aspects of "education," but not all of it. If one may argue that "science" or "mathematics" were all of "education," then each one would be equivalent to "education" and there would be no need to say "science education," "mathematics education," and so on. To say so would be a redundancy; in the same manner that it is a redundancy to say "education education." The existence and use of the above approved expressions, however, indicates that this is not so. "Science" or "mathematics" is "education" but "education" is not only or all "science" or "mathematics" or both. It includes both and other areas of study as well; it is broader than either "science" and "mathematics," hence not reducible to one or the other.

What is the logical meaning of "education?" To say "He has acquired some education" is also to say "He has acquired some knowledge." Or, to say "He is educated" is also to say "He has characteristics which qualify him to be called educated," which characteristics have to do necessarily with having undergone the process of securing knowledge, knowledgeability, and so on. The logical meaning of any given concept is that which is necessarily entailed by it. To find out if such a claimed meaning is the logical meaning of a concept one may negate it to see if the expression results in a semantic contradiction or nonsensicality. To say, for example, "He has education and does not know anything," is simply odd. Similarly, no one says: "Having been educated and having acquired education, he remains ignorant." "Education" in such expressions as "science education," "mathematics education," and so on, refers to knowledge/knowledge claims in these areas which, as shown above, is its logical meaning and is shared by all areas of study that qualify as "education." "Science education," "mathematics education," and so on means knowledge of/in these areas and it must be necessarily true of them. Knowledge is a body of propositions of a given area, its nature (what it can do and what it cannot do), its processes, and its form of assessment.

Now, any claim to being an item of knowledge is a claim to that which is true. When one says "I know" it must be the case that what one knows is true. If shown to be false, then the use of "I know" is wrong. The condition of truth is a logical meaning of knowledge. And when one claims that something is true, and it is true, evidence is necessarily entailed. It is simply pretentious for one to say: "What I am saying is true but I have no evidence for it." Or, if he claims to have evidence and says: "I cannot offer evidence publicly for it is internal, subjective, to me." There is something odd about this use of "evidence." "Evidence" is never private to the person who holds it. For if evidence is to count as evidence it must be true and before it is accepted as true, it must be subject to public investigation and assessment.

The discussion, thus far, suggests that education is knowledge and it is necessarily true. Since that which is true requires evidence in order to be accepted as true, this, in turn, suggests that the "truth" necessarily related to/with knowledge is that which is public, amenable to approved methods of verification and/or validation. In short, the empirical/scientific and/or logical truths. "Science education" and "mathematics education" meet the necessary requirements of the concepts "education" and "knowledge." If both of them are taken as paradigms of the studies in education, how would "values education" fare? There is a similarity among them in their syntactic structure, but this does not mean that "values," like "science" and "mathematics," could, therefore, fulfill the required conditions of knowledge. If this is so, it may be asked whether or not "values" could be spoken of as knowledge, in its strict sense. If not, is there any sense at all in which it may be argued that "values" is a "good" candidate for the claim "knowledge?" This question is important for it raises the other issue of "knowledge" and "schooling." If "values" can in no way be spoken of as "knowledge," and can be rejected as "knowledge," should "values education" or approaches to it be taught?

To make explicit some of the problems of "values," consider the following statements: (a) "I know Darwin's biological theory of evolution." (b) "I predict that President Ford's economic programme will solve problems of inflation." In sentence (a), the claim is that I know something to be so. My right to the claim, however, can be challenged. Someone may ask me for some information on an aspect of Darwin's theory and I may give answers which, in his further reading of Darwin, he finds to be false. He can tell me that my claim to know Darwin's theory was not altogether correct. However, if my claim is shown to be true, the challenger cannot say: "I don't agree with you." Sentence (a) is a verifiable claim, easily settled because it is subject to a set of criteria independent of both the challenger and of me. It is either true or false that I know the claim and the claim is true.

Sentence (b) is not as simple to solve as (a). The bases for my prediction may be factual and they could be checked. Still, my prediction may turn out to be false. Not being in economics, mine was a layman's analysis and although my bases are true, still they were irrelevant to the inflationary problems. More knowledge in economics may solve the problem; as it did in Darwin's theory in (a). Not so. For economists, while not in disagreement on what constitutes inflation, are in disagreement over the solution to it. Economic problems obviously partake of factual, observable matters and at the same time require judgments/rational conjectures on the part of those claiming to have the solution to them. As soon as judgments have to be made, then, the difficulty of making choices on the basis of inconclusive evidence has to be admitted. Consequently, someone can contest the soundness of President Ford's economic programme. Erroneous judgment is always a possibility. In contrast with sentence (a), solution to economic problems is difficult to settle because along with matters of factuality, observability, and predictability, there is the added dimension of sound judgments.

Consider, now, the following sentences: (d) "Schooling is of value." (e) "Schooling is a value." Sentence (d) claims that "schooling" possesses, has certain qualities of its own, which may be considered "of value." Simply translated, it reads: "Schooling has value." The qualities of schooling may simply be described and, as such, they can be examined whether they are so or not. Having described them, they can be equated with "of value/has value" and with some arguments "is valuable." The move in sentence (e) concludes: "Schooling is a value." It is a good. On the surface, "a value" or "a good" is here used as a substantive. But, perhaps, this is a reduction of the expression "a good thing." That is, "a good" has taken the function of the noun phrase "a good thing." "Good" like "value/values" centrally functions as an adjective and thus partakes of value-judgment, whether it be moral or non-moral. But, in claiming that I am merely describing schooling, I may say that I am not imputing characteristics/qualities which are not already in it; hence, no judgments or commendations are made. As a description, the statement is verifiable. However, in looking at the qualities described, one may ask: 'What makes these qualities "of value?" Why do they constitute value? What is value?' The qualities, may, indeed, be descriptively true but there can be disagreement on why/whether or not they are "of value."

The basis for contesting the claim is not factual but now one of *judgment* and *meaning*. The question is: "What are your criteria for 'value?'" What do you mean by "value?" If the criteria given do not satisfy the challenger, then, he can counter: "Given these qualities, schooling is of no value." Notice that his counter claim has not rendered sentence (c) false and both claims, although contradicting each other, are acceptable semantically. (Recall sentence (a) and the challenge that rendered it false.) This is, of course, the main difficulty in value-questions. Opposing value positions, for example, in moral values, political values, religious values, and so on, may be presented but there is no agreed upon methodology for assessing their truth, cogency, and correctness. One position may provide a complete justification for itself but this does not mean that it has excluded all other opposing views from competing with it. Another way of life may be equally well reasoned, susceptible of complete justification. There are irreducible open options in the field of value questions. And, even if my criteria for value satisfy the challenger, he can raise the further question of why I chose such a criteria, or the criteria for my choice of the criteria, and so on. It is like a case of my persuading a friend that cheating in the classroom is an instance of dishonesty. It is not a matter of survival or knowing the "tricks of the trade" of learning. Since I believe in being honest *all* the time ("Honesty is the best policy"), it is reasonable to expect me not to cheat at any one time. My friend may be convinced that cheating, no matter how we attempt to change its meaning, is a case of dishonesty. It belongs to the moral question of what honest behaviour is. However, my friend may ask: "Why do you believe in honesty being the best policy?" This is harder to answer than to show that cheating is an instance of a dishonest act. Here, I appeal to a rule to justify my beliefs about honesty, such as, "Honesty has always been encouraged by my family." When pressed further, "Why?" I may reply: "It contributes to pleasurable relationships with others," which is an appeal to a general rule. Still, the point on "pleasurable relationships with others" may need to be justified. I appeal to a more general rule and finally to my superrule: "Honesty is anchored in my belief in God" or, in the case of others, perhaps, "in man's ultimate goodness," which rule is no longer susceptible of proofs. It constitutes one's *first principles*, or some would say, *value*, used in the sense of an *ordering principle*. My friend, although convinced of the reasonableness of my position, may reply: "I agree with you, cheating is a case of dishonest behaviour." But I say: Honesty is the best policy only under certain conditions. My superrule is: "Live and let live." Either view does not cancel the other out but, on the contrary, with their differences, both seem to have a semblance of "truth" and equal plausibility.

On religious values, taking religious to be derived from religion considered as a realm of "knowledge" beyond verification and human inspection, the problem is much more obvious. There is simply no way of finding out which religious values based on which religious "truths" are capable of responding to questions of truth and, some may add, of logic. All are equally acceptable which is, perhaps, also to say: "We do not know how to go about assessing religious statements" or "We do not know how to show what we claim to know/to believe to be true." Who is right? Who is wrong? The Jews/the Arabs? The Irish Catholic or/and the Irish Protestant? Could all of them be both right and wrong at the same time?

Is this then to say that *any* value position, be it in moral, religious, political situations, or whatever, is acceptable and that there are no standards, whatever they may be, external to the value position and to its adherents which can be employed to assess it? To admit thus is to say with Hume: "Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger." Surely, this is not so. The point here is that in the realm of value questions, even when it is considered solely within the context of ordinary, human experience and knowledge, there are complex problems to be attended to which problems do not obtain in sentences (a) and (b). If such problems are missed, then, value positions may be nothing more than *mere private feelings* or *subjective intuitions* which may be impossible or independent of *rational considerations* and thus questionable as educational matters. Notice, also, that with the use of "value" in sentence (c) there is a suggestion that the sentence is not merely describing schooling, but also, although in this case, not necessarily so, commending or prescribing a certain course of action, saying, "We ought to do such and such . . ." If value statements/judgments almost always are prescriptions for action, then, it is all the more imperative that the bases for accepting the prescription and for deciding to act be made clear. Values/value questions, "What ought I to do with such a problem?", "How ought we to decide and act?", are more directly related to human actions, to a good part of our daily living, hence, there is much concern and anxiety over them. The problem, of course, is that we are never absolutely certain of our values, moral values, religious values, whether they are "right" or "wrong," "bad" or "good." "sound" or "unsound." We are not absolutely certain how we come to "know" them, if at all we can say that we "know" them in the same manner that we can say "We know that Edmonton is the capital of Alberta" or in the same manner that we are sure of "2 + 2 = 4."

To summarize this section. It has been shown that unlike problems in sentences (a) and (b), sentences (c) and (d) involve more than matters of truth/falsity and judgment. The problem of criteria, of standard, for choosing one position and not the other for purposes of direction and action in matters of value questions is the main difficulty, along with the fact that there is personal involvement, on the part of the chooser, in choosing the value position. While matters of evidence and logic are necessary to the justification of a value position, they are not sufficient to cancel out other opposing value positions. There are simply irreducible elements in all of them, which elements, some suspect, stubbornly resist educational analysis. If, in the end, it is shown that value-questions cannot be resolved solely on matters of truth/logic, which are the demands of knowledge, then, on what bases may we say that values education, recalling the analysis on "science" and "mathematics" education, is at all possible?

Now, to inquire into the concept "value" by analyzing the meaning of the expressions "an aspect of a thing/something is of value/has value" and "the values of the individual." And then to isolate aspects of value-questions which may be assessed for their responsiveness to the standards of knowledge.

Consider the sentence (e) "John values rationality." (6) What does this mean? Obviously, a relationship, which may be called a value relationship, has been established between a sentient subject (John) and a non-sentient object (rationality). Does this mean that "rationality" is, therefore, valuable for/to John? Not necessarily so. The converse of "John values rationality" is not "rationality is valuable for John" but "rationality is valued by John." Also, what is valued is not necessarily valuable, in the same manner that what is desired is not necessarily desirable. Notice, too, that John did not claim that he values rationality. Someone imputed the value of "rationality" to him. It is possible that rationality is not valuable for John or we do not know whether it is or it is not valuable for him. The latter suspends judgment on the question. Now contrast sentence (e) with (f) "I value rationality." Others, of course, may question the valuableness of rationality to me but I cannot say, without sounding crazy, "I value rationality and it has not done me any good." It would be like saying "My beliefs are false and I continue to hold on to them, believing them to be false." Clearly, if we say that our values have not benefited us, have not in any way improved us, then we would be irrational to continue claiming them to be our values.

In saying that "I value rationality" I am saying that rationality has certain qualities/properties which have been of benefit to me. In imputing certain values to others, however, we cannot be certain of its benefits to them. The notion of "benefit" seems to be central to "value" even when one considers "value" relations between material objects, for example: "Rain is good (valuable) for the crops." "Sunshine is good (valuable) for plants." "The droughts in Dacca are bad (disvalued) for the farms." A valuable relation holds when either the survival/growth (valuable) of something is encouraged or when something is destroyed (value withheld).

It does not, of course, mean that anyone who finds rationality of value will automatically find the properties which are beneficial to me beneficial to them simply because they are properties found in rationality. If this were so, there would be no discrimination between someone's value relation (with regard to rationality) and that of another. To the extent that I have certain ends for which I find certain properties of rationality to be relevant and beneficial, then, to that extent my value relations may differ with others. When we say: "We value schooling" we are not necessarily saying that all of schooling are valued equally by all who say "We value schooling." (Equally here means: in the same manner, to the same extent; in short, sameness.) And when I say: "I value schooling" neither am I saying: "I value all aspects of schooling." When one says: "I value" he is also saying: "I appraise" and may or may not find something wanted or desired by him. In appraising rationality or schooling, I ascertain its evaluative properties or features which are selected on the basis of their being wanted not simply on the basis of their being properties of an object. (7) To admit the latter would be to say: "I value all properties that are found in schooling." This is difficult to accept because to value/to appraise has to do with ranking and/or grading. How can all the different properties of schooling or rationality be equally appraised? The concepts of ranking and grading cannot be discussed in this paper but are mentioned only to show that when one says: "I value schooling/rationality" it is always possible to ask for further clarification.

Now, notice the term "want." A given "want" has always been shown to be either "good" or "bad." It is not necessarily of value. In contrast, "need" is always a "good" and often is used in the context of a normative statement: "You (or I) need to go to school." Or, one may say: "I want to spend my money on a car but I need to save it for next year's schooling expenses." Here, a "want" is judged on the basis of a "need" which is of more value. But could it be argued that any property of something which is judged "of value" to someone always start as someone's "wants?" Clearly, it would be odd, for example, for one to claim something to be of value/a value to him if he has never wanted/does not want it in the first place. Notice the oddity: "I value x but I do not want it." Or, "I value my life but I don't care to protect it. It does not matter whether I get killed or not." ("To value" something is also "to protect/preserve/enhance it.") However, it may be the case that not all wants are necessarily of value/a value to someone. For if to say "I value" is also to say "I appraise" then some wants may not be of value/a value, as in the example of "wanting a car." "Wants," however, may achieve the status of "a value/of value," when they are appraised, evaluated (commonly expressed as the evaluation process) on the properties which they claim to have, which they claim to confer on the value-holder, and whether such properties can accomplish their claimed purposes and if such purposes are beneficial and which benefits are of such a magnitude that they are conferred not only on the individual value-holder but also on society at large. This means that even those who do not share my view that something is of value benefits from it. This, then, is to say that something is of value/has a value to someone.

But, perhaps, we have not established securely the case that a "want" is not necessarily a value/of value to someone. Notice, again, that there is something wrong in saying: "I value something but I don't want it" or "I want something but I don't value it." It has to be admitted that it is acceptable to say: "Whatever I want I also value. My want is my value." It seems that whatever one wants one also values. In saying this, however, one is obligated to answer such questions as: "Why do you consider any want a value/of benefit to you? If all your wants are your values, have you appraised them, since appraisal is central to be the expression "to value?" If so, how is it possible that all your wants are of value to you?" The answer is, of course, that all wants are not given the same value, which is to say that there is no claim that all wants have the same capacity to confer on the value-holder the same amount and kind of benefits. Some are of lesser value, hence, may be put aside for a while in considering other values which have greater capacities to confer greater benefits on someone. The car that is wanted is a lesser value. In labelling "schooling expenses" a "need" one has given it a "higher value." It could be that if one buys a car he may not be able to finish his education; but if he secures his education first then he could also secure a car, granting that he still wants a car because he judges it to be of value to him. There is then a graduated series of values expressed by such related terms as desires, wants, tastes, needs, prizes, treasures. The point is that for something to be considered of value to me, it must be the case that I also want it. But all wants are not claimed to be of equal value/benefits to someone.

In judging different wants to be of different values/benefits, it is also possible that different evaluative criteria are employed. For example, according to the evaluative process of medical science, smoking is physically harmful to the body. In some cases, it can be either a direct or contributory cause to lung cancer. No questions are asked of the appropriateness of the employment of the scientific process in evaluating the effects of smoking to the physical body. Now, when people continue to smoke, it is not because they do not accept the factual judgment of medicine, it is factually correct. They simply employ a different evaluative criteria in assessing the effects of smoking, which criteria have nothing to do with whether or not the effects of smoking are harmful to the body, but perhaps with one's feeling of relaxed pleasure, a sense of manliness, Continental sophistication, especially when one smokes a pipe. While the value of smoking is questionable according to one set of criteria, its benefits are upheld by another. And there will always be these problems of appropriate criteria, ranking, or grading, etc. when one appraises what he claims to be of value.

The problem, of course, is that there are diverse wants and they are person-relative. No one can question someone who claims he knows what is of value to him, thus want something because it is of value to him. He alone can judge a value to him. (Recall the problem of imputing values to others.) But to talk of the value of something to be no more than "private, personal wants" is to encourage solipsism, extreme individualism and, perhaps, even anarchy. This also gets us back to the discussion of subjective and objective values, which, I content, is uninformative in elucidating the concept itself. In any case, subjectivism empties the concept "value" because, in its view, it is possible, given all kinds of private tastes, needs, etc. to value all things. In so doing, the discriminatory force of "value/to value" is lost. Moreover, the view may be forced to allow for some distortion of meaning, in some cases. For example, one may claim that it is of value/benefit to him to torture himself physically to the point of bleeding. If "a value" is purely and solely based on the "inner feelings" of the individual, then, perhaps, there is not much we can do for the above individual. He might as well say: "I am against that which I know is good/of interest to me." This, of course, is what Dostoevsky's "underground man" persuades us to accept. But to agree with example here, we must allow him the right to give a new meaning to "to torture to the point of bleeding" such that it fits in with the meaning of "benefit." If not, then, it is reasonable to say: "This is a pathological case."

On the other hand, objectivism talks of objects, acts, experiences, as having values in themselves, having intrinsic values. This, perhaps, is a misunderstood expression. To say that a map has an intrinsic value is to say that it fulfills its rightful purpose, for example, to tell the relationships of different roads, different places. However, if the map is outdated, hence, no longer serving its intrinsic value, it can still have a secondary value, either as an aesthetic or historical one. Objects, entities, etc. have intrinsic values given their primary purposes. There is nothing more to the expression. (8) The main difficulty of objectivism is its point that a value-object must exist antecedent to the occurrence of the value relation. If so, it must be any object. And it would have to say, with its absolute-property view, that all objects are capable of being valued, suggesting potentiality. But if all are potentially capable of being valued, there is no way of finding out which is and which one is not capable of being valued except after it, in fact, turns out to be so. To be an object capable of being valued is no different from simply being an object. Objectivism has not rescued "value" from its obscurity completely.

To say that there can be no total agreement on what a value/benefit is to someone, is not to say that it cannot be studied objectively and independent of personal tastes. Certainly, it is possible to study what items are wanted by whom, for what purposes, under what circumstances, etc. Or, to ask: "Why do they want them? What for?" Such questions inquire whether or not such wants can be shown to be of value/benefit, whether or not they do make a favourable change/difference in the lives of people. These are indications that although wants/benefits are person-relative, they are not necessarily beyond objective and empirical assessment.

In talking of appraising wants, whether they qualify as of value or not, it is also suggested that there are certain aspects of a person's judgments that something is of value which may be isolated and publicly questioned, independent of his conclusion that this something is of value to him. Perhaps, it will not be easy to convince him that what he claims to be of value to him is not actually so, especially if he has started to believe it. However, it may be easier to show him that his method of arriving at his conclusion is questionable. Already suggested is the point that there is an empirical/factual basis of what one claims to be of value. If one insists on certain properties of a thing to be of value to him, and it can be shown that these properties, translated capacities, are in no way related to his purposes, hence his purposes cannot be achieved by them, then it is sheer hard-headedness for the individual to go on claiming that the thing has the capacity to achieve his purposes for him. This is simply a matter of truth or falsity. There is also the matter of reasoning, whether it is valid or invalid. That a "want" may be of value to someone, does not mean that all his "wants" are therefore so. Arguments, too, may contain logical fallacies. And, as shown in the example of "to torture," there is also the matter of spurious definitions, grossly extending meanings of certain words until they are emptied of their sensible meanings. But no one has the license to distort the meaning of words in order to support a private view on a given matter. To the degree that these inadequacies may be noted in one's claim that something is of value/of benefit to him, then, to this degree is his claim questionable on public grounds, even if he argues that what he claims a value is only a value for/to him and is of no concern to anyone else.

That there are such cases that refuse to be examined sensibly is evident in the often heard expressions as "It is my value, that's all," "What I value, I value," or "That is just his value," suggesting either that they need not be taken seriously or they cannot be assessed rationally because of their "purely" subjective nature. But such cases must be distinguished from what has been termed here "of value/a value" and be labelled "objects of prizing." (9) To express a value is to appraise, which is also to judge. And as shown in the previous section, a judgment, insofar as it is a judgment, is grounded on evidence, reasons, and other publicly accepted standards. Some judgments are correctly called factual value judgments because they are more like findings than subjective, appreciative feelings. Some judgments in medical and nutritional sciences are of this nature. "Peter has lung cancer," judges the medical doctor. Or, "Spinach, because of its iron content, is good for growing children," advises the nutritionist. To prize, or the act of prizing, on the other hand, is a ". . . bestowal of value on a thing" (10) regardless of the value of the properties of the thing, whether or not the value bestowed responds to certain appropriate objective standards. Here, it is a matter of feelings, preferences, likings, favourings: ". . . prizing . . . is a matter of love." (11) It is to say: "No matter what the antique dealer says of my piece of jewelry, its value is all the world to me." We cannot question one's object of prizing or expression of personal valuation (or value) unless the corresponding process of evaluation/appraisal is also shown. The two, however, are related.

Notice, that to talk of a value/of value is ambiguous. It suggests either that which is valued, hence, suggestive of values (or valuations), or that it is an expression of appraisal or value judgment. (But, of course, to assess the value of a thing is not necessarily to commend it; nor, to say it is valued. Gold is found of much value these days -- this is an expression of appraisal -- but very few find it of value to them enough to buy it. Gold is not everybody's value, or prize.) In other words, when one is expressing a value judgment, he also knows what to value as a result of his judging/judgment. "One who can make accurate judgments, or appraisals, is also a person who has learned to prize what, according to his appraisals, has worth. Hence, his value judgments will be simultaneously an expression of his judgments based upon grounds of reasons and also expressions of his preferences, likes or favourings." (12)

In attempting to show that "wants" may or may not qualify as of value, the process of appraisal was invoked. It was then suggested that to appraise is to value, or to make a judgment of value, and as such it is capable of being discussed in terms of truth/falsity, validity, and meaningful reasons. Such standards apply to all claims to knowledge and to be considered knowledge or good claims to knowledge, such standards must to some extent be met. If they can apply to and can be met by value questions, then, such are not empty of rational considerations. Since we have attempted to show that value questions do indeed meet these conditions, then value questions can be considered as educational matters and can, therefore, be taught. The activities here pertain to attempts at making knowledge claims which may be described as "making judgments of value/worth." Is this to stress the teaching of the process of evaluation, appraisal, or making of "sound" value judgments to the disregard of the teaching of values/valuations? Not so. Both are emphasized, for the argument is that when one knows how to make a sound value judgment, then, he also knows what to value, what items he can claim to be of value/benefit because he has good grounds for saying so. Values such as physical health, happiness, pleasures, love, honesty, loyalty, trust, altruism, and many more, need no apology. There is much evidence to show that these are of value, that is, they are able to confer certain benefits to those who hold on to them and also the benefits are of such magnitude that they extend to all members of one's society and even to those of other lands. The idea that "values" are discursive and are formed non-rationally, hence, cannot be taught (but may be forced down the learner's throat) is rejected. There is nothing in the meaning of the concept "values" that says that "values" are necessarily non-rational. They need not be. (13)

Now, what of the expression "the values of the individual?" It has been stated that if one knows how to assess the value of something, then, it is also to say that he has certain values which guide him in the making of his judgments. What then does the above expression mean? When one says: "I value rationality" he cannot say at the same time "I never bother to practise it." Nor can he say: "I do not care much about rationality." Again, to say: "I value my health" is also to say "I perform certain activities, such as eating well, sleeping decent number of hours, which preserve/enhance my health and I refrain from doing certain other activities which are injurious to it. I minimize my smoking." All these expressions suggest a tendency to act in one way or another, which actions constitute the meaning and fulfillment of the claimed value. From these, it may be gathered that the "values of an individual" are his ". . . tendencies/dispositions to behave in certain ways which can be ascertained by observation." (14) One's values then can be publicly assessed, for one thing whether it is true that what one claims to be his value is in truth (as observed) his value. The discrepancy between what one says and what one does with regard to what he says is only too well known. (This point will be touched on briefly in another section.)

Along with dispositions, one's values are also akin to beliefs and convictions. When one says: "I value education" it is absurd for him to say "I do not, however, believe in it" or say "I do not cherish it." To say "My values are my guide in decision-making" is also to say "I believe in my values." One's values are also one's convictions because convictions tend to issue in action, they are behavioural tendencies to action. A belief is also sometimes described as a conviction favourable to action. Although in conviction there is a suggestion of the degree of intensity of held beliefs which is not explicit in beliefs, thus: "My beliefs convicted me of my behaviour" or one acts out his beliefs because of the "courage of his convictions." Action, then, is a feature shared necessarily by beliefs, convictions, and values; hence, values is also used in the sense of beliefs, or convictions. When used in this way, then, the relationship of values to eternal ideas, beliefs about goodness, moral emotions, ideals, norms, spiritual principles is suggested. Sometimes, of course, values are wrongly reduced to any one of them. But action is a necessary condition of "one's values," which may not be so with all of these terms. They are suggestive of sets of established criteria, static rather than dynamic, descriptive rather than behaviouristic. As such, they are not necessarily related to values, only associated with the concept. That is, their relationship is more psychological rather than logical.

When values are wrongly reduced to these terms, then the idea of "what one does one ought not to do" is encouraged. Values, then, are taken as merely ideals or norms. But, the ideals or norms which are employed to judge the individual's behaviour are independent of him and may not be related to his wants. They, moreover, may constitute the so-called "collective, settled wisdom of society" which tends to be treated as "objective truths," handed down from one generation to another, but rarely, if at all, participated in by its members. In actuality, such claimed values, unrelated to the times and not participated in by its members, have fossilized. Empty of content, they remain as rituals, ceremonials, incapable of informing or correcting behaviour, resulting in the discrepancy between them and the individual's actions. But they may continue to be claimed as values depending upon the feelings of society toward them. Norms and ideals function as "decorations" of society, arousing one's sympathies and positive feelings toward one's own.

Like the value of a thing, appraised for its evaluative property and its ". . . capacity to confer a benefit on someone, to make a favourable difference to his life," (15) one's values also necessarily claim to benefit him. One tends to actualize his values if he knows or if he has good grounds for believing that the consequences of his action will secure his intended benefit for him. If I claim that church membership is one of my values and observing my obligations never gave me a feeling of being blessed, but only being asked for monetary donations, then I begin to question my saying that church membership is one of my values; it does not seem to do me any good. "A person's disposition to devote his resources in certain ways constitute his values if he takes them to be beneficial, to be good ways of expending his resources, or to make his life better than other ways would." (16)

Earlier, it was suggested that "wants" and "values" are related in the sense that something judged to be "of value" starts as a "want." When appraised, it may turn out to be "of value/a value." Now, whenever one says that he wants something, he usually gets it; usually knows what it is that he wants. What one wants, one usually does. For "wants" are mostly motivational; often we act according to our wants. Now, if the values of a person are associated with wants, it is because the values of a person are also associated with tendencies/dispositions to action. "Values are measures of tendencies of persons to promote certain ends because they take the attainment of these ends to make a favourable difference to peoples' lives." (17) There are, of course, different kinds of dispositions, among them, for example, are intellectual dispositions, the tendency to behave in a certain way with the cognitive, rather than affective, elements dominating. If values of a person are his dispositions, then, they are also attitudinal dispositions. They are not merely inclinations or dispositions but also are a "complex organization of thoughts, ideas, or beliefs which are given a degree of cohesion by a necessary component of feeling . . ." (18) Values as attitudinal dispositions partake of affective elements. One's values then are necessarily complex, and, somehow they have a stubbornness, a lasting quality, invested as they are with much feeling and thought, intellect and emotion. Values then partake of feelings but they are not merely feelings. And even as they are complex, certain aspects can be isolated and be subjected to objective assessment, in order that they be judged sound or not.

For values, characterized by appraisal elements, are also formed on certain publicly accepted grounds, for example, those of evidence, of logic, and meaningful reasons. As such, no one can say that the grounds for forming his values are only those arbitrary to him, since his values are his own. If that which is of value is of value to him only, then it is also of limited value. It is not necessarily of value to others. What if it conflicts with other values in society? To dismiss the point by saying "My values are my own and society has nothing to do with them" is to misunderstand the problem of values. Value-questions arise in the context of society, when in the complex network of human social relationships, conflicts of interests are generated. If one were all by himself, he would not need to ask himself: "What ought I to do considering myself only?" When values clash with each other, they need to be justified on grounds publicly acceptable to all, the grounds of knowledge. Decisions on value questions cannot be arbitrary for to be arbitrary is to contradict the nature of value claims. An arbitrary decision, empty of reasonable grounds, is not a judgment of value/worth. It is to say: "I want" not "I value."

In sum, the argument in this paper is that there are public aspects to the questions of values and evaluative/appraisal process. In analyzing the expressions "a value/of value" and "values of the individual," it was shown that their problems are not necessarily beyond verification and validation. Value problems are rational considerations; as such, they can be acknowledged as claims to knowledge. And the more we know of human beings and their wants, it could also be possible that knowledge (true statements) of values could be generated. If values can be taken as knowledge/good knowledge claims, and there are indications that they can be, then they can be taught and, sometime, can perhaps partake of the universality of scientific truths. "A sound judgment anywhere could be a sound judgment everywhere." To be able to say this, with good reasons and appropriate evidences, could be the beginning of the development of universal values for all mankind.

Documentations

1. See: Douglas Superka, "Approaches to Values Education," Social Science Education Consortium Newsletter, No. 20 (November, 1974), 1-4.

2. Louis E. Raths, et.al., Values and Teaching. Columbus, Ohio: Merrill Books, Inc., 1966, p. 9.

3. Ibid., p. 10.

4. According to Superka, some of the approaches to values education are: evocation, inculcation, awareness, moral reasoning, analysis, clarification, commitment, and union. See: Douglas Superka, op.cit. For the popularly known teaching strategies of Sidney B. Simon, see his: Values Clarification. New York: Hart, 1972.

5. Superka, ibid.

6. For some of these points here, see: Kurt Baier, "What is Value" in Kurt Baier and Nicholas Rescher, eds., Values and the Future. New York: Free Press, 1969, pp. 33-67.

7. Kurt Baier, ibid., p. 38.

8. The example here is taken from Kurt Baier, ibid., p. 50.

9. See: Thomas E. Green, The Activities of Teaching. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971, p. 183.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 184.

13. See: Donald G. Arnstine, "Some Problems in Teaching Values," Educational Theory, Vol. XI, No. 3 (July, 1961), 158-167. For a sociological analysis of value formation, see a brief and readable account in Pat Duffy Hutcheon, "Value Theory: Toward Conceptual Clarification," The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, (June 1972), 172-187.

14. Kurt Baier, op.cit., p. 40.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., p. 41.

17. Ibid., p. 56.

18. D. Krech and R. S. Crutchfield, Elements of Psychology, 1958, p. 671.

CHAPTER XVI

AN EDUCATIONAL CLIMATE FOR A PROCESS OF VALUING

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Preliminary Statement. Living in such a rapidly expanding society, it becomes increasingly important that our citizens be capable of handling problems, not only on an individual level, but also on a level which might be of benefit to others. How might this be accomplished? What role shall the schools play, not only in helping citizens define the problems of society, but also in equipping these citizens with the necessary skills to solve the problems which will confront them, both now and in the future? How can one possibly predict what society will be like in the year 2000? No matter how unreasonable it may seem, is it imperative that the schools even consider the role of the individual in the year 2000? Is there a need for a change in the direction of education, not only to meet the needs of tomorrow's culture, but also to meet the needs of today's?

> . . . there are far too many children in the schools today who do not seem to learn as well as they might because they simply are not clear about what their lives are for, what is worth working for. We put into this category those children whom teachers recognize as being very apathetic, flighty, uncertain, or inconsistent, or who are drifters, overconformers, overdissenters, or role players. One thing which unites them all is that they have not yet found a meaningful role for their lives and are therefore unable or unwilling to marshall up their full intellectual resources for use in the crucial game of living. Could it be . . . that the pace and complexity of modern life has so exacerbated the problem of deciding what is good and what is right and what is worthy and what is desirable that large numbers of children are finding it increasingly bewildering, even overwhelming, to decide what is worth valuing, what is worth one's time and energy? (19:7)

Perhaps the most unfortunate attitude held by many educators relative to the concept of the role of education in our culture is that in our schools we are adequately meeting the needs of our citizens today by leading them by the hand through a curriculum overflowing with relevant information which will help them be the "leaders of tomorrow." By allowing the student every opportunity not to think, not to accept any responsibilities, and not to consider meaningful roles for their lives both now and in the future, our schools are instead rationalizing the fact that they are developing leaders and capable citizens for today, and hiding their heads in the sand when someone asks, "How will these people be able to solve their own problems and decide how and what to value in the future?"

To place all schools arbitrarily in this category would be to do a great discredit to those educational systems which are attempting to graduate students who can think critically and independently, and will undoubtedly be capable of resolving problems and making decisions about how and what to value, without someone resembling a teacher standing over them directing their every move while the students memorize the battles of the Revolutionary War. However, the schools which are determined to tell students what to think and value concerning a society which may already have changed to the degree that it is hardly recognizable, are still numerous enough to cause Rogers great concern:

> The world is changing at an exponential rate. If our society is to meet the challenge of the dizzying changes in science, technology, communications, and social relationships, we cannot rest on the answers provided by the past, but must put our trust in the processes by which new problems are met. For, so quickly does change overtake us that answers, "knowledge," methods, skills, become obsolete almost at the moment of their achievement . . . . In the world which is already upon us, the goal of education must be to develop individuals who are open to change, who are flexible and adaptive, who have learned how to learn, and are thus able to learn continuously . . . . educators themselves must be open and flexible, effectively involved in the processes of change. They must be able both to conserve and convey the essential knowledge and values of the past, and to welcome eagerly the innovations which are necessary to prepare for the unknown future. (20:17-18)

Rogers went on to say that within the educational system, considered as a whole, methods must be found to develop a situation in which personal growth is considered important and innovation is not something to be feared. The climate in this educational system, according to Rogers, must be upon the facilitation of self-directed learning, not upon teaching. The individual must be aware of all of his experience, accepting it to the degree that he realizes this experience is constantly in the process of changing to meet new demands of society. (20:17-18) The concerns of Rogers must also be considered when discussing values and teaching.

> We therefore see values as constantly being related to the experiences that shape them and test them. They are not, for any one person, so much hard and fast verities as they are the results of hammering out a style of life in a

> certain set of surroundings. After a sufficient amount of hammering, certain patterns of evaluating and behaving tend to develop. Certain things are treated as right, or desirable, or worthy. These tend to become our values . . . We shall be less concerned with the particular value outcomes of any one person's experiences than we will with the process that he uses to obtain his values . . . . From this assumption comes what we call the process of valuing. (19:28)

The emphasis in this chapter is on the process of valuing, rather than the teaching of values, and the difference is more than a slight shifting of words -- it is indeed a difference in degree, not in kind. The climate that should exist in which values clarification might occur will be discussed, but not the outcomes of establishing such a climate. If values are highly personal (and this author suggests that they are), then to specify which values are to be taught in our schools would be highly personal. Instead of specifying values, the author would prefer to describe a climate which he feels must exist in the classroom if the consideration of value alternatives and consequences is to occur. The writer supports the belief of some that because youth are bombarded today with so many conflicting value positions, the primary service the school setting can provide is to create an environment wherein value clarification can begin. The reader will note that in earlier statements in this chapter, the author has been careful to use this phrase: "how and what to value." This was not by accident. It is necessary to know how to value in order to make any sense out of what to value, as well as making alterations in value positions throughout life. Specifying a process for valuing does not make any pre-determined judgments about what values are "good" or "bad." We have a system of voting in our country. This system is a "process" and does not always guarantee that voters will make "good" decisions relative to placing people into elected office. The process is guaranteed, but not the products. The same is true for values and valuing.

Because the author's subject area teaching field is social studies, the examples provided in this chapter were drawn from that area. Although the process of valuing must permeate the entire school scene, much emphasis has been given over to this process in the last ten years by social studies educators in our country.

An Analysis of Society and Culture. The writer feels that it is important to have an understanding of the roles played by society and culture in education, in order to gain a better perception of how these roles relate to a process of valuing.

If we are really convinced that the democratic "process" is the best form of government under which to live, then it seems reasonable to assume that these same ideas should be related directly to our schools. For how can we live a democratic process outside the schools and expect our students to accept any other process inside the schools? What does democracy mean for the valuing process? A partial answer lies in the definition of democracy given by Bayles: "We propose that democracy should be defined as equality of opportunity to participate in making group decisions and equality of obligation to abide by them, once they are made, and until they are revised or rescinded." (1:157)

> Defining democracy as above places no limitations on the laws that a people may enact, as long as the enactment-stipulation is satisfied. The process of lawmaking is stipulated, but not the product. Therefore bad laws may be enacted as well as good ones, both kinds democratically. Democracy does not specify nor guarantee that laws must be good ones -- that they must promote the general welfare or satisfy any other criterion for goodness. This is the danger that forever faces a democratic people; it can democratically make mistakes as well as avoid them . . . . By defining democracy as process rather than as product (as the definition does), no properly enacted law violates the definition. Even if one law contradicts or negates another, if we wish it that way, that way it shall be. (2:71-72)

This same process applies directly to valuing. Values which are deemed "good" and "bad" are only in the "eyes of the beholder." This is in itself a value judgment. We must afford students the same freedom in making mistakes which Bayles discusses above. The freedom to make mistakes is a luxury not reserved to adults. As teachers, we should not shield students and try to create an artificial vacuum around their lives. We become afraid students will not adopt "our" values and beliefs, and therefore the tendency is to impose instead of providing a climate wherein students can explore, discover they have made mistakes, and learn. The question then is: If we do this, what are the protections that prevent unwise and irresponsible behavior? Bayles identified two safeguards in his definition of democracy which also apply to the valuing process. The first safeguard is in the latter part of the definition of democracy itself. The idea that we must live with whatever laws we make is a very powerful concept. As Bayles said: "If we have to lie in the bed we make, we tend to exercise care in its making." (2:72) If we feel a commitment to live by those values we cherish, we may exercise care in the selection and prioritizing processes. The second safeguard, according to Bayles, is educational. "We need not only to want to do as well as we can, but we also need to become as able as we can." (2:72)

Isn't it possible to arrive at these same societal conclusions relative to democracy as they might pertain to the schools? Education in a democracy should help members of society find a consensus in their central values, and a consensus on the meaning of democracy, but in ways which are in keeping with the requirements of a democratic culture: not indoctrination, but in terms of equality of opportunity, and equality of obligation. An apt term for describing the task of education in a democracy is "creative resolution of conflict." (11:10-11)

The writer has found the following criteria useful in describing the process of valuing in a democracy: choosing freely, choosing from among alternatives, choosing after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative, prizing and cherishing, affirming, acting upon choices, repeating. (19:28-29) These criteria are described in much greater detail in Values and Teaching; however, the authors make a point that these criteria, taken collectively, comprise the process of valuing. If one is omitted, or is incomplete, the process has not been used in its entirety.

Instead of viewing values and teaching as a process, teachers have traditionally done one or more of the following in teaching values:

> 1. Moralizing is the direct, although sometimes subtle, inculcation of the adult's values upon the young. . .
>
> 2. Some adults maintain a laissez-faire attitude toward the transmission of values. The rationale here is: No one value system is right for everyone. People have to forge their own set of values. So I'll just let my children or students do and think what they want without intervening in any way; and eventually everything will turn out all right. . . .
>
> 3. Modeling is a third approach in transmitting values. The rationale here is: "I will present myself as an attractive model who lives by a certain set of values. The young people with whom I come in contact will be duly impressed by me and by my values, and will want to adopt and emulate my attitudes and behavior." (22:15-18)

Raths, et.al., had similar examples of ways that have been suggested for "helping" children develop values:

> 1. Setting an example. . . .
>
> 2. Persuading and convincing. . . .
>
> 3. Limiting choices by giving children choices only among values "we" accept. . . .
>
> 4. Inspiring by dramatic or emotional pleas for certain values. . . .
>
> 5. Rules and regulations intended to contain and mold behavior until it is unthinkingly accepted as "right". . . .
>
> 6. Cultural or religious dogma presented as unquestioned wisdom or principle. . . .
>
> 7. Appeals to conscience, appeals to the still, small voice that we assume is within the heart of everyone. (19:39-40)

These same authors were concerned about the above-mentioned traditional methods of teaching values when they asked:

> Why must teachers see their role only as putting things into the mind of the child? Why can't a role be defined that would help a child take all the confusion that already exists in his mind, remove it, look at it, examine it, turn it around, and make some order out of it? Why can't teachers learn to spend some of their time helping children understand what the bewildering array of beliefs and attitudes that saturate our modern life are all about and which suits him best? Is this not the road to values, to clear and personal values? (19:45)

Hilda Taba, in her book, Curriculum Development: Theory and Practice describes three current conceptions of the function of the school in society. It is necessary to examine these in answering the questions raised above. The three ideas suggested by Taba are: (1) schools as the preserver and transmitter of cultural heritage; (2) schools as the instrument for transforming culture; and (3) schools as the means for individual development. Taba said in discussing these three functions of the school, that an educational program based on any one of the three is inadequate. The writer will take each of these ideas, discuss them in turn, and suggest the importance of these relative to a process of valuing.

In the first alternative, we have man as a rational animal, and the chief function of education is to develop the rational mind. Education then becomes the cultivation of the intellect. The premise here is that if the faculties of the mind are developed in balance, man will lead the "good" life. "This group argues that since all cultural traditions have roots, cultural continuity is possible only if education preserves this heritage by passing on the truths worked out in the past to the new generations, thus developing a common cultural background and loyalties." (23:18-19) The Harvard Report on General Education points out that it is the function of the school "to pass on the inherited view of man and society, and that its main task is to perpetuate such ideas as the dignity of man and common beliefs in what is good. . . . It is the business of education to instill a commitment to these truths." (23:18-19) The writer's question here is "How do we do this in light of the teaching of values as a process?" Fenton considered the following questions, which seem relevant at this point:

> 1. Should social studies education try to help preserve American culture by passing on its values? If so, how? Should teachers endorse the values of their culture over those of other cultures? Should positive attitudes toward the democratic law-making process be taught, beyond simple compliance with laws as a procedural necessity?
>
> 2. What . . . does the word "democracy" . . . mean?
>
> 3. How best can citizenship be defined for the education of the young so that they can function in a changing world and yet adhere to the ideals of our democratic society? (9:64)

After listing these questions, Fenton inserted the following thoughts:

> "Transmitting our culture" in a changing society means self-examination and a certain detachment; for, unless our analyses are good, our teachings may go into limbo with the passing of some special set of circumstances . . . . One great danger we face under this system is not that the child

> will be rebellious or insufficiently docile -- but that he will learn his lesson of docility too well. Our schools impose the school schedule, the subject matter, the personnel, the forms of discipline; in all these matters the child takes what is offered. As long as he accepts these arrangements as the condition of his progress toward adulthood, his docility in these matters does not interfere with a later independence. But the training is overwhelmingly in docility rather than in self-reliance and independence, and many adults have obviously been overinfluenced by this training. They find dependency hard to relinquish. (9:68-71)

The author was not only concerned with the child learning the lesson of dependency too well, but also learning the lesson of allowing his moral conduct to be imposed upon him from without, rather than from within.

Is cultural continuity possible only if truths are passed on? Can we ask the learner to accept culture as having value, without teaching him how it came to be? Yes, we can ask him, but should we? As an example, do we indoctrinate children in the traditions of patriotism, or do we follow a step-by-step analysis of this concept? The key question to this entire position is: Do we impose our values on someone, or rather do we allow them to establish a personal set of values for themselves? What are these truths, and how do we teach them? Along with "transmitting cultural heritage" must go the acquisition of self-reliance and independence. Patrick also attempted an answer to these questions:

> . . . One might interpret the findings of political socialization research as leading to the conclusion that fresh positive efforts should be made to improve the political socialization strategies of American schools . . . . Social reconstructionism according to a preconceived blueprint of immutable "truths" is certainly not consistent with the previously mentioned ideological orientation. Rather it is assumed that central to the improvement of political socialization strategies of secondary schools should be efforts to keep the socialization process open-ended by providing young people with the tools to reflectively think about their beliefs, with dispositions to critically examine traditional practices, and with an educational atmosphere conducive to reflective thinking. (16:71-72)

The second alternative, as introduced by Patrick, is the reconstructionist theory. In this idea, we supposedly look at society, see the needs, and then educate the people to go forth and make the necessary changes. It is based upon the fact that society changes, and not upon the fact that there are eternal truths.

> The main thesis of this group was that the school is not merely a residual institution to maintain things as they are: education has a creative function to play in the shaping of individuals and through them in the shaping of the culture . . . . The main theses of the reconstructionist position are somewhat as follows: the transformation of society by technological and scientific revolution is so radical as to require a new moral and intellectual consensus capable of molding and directing this transformation. It is the task of educators to analyze the social trends, to discern the problems society is facing, to speculate on the consequences of the current social dynamics, and to project the values and the goals which need to be sought to maintain a democratic way of life . . . . Critical examination and reconstruction of the cultural heritage -- in the light of current problems and conditions, rather than inculcation of traditional ideas, must constitute the core of the educational program of today. (23:23-27)

Is no one else responsible for analyzing the social trends, except the educators? What role does society play in deciding what needs to be sought "to maintain a democratic way of life?" What is meant by "molding and directing?" What do we mean by "shaping individuals?" How do we predict what society will be like twenty-five years from now? How valid is it to decide upon values of any kind by reconstructing society alone, and considering no other alternatives?

The third alternative, as presented by Taba, is that it is the function of the school to develop the individual. "The idea was to move the child into the center of educational activity and to allow him freedom to develop as a unique personality." (23:28) A more moderate conception of individual development as discussed by Taba "included concern with the needs of the individual and with his fullest opportunity for self-realization in an intellectual as well as emotional sense, while recognizing that this development needs to combine social and intellectual discipline and freedom in reasonable balance." (23:28) Again a question arises: Are we taking the student out of a situation in which he had relatively little freedom and placing him in a situation in which he has too much freedom? Does the child have complete freedom in making the rules by which he lives in the classroom, or in the learning situation? This attitude resembles the laissez-faire approach mentioned earlier in this chapter. When Bayles discussed "equality of opportunity" in making group decisions, this could be interpreted as a desire to have a cooperative student-teacher process in arriving at procedures best designed to develop the individual and initiate and sustain the valuing process.

As Taba concluded, it seems that no one of these by itself can answer the problem of the school's relationship to society; "the overlapping in these conceptions are too great to make possible a refined classification of concepts of the function of education." (23:18)

It would appear rather difficult to find the function of education in society alone. We cannot blindly accept the values of society for education, but we must make a professional interpretation of these values, and this involves something different than reconstructionism. If we are going to have a democratic system of education, we must realize that our ideas of what constitutes "democracy" are constantly changing, to meet new conditions. Teaching and learning and educational values must reflect the needs of the learners. There is a need to equip students to meet and cope with change. Students should learn under their own initiative, with an abiding interest in doing so.

In the 1970's the schools would, at the very least, seem to have these four major tasks:

1. The task of strengthening general rather than special education;

2. The task of creating minds capable of coping with a fast-changing world;

3. The task of providing value orientation. Do we instill the values we want our students to have, or do we lead them to consider the consequences of accepting or rejecting any of these values? Do we ask them to commit themselves to values which will help them later in life? The writer feels we do, with the understanding that future developments might alter these values. Does everyone have the right to his own opinion concerning what he values? As long as this opinion is a considered opinion, students have a right to value those things important to them. How does an opinion become a considered opinion? As long as one follows

the seven criteria listed earlier for the valuing process, opinions will be thought to be considered.

4. The task of developing new insights into the dynamics of individual behavior.

Perhaps at this point we should differentiate between society and culture. Simply stated, society would be current factors, and culture would be the broader patterns of different types of society. It is a design or pattern of shared regularities and expectations. Immediately we come to the problem of relating personality and character in terms of cultural concepts.

In his book, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of a Changing American Character, Riesman distinguishes various types of socialization in culture. These are: (1) tradition-directed -- a tendency to follow tradition; (2) inner-directed -- early development of an internalized set of goals; (3) other-directed -- tendency to be sensitized to the expectations and preferences of others. The question becomes one, then, of how to reduce overadjustment, conformity, and anomie, and how to support individuality and autonomy in this age. The function of the schools is to move the student from a situation in which he is basically other-directed, to a situation in which he is basically self-directed, in which he can think and act for himself. The student may begin his educational career being directed by a teacher, but hopefully he will end this career directing himself in the kinds of activities which appear most meaningful to him. The student must have the freedom to utilize the seven criteria which taken together comprise the valuing process. The writer would maintain that the concept of personality of culture is phenomenological in nature. The meaning we give to culture is what we make it to be. The individual is not governed by his environment, nor does he master it; but we see environment and culture in terms of how it relates to our concept of self and how we see our self. We develop a concept of self and a relation to culture through our interaction with different things. This is also another way to describe the valuing process.

We have a tendency to be ethnocentric and concentrate on our culture. However, again, "culture" means different things to different people, depending upon their perceptions. For example, people living in a "culturally deprived" area tend to perceive their culture differently perhaps than those not living in that area. Consequently, our value patterns will develop out of the things we see as significant, growing out of our experiences.

Teaching/Learning and the Valuing Process. Before discussing the teaching/learning process which complements the valuing process, it is necessary to enter a brief discussion of human behavior. This behavior is based on theory -- we do A because we theorize it will produce B. This behavior is based on assumptions about people, what they are like and what their nature is. When we have different assumptions about what other people are like, we relate to these people differently. If we think people are naturally "bad" we relate to them in this way. Witness the teacher who just cannot leave his class alone during a test, because they're sure to cheat. Isn't it too bad the teacher created the kind of atmosphere in that class where students felt they had to cheat to survive? If we think people have the capability for good, we tend to relate to them in positive ways. The self-fulfilling prophecy usually proves us right -- if we expect bad, that's what we get, and if we look for good, we usually can find it. Gordon Allport has specified three psychological models about the nature of man. The first model is that man is a reactive being. Here we see man being pushed and pulled around by the stimuli in his physical environment. He is not proactive in the sense that he controls or wishes things to happen in certain ways. He is reactive, and his behavior is controlled by his environment. The second model is man as a reactive being in depth. Here man's behavior is a function of things of which he is unaware. The third model shows man as being-in-process of becoming. Man has the potential for good, and this potential is nurtured by his environment. Man is not controlled by his environment, nor does man do the controlling over environment. Rather, man and environment are constantly interacting as man is in the process of becoming.

These three models are not verifiable in the scientific sense. There is no way to establish the "truth" about man's nature. E. G. Williamson once said that he did not like the word truth. He said, "Truth is a shady spot where we sit down to eat our lunch before moving on." (17, 1972:119-120)

Douglas McGregor in The Human Side of Enterprise has developed two theories to explain human behavior. The traditional view of man, widely held, was labeled "X" and seemed to be based on the following set of assumptions:

1. People are naturally lazy; they prefer to do nothing.

2. People work mostly for money and status rewards.

3. The main force keeping people productive in their work is fear of being demoted or fired.

4. People remain children grown larger; they are naturally dependent on leaders.

5. People expect and depend on direction from above; they do not think for themselves.

6. People need to be told, shown and trained in proper methods of work.

7. People need supervisors who will watch them closely enough to be able to praise good work and reprimand errors.

8. People have little concern beyond their immediate, material interests.

9. People need specific instruction on what to do and how to do it; larger policy issues are none of their business.

10. People appreciate being treated with courtesy.

11. People are naturally compartmentalized; work demands are entirely different from leisure activities.

12. People naturally resist change, they prefer to stay in the old ruts.

13. Jobs are primary and must be done; people are selected, trained, and fitted to predefined jobs.

14. People are formed by heredity, childhood, and youth; as adults they remain static; old dogs don't learn new tricks.

15. People need to be "inspired" or pushed or driven.

Another view of man was called "Y" or theory "Y". This set of assumptions about the nature of man is set out below:

1. People are naturally active; they set goals and enjoy striving.

2. People seek many satisfactions in work; pride in achievement; enjoyment of process, sense of contribution; pleasure in association; stimulation of new challenges.

3. The main force keeping people productive in their work is desire to achieve their personal and social goals.

4. People normally mature beyond childhood; they aspire to independence, self-fulfillment, and responsibility.

5. People close to the situation see and feel what is needed and are capable of self-direction.

6. People who understand and care about what they are doing can devise and improve their own methods of doing work.

7. People need a sense that they are respected as capable of assuming responsibility and self-correction.

8. People seek to give meaning to their lives by identifying with nations, communities, churches, unions, companies, and causes.

9. People need ever-increasing understanding; they need to grasp the meaning of the activities in which they are engaged; they have cognitive hunger in extension into the universe.

10. People crave genuine respect from their fellow man.

11. People are naturally integrated; when work and play are too sharply separated both deteriorate; "The only reason a wise man can give for preferring leisure to work is the better quality of the work he can do during leisure."

12. People naturally tire of monotonous routine and enjoy new experiences; in some degree everyone is creative.

13. People are primary and seek self-realization; jobs must be designed, modified and fitted to people.

14. People constantly grow; it is never too late to learn; they enjoy learning and increasing their understanding and capability.

15. People need to be released and encouraged and assisted.

The need is to make our assumptions about human behavior more explicit and to check how well our own behavior reflects our assumptions. Theory Y is more dynamic than X, more optimistic about the possibility for human growth and development, more concerned with self-direction and self-responsibility, more consistent with the available social science knowledge. The kind of environment necessary to allow the process of valuing to occur is the Theory Y environment depicted by McGregor, and the being-in-process of becoming depicted by Allport. The student must have an opportunity to interact with his environment, and we as teachers must afford to students the freedom to become. It is vital to understand that the way we view man and his behaving has a tremendous impact in the way we perceive the value-forming process.

What type of teaching is most complementary to the learning atmosphere described above? The writer feels that the method known as reflective teaching deserves consideration. How can reflective teaching facilitate the valuing process? "If, in addition to developing as many insights and as deep, penetrating, dependable, and inclusive ones as possible, democratic education is to be focally concerned with enhancing the capacity to develop insights independently, it follows that a basic education objective is to teach students how to think as well as what to think." (2:76) And if we are to keep within the framework of democracy, it would seem that we would want to "promote more adequate and more harmonious student outlooks on the life of which they are (or foreseeably will be) a part, and heightened capacity to reconstruct outlooks independently." (2:99) Reflective teaching and learning is a process of arriving at I-don't-know situations. The first step is problem-raising (arriving at a "fork-in-the-road"), and the second step is problem-solving.

Reflective teaching is problem-centered teaching, and the fact that genuine problems which are meaningful to the students are being considered distinguishes reflective teaching from nonreflective teaching. "At the outset of the study, a real question develops for which students have no answer, or at least no adequate one. And through the study the students and teacher, working cooperatively, develop a new or more adequate solution." (3:327) The teacher acts more as a guide, and the class is involved actively in attempting to arrive at tentative conclusions. The word "tentative" is used, because the conclusions reached by the class will not be final, fixed conclusions; but, rather, they will be conclusions which are left open, pending further investigation. Once the valuing process is complete (i.e., all seven criteria implemented and tentative conclusions reached) it is necessary to continue using the criteria -- future conclusions will quite likely alter present determinations. The teacher guides the students by posing hypotheses, insisting upon definitions, and separating facts from value judgments.

> To accomplish this, the teacher uses approaches which help students become aware of the beliefs and behaviors they prize and would be willing to stand up for in and out of the classroom. He uses materials and methods which encourage students to consider alternative modes of thinking and acting. Students learn to weigh the pros and cons and the consequences of the various alternatives. The teacher also helps the students to consider whether their actions match their stated beliefs and if not, how to bring the two into closer harmony. Finally, he tries to give students options, in and out of class; for only when students begin to make their own choices and evaluate the actual consequences, do they develop their own values. (22:20)

Summary. This chapter has been concerned with creating a climate in and out of school wherein the valuing process might occur. This climate needs to extend beyond the classroom and encircle our students' lives. We're making a plea for consistency. We do not want "life" to be one thing and "school" to be something else. The two should be completely interrelated. If teachers feel comfortable teaching, and in fact being, in the kind of environment described in this chapter, the criteria which comprise the valuing process will take care of themselves.

There are numerous examples of the use of values in the classroom. The book Values Clarification: A Handbook of Practical Strategies for Teachers and Students contains numerous values-oriented activities, representative of each of the seven criteria of the valuing process. The reader is urged to familiarize himself with this publication. The publications from University Associates (17, 18) provide excellent activities and springboards for value clarification.

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CHAPTER XVII

TEACHING, VALUES, AND VALUING

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For some time philosophers of education have claimed to be hampered in their philosophizing about education because of the ambiguity of the concept 'education.' It is as if the changes in knowledge brought about by new empirical inquiries and methodologies has made heretofore acceptable criteria for using this concept no longer adequate. And, since it is the philosopher who must see to it that such problems of language use are set right, it would seem that attempts at philosophizing about education without a clear understanding of what 'education' means (i.e., how the term is to be used) are premature. But 'education' is not the only concept for which criteria must be reviewed and/or revised. 'Teaching,' the subject of several philosophical investigations over the past decade, still requires attention. Its relation to 'learning,' which itself has acquired new senses as a result of educational/psychological researches, as well as its relation to 'education' are but two of the many facets of this concept that need to be examined. That the title "The Teaching of Values" is at best very wide-ranging and at worst hopelessly confused bears witness to the ambiguity of this concept. Surely for some, this phrase represents a practice inherently worthwhile and [illegible] of promise for the "new generation" while for others it implies the most invidious form of indoctrination. And, if this were not trouble enough, just what values are to be taught? Personal values? Inherent values? Contributory values? Societal values? Is the teaching of values meant to form the basis of a moral education or is a moral education one wherein duties and obligations are made clear (i.e., rules are presented and the consequences of rule-breaking described in detail)? Is the teacher of values like the artist who unlocks new meanings in works of the masters or is he more like the Calvinist who describes but one way of seeing the world? And finally, is it correct at all to say that teachers can, do, or should teach values? Would it not be better to refine the students' processes of valuing -- to sharpen their criteria for holding or making certain value claims, or, does this shortchange them? Is the teacher attempting to provide the students with insights into what things are valuable by allowing them only to discuss and reappraise their own valuations and, if so, is this not like teaching the joys of gourmet cookery by concentrating on how to manipulate or choose utensils, balance ingredients, and how to chew and swallow? Surely there is more the teacher can do, or is there?

It will perhaps be objected that to raise so many questions while claiming that 'teaching' is ambiguous results only in a proliferation of problems and is, at base, a rather unfair practice. Surely the questions are difficult enough but the answers seem now to be almost impossible to give. What answers are considered will depend on how one understands the matter of "teaching values" which itself depends on how the concepts 'teaching' and 'value' are to be understood. And, as if this sort of analysis would not therefore be difficult enough, "teaching values" must be examined in the context of education (i.e., whatever is referred to by 'education') the aspects of which phenomenon important to these sorts of questions have yet to be clearly understood. But questions of the type above must be raised if for no other reason than they may inspire educational philosophers and practitioners to more carefully consider just what "teaching values" entails. It is impossible to answer these questions here and no attempt will be made to do so. What can be done, however, and what seems appropriate for a philosopher to do in a few words, is to attempt to put in clearer perspective some of the reasons why teaching, values, and valuing have been and are regarded as important ingredients of moral schooling.

To say that "X is teaching" is elliptical usually for "X is teaching something" which in turn is elliptical for "X is teaching something to Y." What is required of X is that he be knowledgeable of the something, at least as knowledgeable as is necessary for him to know what it is (e.g., that it is mathematics rather than english, geometry rather than algebra). And, besides a knowledge of what it is, X may be expected to be knowledgeable of how this something is to be presented to Y. Minimally this requires X's understanding of the easy-to-difficult sequencing of the something but may, and usually does require X's understanding of this sequencing with respect to Y. But more than X's understanding of the something and his understanding of it with respect to Y is implied by the statement "X is teaching." The something that is taught must be of value in X's estimation or X must accept that it is valued by someone whose interest(s) X represents. More than this, X must regard the something as valuable or regard it as "a valuable" in the eyes of those he represents for Y -- whether or not Y feels this way. An interesting distinction may be made here between in-school and out-of-school teaching. While certainly not true in all cases, it oftentimes is true that what X teaches is valued by Y when the teaching takes place out-of-school (i.e., where X is Y's friend, sister, music teacher). It may also not be altogether incorrect to say that when X is Y's father or mother that the something taught is valued and indeed is asked for by Y while the teaching of that which is felt by Y's father or mother but not by Y to be valuable for Y is left to Y's in-school teacher.

This may sound overly confusing but it surely is understandable. On the one hand one may say that all teaching has a purpose, that the person doing the teaching can give reasons for what he does in terms of its proposed effect(s). On the other one may say that all teaching involves values -- necessarily those of X or those whose interest(s) X represents and possibly those of Y as well. Thus the phrase "teaching of values" seems redundant. But it will be objected and rightly so that what is meant by persons who speak of teaching values concerns those cases wherein the something that is taught is a value rather than a something of value. It may, of course, be of value as well but this seems due more to the fact it is taught than for what it is. What then are these values which X can be said to teach? Goodness? Beauty? Truth? These are the sorts of values which it seems those interested in value-teaching must be considering. They certainly represent in a traditional sense the highest of values. But they present a problem in that each is quite abstract and the concepts "goodness," "beauty," "truth," are not easily defined. How then is X to teach these abstract concepts to Y? Will (or can) X approach this task as he would approach the teaching of mathematics or english? Or, will X have to use different teaching techniques?

If X teaches goodness to Y in the same way he teaches mathematics to Y, then X must know what goodness is, understand how to present it in the appropriate sequence for Y, and either value goodness himself or believe that those persons he represents value goodness. Assuming that no one does not value goodness, X need be concerned only with what goodness is. But what is the good? When asked in this way it is implied that the good exists independently of good acts, qualities, etc. . . That is, the good is to be known as the good not as a property of those things that are good, and, more importantly, not as a property of things considered as good by these people in this situation. In short, the result is much like that given by Moore -- the good is the good and is not so much known as it is intuited (since its character is not determined empirically). Thus, the teacher who teaches the good must either have intuited what the good is or have been told by those he represents what the good is -- the latter definition having been duly intuited. But perhaps the teacher does rely on those qualities and actions which are called good to pattern his teaching. If so, then what is taught may be those aspects of the good which are common to all these instances. But how many instances need be considered, across what cultures, and in which contexts? Minimally it seems as if the good that is taught must be multidimensional. It must be the good for each student taught, taking into consideration the culture and situation of each. Hence, it is "varieties of goodness" that must be taught. But remembering that whatever is taught must be of value to the teacher or to those persons the teacher represents, and that the good may be differentially or in some cases contradictorally defined, then the teacher may find himself expressing or representing many different if not opposite versions of the good in the classroom. How many versions can he manage to teach and how can he teach all that are required when for each student those situations considered may need to be treated uniquely? In fact, would it not be simpler to merely teach the students how to recognize the good when they see it -- each in his own situation? Surely this would enable the teacher to present a single subject matter to the students, a structure within which the students themselves may arrive at what is the good.

The subject matter of X's teaching may be 'valuing' or how-to-value rather than a description of one or more values themselves. And, while examples of the good, the beautiful, etc., could be used as possible valuables to be reviewed by X or by Y or by both X and Y together according to the method of valuing suggested, none of these examples themselves can be accepted as good, beautiful, etc., prior to such analysis at least in principle. One problem that arises, however, is just how these examples of the good, beautiful, etc., are to be chosen for review. The teacher may have some ideas or may have already reviewed several possibilities so that what is presented really is the good, the beautiful, etc. But this amounts to teaching the good and leads to some of the difficulties noted above. One might argue that the problems are different, that in this case the teacher is not so much teaching the value but the method of realizing what is of value. But what if the students come to the conclusion that what is reviewed is not of value? Can this happen if both the teacher and the students use the same method? It probably can and should since whatever the method its applicability and results must be person-specific. What, then, is the teacher to do? Suppose the students suggest examples of the good, the beautiful, etc., that the teacher is not especially convinced are really "important" examples of these values. If the teacher and students together evaluate the examples using the method previously presented will they all come to the decision that the examples are really examples of the good, the beautiful, etc.? Surely it is possible (and rather likely) that more than one view will emerge -- even with the same method used. It is here, then, that proponents of the teaching of how-to-value rather than of values themselves have to refrain from claiming that one method will produce necessary agreement on what is good, beautiful. And, it is here that they must regard the teacher and students as equally experienced, equally perceptive participants in determining what things are of value. This all sounds very well.

But even Dewey had some reservations about this sort of laissez-faire valuing. The teacher was not to allow any inquiries but was to have some plan for determining what inquiries would be most rewarding for the students. Thus one might say that at the least the teacher of how-to-value must have an idea of what student-given examples are worthy of further class study. But this may seem to border closely on teaching values as well as how-to-value. And, this sort of move from totally free to more controlled inquiry seems to correctly capture the spirit of Dewey as well as present a more realistic picture of how a teacher might approach the teaching of how-to-value. Is this sort of combination then the best of teaching strategies for examining values? Would the advocate of teaching values per se be likely to support this sort of position? The answer would seem to be no. Although many of the so-called neo-idealists in philosophy of education do claim that Dewey himself was a kind of idealist, espousing the educational relevance of the good, the beautiful, etc., and would accept the above position, Dewey himself does not truly represent their idea of what teaching values must necessarily include. What they seem to have in mind is a more Whiteheadian view, that the teacher has the responsibility to provide the students with as many insights into what is the good, the beautiful as he is able while allowing as well for student-oriented inquiries. This sort of position differs from the one above in that it allows for the teacher's insights as well as judgments.

In sum, then, the matters of teaching, values, and valuing are quite complex and in need of critical review. What has been done here is merely the briefest of preliminaries. It should be clear, however, that 'teaching' does itself involve values and/or valuing. And, neither "teaching values" nor "teaching valuing" alone seems sufficient for those concerned with the greater appreciation and understanding of the good, the beautiful, etc., by teachers and students.

CHAPTER XVIII

BASIC VALUES INHERENT IN SCHOOL PROGRAMS

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A wise man's heart discerneth both time and judgment. -- Ecclesiastes 8:5

I would have you wise unto that which is good. -- Romans 16:19

Follow not that which is evil, but that which is good. -- 3 John 1:11

Labor to keep alive in your breast that little spark of celestial fire -- conscience. -- George Washington

Sir, I would rather be right than President. -- Henry Clay

What is valuable is not new, and what is new is not valuable. -- Daniel Webster

Though admittedly difficult to accomplish, it is not impossible to identify a series of values that should be made the core of any educational program in this society. That such a series of values should be taught I take for granted. I shall have to try to show, however, why I believe this to be the case. To do so, it will be necessary to argue the inevitability of the schools' manifesting certain values in their instruction and in their social structures and to indicate how deliberate choice of the particular values they will manifest can be made from among an array of possible values, despite the natural differences of opinion that exist over such matters.

Whenever we make choices in schools between teaching one thing rather than another, between encouraging one attitude or behavior rather than another, between structuring young people's schedules and activities one way rather than another, between governing school affairs one way rather than another, we are laying the building blocks that will manifest certain school-sanctioned values which influence the values assumed by every pupil coming in contact with them. There is no escaping this fact. Education, both in its purposes and processes, is a moral enterprise. It is shot through with expressions of preferred values, and whatever values are represented as preferred, values of some kind are inescapably present in the day to day life of the school. (1)

Since schooling is a form of social intercourse, those values that are active in the exchanges between individuals (and between groups and also among groups and individuals) influence the formation of values by each person involved in schooling. This too is inevitable. Almost unconsciously, values are adopted by the uncommitted person from those being manifest in his social situation. If all those value preferences being expressed around him are received by him with a degree of personal psychic satisfaction, they become part of his repertoire of values. The more he matures in his acquiring of his own value preferences, the more he is likely to notice a sense of dissatisfaction arising within himself when he begins to recognize that some value preferences he has absorbed or adopted appear to be in conflict with certain others. At this point, he is forced to think, to sort out the conflicts, to reason why this value grates with that value in his psyche, and eventually reject certain values for himself in favor of others. (2)

Anyone who has ever taught school knows that these "givens" of any educational situation pose challenges and obligations in the realm of values education with which teachers and other responsible leaders in education must come to grips. There is first of all the problem of consistency or inconsistency of the values being manifest by the curricular and social structures of the schools. Within the curriculum or within the norms of the school society, as well as between the two, there can be conflicting or irreconcilable values being manifest. It is extremely important that these each be made internally consistent and then consistent with each other if we are dealing with young people who would be overwhelmed by the need to sort out their own value conflicts should a number of value inconsistencies be present in their studies, their school norms, or both.

One cannot easily say when a child can begin successfully to cope with his own value conflicts and at what rate those coming at him can be reconciled; every child differs in this respect, no doubt in relation to how much help he has in learning to deal with the rational and emotional aspects of the task. But we know that to overload a child with such value-resolution tasks has unfortunate consequences in terms of disintegration of personality and separation of self from the natural core of his being. (3) Therefore, it is imperative that educators recognize how much inconsistency of values is present in all that is manifest in the exchange of value expressions in the school setting and reduce as much as possible these inconsistencies for the sake of children who as yet are unable to cope with very much of the needed value-resolution. Watching each child absorb certain values from the array of value expressions present in the setting, including those sanctioned by the school's curriculum and social norms as well as those appearing inadvertently from other children, teachers, and outsiders, which may not be consistent with those values being sanctioned, can give important clues as to whether too much value disturbance is present for the child's stage of value development. The older child should have acquired more ability to cope with his value conflicts and may need less systematic protection against overload, but the goal in either case is not to shield the young person from the necessity of making preferences but in fact to enhance his ability to make such preferences and to resolve value conflicts for himself adequately and at an ever-increasing rate.

No one can argue for the complete elimination of value conflicts in school (to say nothing of elsewhere); it is a fact of life that such conflicts will always and everywhere exist and that every person must choose for his own reasons and with his own feelings those value preferences that are to be his own (or live with the consequences of non-commitment and psychic value conflict). One can argue, however, and must argue if the school is to assume the responsibility for how children learn to acquire values, that teachers and other educators should regulate the exchange of value expressions within the educational setting so that the optimum level of unconscious and conscious adoption of value preferences by children exists in relation to their growing abilities to integrate a set of values into their lives that will neither be solely environmentally conditioned nor ultimately conflict-ridden and disintegrative.

This, of course, is not as easy to accomplish as it is to prescribe, but the whole matter is facilitated by the effort to identify those values which actually are manifest in the school's program and processes. We are now able to utilize a number of techniques for detecting the presence of value assumptions in program substances, in teaching practice, and in social norms and rules of a school. (4) Analysis of findings from these procedures can go a long way in sensitizing teachers and other educators to the potential value impact of the educational environment. To my knowledge, there are fewer techniques available for detecting the stage of "cope-ability" a given child is at; there is no substitute, however, for knowing children's minds on these matters on a continuing basis. This is one good argument for having the school experience organized so that a single teacher can monitor all the activity of each child. All good teachers try to take account of the actual value acquisitions, the rate of conflict resolution they see displayed, and the integration of value commitments into consistent character that each child attains in the development of each young person he teaches. Perhaps the best techniques for doing these things will be written down and shared by those educators who have found something workable.

A second challenge and value education that places an obligation upon educators is related to the direct teaching of values per se. I have suggested that it is better to give deliberate attention to the value dimensions of the curriculum (and also to the so-called "hidden curriculum") than not to do so, for the reason that values are taken up indirectly by pupils either way and it is well to be sure that the desired values are consistently presented. So, too, is it important not to be satisfied with teachers teaching of values incidental to the teaching of other material. Pupils must be deliberately provided assistance in their endeavors to acquire their own set of values, and this must be made a legitimate part of all teaching if the importance of this type of learning is to be made consistently manifest to pupils.

If all that teachers appear to be required to do is to teach subject matter (either content or processes), pupils will get the impression that personal values are not of much consequence because most of their learning is focused elsewhere on objective knowledge or on non-personal affairs. Or perhaps, they will get the impression that the making of preferred-value choices is so easy without benefit of education in these matters that anyone should be able to come to his value commitments with little thought and quite naturally rely considerably on "instinct" or on "the stars." Or worse yet, pupils can get the impression that a relativity of value choices must be the norm, that it really does not matter what values one holds, or that purely self-centered judgments are involved in all value choices, because the actions of classroom teachers signify the avoidance of all these issues as a part of the educational process.

Once again, if we are in favor of value education in the schools, we must be consistent in providing time to teach and time to learn the content and processes of individual value commitment as well as in providing time to teach math, science, etc. Pupils are not going to believe it is as important to acquire solid values and to live by them as it is to acquire the usual sorts of knowledges and skills in school if time is not allotted proportional to the importance the school must think value development deserves. Casual reference by teachers to the importance of value-learning will sound pretty hollow if little attention is deliberately focused on such matters during some portion of the total learning time.

Now, I am not suggesting that the way to achieve this balance between value education and other kinds of education as to insert a half-hour period of instruction everyday for a subject called "value education." Nor am I suggesting necessarily what some schools are trying now (and it is a worthwhile experiment), that is, to structure their entire curriculum around value concepts and bring in math and science and social studies substance incidental to these value courses. I am, rather, suggesting that to take the obligation for value education seriously means that in all courses and lessons (however organized as to primary objectives and focused as to content) all teachers have to give deliberate attention to the progressive development of integrated systems of value and belief within each of their pupils. It is at base a teaching problem.

The imperative placed upon teachers to teach in this values area demands that a whole new range of pedagogical approaches be learned and utilized by teachers in addition to the usual methods of instruction associated with matching pupil psychological states with cognitive objectives. Insofar as there are cognitive dimensions involved in acquiring conscious value commitments (and, of course, there are such dimensions), many of the traditional methods of teaching are quite suitable. But where one is attempting to open up value options to be assessed and selected from, when value conflicts within individual pupils need to be shown up in reality as conflicts to be resolved, or when critical reasoning processes must be acquired and practiced by students enroute to value choices or conflict resolution, some very different approaches and types of lessons are required that are not customarily employed in other types of instruction. Providing choice-situations and reflecting upon the consequences are two very basic approaches of value-oriented teaching. The opportunity to learn to act on one's commitments and beliefs is another kind of educational experience that can be provided by teachers or drawn upon from previous or non-school experiences of pupils. (5)

All these approaches require that the teacher have objectives in mind which are not common to a group of pupils but which are unique to each pupil. After all, the pre-lesson state of each child's value learning is bound to be different because of the unique series of value-choices he has already consciously or unconsciously made. To be faithful to the overall goal of value education means that teachers must allow and recognize the existence of individual value choices about a very great many matters on which their pupils will have had to have made different choices. The openness to work with values of all kinds within differing pupils is a quality difficult to possess for some teachers, but respect for pupils who differ in their values from those held by the teacher and an expectation that pupils will sometimes not choose what you think are "best" values are characteristics that must be acquired by teachers who wish to be technically competent in this area. The whole business requires a different stance from that taken, for instance, in teaching the difference between real and imaginary numbers, or the rules of evidence in scientific investigation, or the proper procedure in the breast stroke. It requires unique objectives for each pupil and instructional approaches appropriate to valuing-type experiences. Some of what is being discussed in relation to personalized instruction (if not individualized) will be pertinent to the requirement for unique objectives. (6)

In the realm of teaching methodology, the type of approach to be used depends chiefly upon whether the pupil is being exposed to a value pre-established by the school that all pupils hopefully will adopt or whether the value is among those he may freely adopt or reject according to his own value structure. This issue between being entirely free to choose and not being entirely free to choose will be taken up in connection with the last challenge in value education I shall discuss in a moment. Clearly, however, while there are certain components of sound value-teaching that transcend this distinction and remain common in both categories, there are other instructional strategies that would differ if the objective were eventual adoption of a certain value, for instance, rather than exploring or clarifying value options for which no compulsion outside the individual's need for integrated values is to be applied.

An example, in the first instance, would be a method for teaching, let us say, "intellectual honesty" -- that is, a habit of being able faithfully to represent ideas of others accurately and unbiasedly, without twisting them for personal motives to personal advantage. If we were to agree that this is a value to be taught to all pupils and that it is one of those to be "indoctrinated" rather than to be merely "considered" by the pupil, then it requires a teaching strategy that might include some of the following approaches: (a) hide a particular child's bag-lunch, set up a whisper-circle in which each person in the circle whispers the location (some cued to falsify the information as they pass it along) until the child whose lunch is missing hears the needed information, then let him search unaided till he finds his lunch or gives up, and finally let that child share his feelings and reactions with the class about not being accurately informed (this may not be as good an exercise as one with deeper, more serious, less trumped-up emotional impact would be, which would equally affect all the pupils at once); (b) clearly distinguish for pupils between learning experiences, where utilizing ideas of other pupils is all right, and testing situations, where one's own ideas must be represented accurately; do not as teacher impose rules appropriate for testing to these other settings and thereby obscure in the child's mind when intellectual honesty is applicable and when one is rightfully obliged to state an opinion or knowledge of one's own; (c) let classes examine together case studies of misrepresentation and their consequences, from politics (Nixon, et.al., in the Watergate situation), science (case of the painted mice in cancer research where data was altered affecting scientific conclusions -- SR/World, Nov. 30, 1974, p. 50), business (written contract falsifications of in-person agreements); (d) let pupils practice preparing abstracts, precis, research reports, and the like, until they can in fact accurately represent ideas of others, all done in the context of seeing the significance of accuracy over error in the purposes to which such documents are put. Note that the methods appropriate to indoctrination of a particular value (when that is an agreed-upon aim) are not one-time matters; the same aim must be attempted through a multiplicity of approaches over a long span of time until the habit is developed and commitment to it is established by strongly held personal reasons and feelings in the individual himself. It should also be mentioned that one should be prepared to accept the fact that some pupils will never achieve full and dependable learning of indoctrinated values. This is simply human willfulness operating in spite of good teaching.

Now, what methods of teaching are suited to those situations where values must be chosen by individuals but where latitude among various optional value-choices is natural and expected? Let me suggest some teaching strategies and appropriate methods for this type of objective, again with a specific example to illustrate the broader concept. I could pick a value dilemma that is social/civic in nature, such as, should the U.S. increase its domestic oil production to attain energy sufficiency or turn to nuclear power or to imports? I might also discuss a value dilemma that is personal/moral in nature, such as, should I date Susie who will want me to do things my own value system rejects? A more technical value dilemma which might involve aesthetic matters as well, such as, would I get more service and satisfaction from a Vega, a Matador, or a Mercedes-Benz, could also be discussed. The same sort of teaching strategies are involved in helping students learn to cope with all of these kinds of value dilemmas. For the sake of this discussion, I will focus on one that is often used in schools as a prototype in values education. In precise form the question might be stated, which presidential nominee shall I support in the 1976 campaign?

The value-preferences to be made here are complex. The options are numerous. The criteria available to be applied are varied. The decision to be made is not expected to be the same for everyone. The choice is bound to be affected by a whole range of values that already exist within each person. And the significance of making the right choice (for him) will undoubtedly be recognized by anyone going to the trouble of trying to make a determination on the question. Thus, we have a classic "valuing situation" that is free and open and realistic.

Teaching in this kind of context requires a whole series of approaches: (a) help pupils identify the actual options (candidates); (b) help them learn how to locate stated positions held by each candidate and records of their previous positions and performance; (c) help them to analyze the critical components upon which judgments of preference might be made (character, skill, views, political obligations to persons or groups, etc.); (d) help them identify their own political values and hopes to which they might wish to see a presidential candidate subscribe; (e) help them to analyze the information they have obtained in terms of these personal criteria; and (f) help them to compare the relative adequacy of the various analyses of candidates with the object of identifying the one (or more) who seems (all things considered) most worthy of support.

What is essential to be mastered by the student in this type of learning is for the most part a process, a habit of reasoning, a clarification of his own values. The teacher does not urge one option or another. The teacher asks, have you thought of this, what about that, are you sure you know what you are convinced of? He facilitates the student's access to pertinent information. He holds the student on the track toward value-adoption and choice; he does not let the student "cop-out" of the necessary stages of the process. Of course, the object in this kind of values education is not simply to get this one decision made about which presidential candidate to support, but it is to develop the habit of facing all such dilemmas with a valid way of approaching them. Different opportunities to face similar questions under similar guidance must be provided in order that the pupil may generalize the process and see that if he continually utilizes it, he may reach satisfactory value-choices for himself.

The teacher functions pretty much in a "pastoral role," as noted by Charity James, (7) when dealing with the teaching of values and valuing. The teacher must care enough about the pupil's developing values-structure to facilitate his learning in this area and refrain from judging and invading his "personal space." The teacher's perception of himself and his own values and his perception of his pupils' identities and their values always interact. The relationship between the two must take the form of "communion" with each other, as Gary S. Belkin points out, (8) rather than of domination-submission or control and lack of free-choice. There must be a convergence of spirit and mind between the teacher and the student, though there may be a divergence in value positions held by each.

For all educators, the overriding challenge in value education, and the third one I shall treat in this article, is the necessity to determine which values are to be chosen and justified as appropriate for teaching to all pupils as a minimum core of their individual value structures and which are to be left for them to weigh independently and taken unto themselves to make up a unique value structure of their own in a life-time of value exploration.

As a first step in attempting to reach informed judgments on this question, I would urge educators to brush up on their knowledge of values and the process of making judgments. This knowledge conventionally falls in the areas of study known as axiology and ethics. There are some convenient resumés of this knowledge especially written for educators that might be worthy of study by those having limited time to dig into these fields. The Belkin article, (8) already mentioned, is a good place to start. It defines various types of value, such as moral, values of choice, taste, and self-values. Drews and Lipson, in *Values and Humanity*, (9) trace more fully the sources of value and their relationship to man and to reality, as well as describe the evolution of hierarchies of value and changes in them over time. Clive Beck's little handbook, already referred to in footnote (5), is extremely succinct, yet helpful, especially the section on "A Theory of Values for the Schools." A collection of recent papers, presented at an Ohio ASCD Curriculum Research Institute, also has excellent background resources in this connection. (10) Rokeach has presented in this booklet a refresher course in values and value systems, terminal and instrumental values, change in values and attitudes, and educational values. Implications for education are dealt with in another article included in this booklet by Arthur Combs. Clive Beck has also treated psychologically the development of moral judgment. I have also cited several other books for those needing more depth in their study. (11)

A second step in preparing to decide what values to manifest in schools is to establish criteria for the values to be chosen. Some of them may need to be identified as ones having universal or near-universal acceptance on the basis of their being humanity-wide, so fundamental to the life and welfare of the individual and of all mankind that we very nearly take them for granted. Regarding human life as being so valuable that taking the life of another person is considered unthinkable would be an example of such a value. Another category of value might be culture-wide or society-wide. One might choose a value of this kind, such as, the right to produce goods and services for profit by the individual or private corporation, or freedom of artistic, literary, or personal-opinion expression. There are also bound to be community-wide values or standards that can be identified as appropriate for schooling within that community whether other communities believe strongly in these same ones or not. Even in a pluralistic community, there could be a value agreed to by most, such as, the enhancement of agricultural fairs, sporting contests, special parks or other community facilities. Schools in these communities dare not fail to indoctrinate the young into certain of these localized values. Individual schools may also have distinct values to be fostered. In all these instances, you will notice that I have used the suffix "-wide." This is to suggest that one criterion for choosing values that are to be deliberately indoctrinated is their universality (or nearly so) within the various levels mentioned.

Another kind of criteria has to do with the nature of the school as an educational institution. Depending upon what philosophy of education the school operates under, there are certain values inherent in the educational process that demand allegiance or else the process will be thwarted. "Intellectual honesty" and "it is OK to make mistakes" might be examples of educational values inherent in schooling itself.

There are no doubt many other ceiteria for selecting values to be exemplified in the curriculum and through school norms, but I will mention only a few others. (12) It would seem advisable to choose values that are norms rather than absolutes. That is, they should be ones accepted as worthy of commitment now whether they are to be regarded as worthy forever. You will not get agreement on what values are absolute, but you can get agreement at any given time on what shall be temporarily supported, admitting that the list will change from time to time. Secondly, it would seem advisable to accept into your list of school-sanctioned values many that may be beyond the capacity of given youngsters to understand fully (perhaps even by the end of their schooling). Schooling in values should probably not be limited to what you can get a group of children to accept at a particular time or place. After all, the values on the list have their sources beyond the ideas and experiences of young people themselves and come forth from the whole history of man and from broad knowledge of given social contexts. Thirdly, every value selected should probably be capable of three kinds of treatment in and through schooling: careful differentiation from other values (no sense in muddling up kids' thinking about two so-called values if nobody can discriminate clearly between the two); judgments between alternative or opposing values (no sense in indoctrinating if the pupil can't tell what is not being indoctrinated as well as what is being); and demonstration and fostering of action consistent with the value (no sense in obtaining mental or verbal consent to a value if a pupil's actions are not governed by it). These points, along with the other kinds of criteria suggested, should reduce the list of accepted values to something finite enough to work with. While I have not set up an exact list of criteria to be drawn up (let alone a recommended list of values), these suggestions should indicate the nature and purpose of establishing criteria. And that is the chief thing being urged, that you have to establish such criteria before you can select the values.

The question may have occurred to you during the previous discussion, how do we ever get such a list selected, even with some reasonable criteria available? Just a comment or two on this. It would seem to be an overwhelming task if every local school were left to its own devises in this matter. However, there are people who attempt to identify values aspired to by people in the various contexts mentioned -- mankind, society, community, etc. We need to discover well-done lists derived for each of these contexts which are not just opinion surveys but careful assessments of enduring and generalizable values.

At the humanity-wide level, I can cite a brief, but useful array of values in the area of person-other transactions, which I believe could stand the test of any criteria you set up. (13) You may wish to judge whether its scope is broad enough to cover adequately this category of value. Turn to Appendix I for an explanation of this list.

At the society-wide level (American society), I can cite a very comprehensive list of values in nine categories by Ralph H. Gabriel. (14) Turn to Appendix II for extracts from this list.

Efforts should be made at the local community and local school levels to develop a list appropriate to each of these levels. The aid of a values philosopher/sociologist may be enlisted in deriving a list of community standards and values that the board of education may be willing to support as values to be taught. (Boards need to accept lists from the other, wider contexts as well, once such valid lists can be found.) At the school level, probably the professional staff with the aid of the student body and professional educational bodies can identify the lists appropriate at that level.

As in beginning this article, I end this article by asserting that schools inevitably indoctrinate in values (as well as aid pupils in exercising their freedom to choose values beyond these core values common to all pupils) and by underlining the obvious: that it is better to deliberately choose which values shall be manifest in the teaching and the norms of the school than it is to let this matter fall to chance through lack of effort to determine which ones the school really wants to sanction. I have argued that both in teaching and in selecting values to be taught and manifest by the school, there are defensible procedures that can be followed. If we are to improve education in values, we will have to understand and act on these procedures.

Appendix I

The Rucker Categories of Values for Humanization (15)

Value Category	Fulfillment Of The Concept
1. Affection	Human transactions of emotional warmth, intimacy, and support in love, congeniality, and friendship
2. Respect	Human transactions recognizing admirable uniqueness and individuality in a context of mutual identity
3. Skill	Human transactions that develop talents to the limits of their potential
4. Understanding	Human transactions that stimulate each person to find his own truth in every issue while gaining understanding of social norms and the significant events of human history
5. Power and influence	Human transactions in which each person will participate in making decisions that concern him and will exert informal influence according to his talents and responsibilities
6. Goods and services	Human transactions providing facilities, materials, and services to promote excellent conditions of living

7. Well-being	Human transactions which foster the physical and mental health of each person
8. Responsibility	Human transactions that share experiences enabling the person to develop a sense of ethics and integrity in his behavior within the broad limits of his social context

Appendix II

Traditional Values in American Life (16)

In Politics

1. The concept of the state as a utilitarian device created to provide for the common defense and to further the general welfare.

2. Freedom and responsibility of the individual adult citizen to have a voice in the government under which he lives, as exemplified in the right and responsibility to vote.

3. Freedom of access to knowledge of all kinds save only when disclosure of particular information would endanger the whole community.

4. Freedom to express orally or in writing opinions honestly held concerning economic, religious, political, or social matters.

5. The protection of the free citizen against unreasonable invasions of privacy by officers of government.

6. The right of free citizens to assemble peaceably.

7. The supremacy of civil authority over the military in conformity with the principle that the civil authority is the decision-making power and the military is the instrument, when needed, to carry decisions into effect.

8. The concept of the American Federation as a "permanent union of permanent states," firmly established after the Civil War, maintained by judicial enforcement of the Constitution and forbidding nullification or secession on the part of the states.

In Law

1. The concept of a "government of law and not of men." In the United States this means the supremacy of law administered by the regular courts over the officers and agencies of government.

2. The concept of law as a living growth, changing with the evolution of society.

3. The right of every person to be free to move about and to choose his occupation, unless convicted of crime and subject only to the general law, thus forbidding slavery or involuntary servitude.

4. The right of every person to be informed specifically of any charges made by the state against him, to speedy and public trial, to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, and to legal counsel assuring him equal protection of the laws.

5. The right of a person to refuse to testify against himself.

6. The right to a trial by a jury of peers when the United States government brings the charges.

7. The protection of persons from being "twice put in jeopardy of life or limb" for the same offense or, if convicted, from "cruel or unusual punishments."

8. The denial to government of the power to punish a person through the instrumentality of an ex post facto law, that is, a law formulated to make an act an offense after the act had taken place.

In Religion

1. The idea that the state is not coterminous with society but that religious institutions exist of their own right in society independent of the state -- the separation of church and state.

2. The freedom to believe and to propagate one's faith as the conscience of the individual person directs, or freedom to refrain from worship.

3. The idea of the church as a free association of believers who assume responsibility for its support.

4. The widespread but not universal emphasis on some form of theism as a frame for explaining the meaning of human life.

5. The idea, widely but not universally held, that ethical standards spring from religion.

6. The idea that the furthering of the brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God calls for the outreach of the churches to the far corners of the world on errands of mercy, to assist social evolution toward a better life, and to further mutually helpful cooperation among all peoples.

7. A sense of charity, stemming in part from the humanistic tradition and in part from that of Judeo-Christianity, coupled with the idea that the performance of acts that contribute to the well-being of individual persons and of society are in themselves religious activities of merit.

8. The idea that the state must respect the convictions of the conscientious objector to refrain from participation in the bloody violence of war, but that the state may require of the conscientious objector in time of emergency special service of a nonviolent nature.

In Education

1. The idea that effective self-government requires that a significant proportion of the electorate have sufficient education to be able to inform themselves of issues and to consider them rationally.

2. The idea that equality of educational opportunity for all citizens is the just and desirable foundation for a democratic society.

3. The idea that the state has an obligation not only to provide educational opportunities from kindergarten through the university, but to require children to attend school until their early teens.

4. The idea that the state should not have a monopoly of education and that independent, privately supported schools, colleges, and universities bring to the educational system a diversity and variety that further the general welfare.

5. The idea that education, particularly advanced education, by training specialists to work in a society which emphasizes specialization, increases the opportunities of the individual person to find for himself a useful place in the community and to achieve an income commensurate with his abilities.

6. The idea that from the elementary grades to the bachelor's degree, the school exists for the training of the student as a social being as well as for the cultural enrichment of the individual and the training of the mind.

7. At the level of the university, the idea that general education should precede or pace side by side with the training of the specialist to the end that the specially trained person have breadth of view and flexibility of mind along with a particular competence.

8. The idea of academic freedom which asserts that teachers in higher education should be free to search for and to teach the truth as they see it without compulsion from the state, the church, the business community, or the administrative authorities of the institution and to this end should enjoy security of tenure.

9. The idea that education should be a lifelong process and that opportunities for post-school training should be available to adults as far as practicable.

Social Values

1. The dignity and importance of the individual person.

2. Freedom of thought and action of the individual person.

3. Freedom, and so far as possible equal opportunity, of the individual person to make of his life what he can in accordance with his abilities.

4. Regard for the group and for group activity as a means to the ends of developing individual personality and of enlarging the possibilities for effective action that has importance for the individual person, resulting in the formation of voluntary associations in extraordinary number and for a wide range of interests.

5. Regard for the family as the basic social institution.

6. Regard for work leading to recognizable accomplishment -- professional preferment, the accumulation of property -- as a normal aspect of the good life.

7. Concern for the physical and mental health of the community.

8. Regard for voluntary public service by private individuals.

In Science

1. Regard for rationality -- the critical approach to the phenomena of nature and of society, coupled with the effort to reduce these phenomena to ever more consistent, orderly, and generalized forms of understanding.

2. The conviction that man must dare to unlock the secrets of nature to the extent that his abilities permit.

3. The conviction that man must accept and not shirk the moral responsibility for the use of whatever new power increased knowledge brings to him.

4. The understanding that the method of science, combining precise reasoning with accurate observation and controlled experiment, can achieve new knowledge when and only when it conforms to an ethical code, a code that might almost be described as the laws of creative thought.

5. The scholar who seeks new knowledge must have freedom to explore, to reason on the basis of discovered fact, and to express his conclusions.

6. In communicating what he has found, the scholar must be faithful to the truth he has discovered; he must describe honestly what he has observed or found by calculation.

7. The scholar must approach the solution of problems with objectivity, a willingness to accept evidence and to reject disapproved hypotheses, no matter what the consequences.

8. Regard for the application of scientific knowledge through technology to the affairs of life.

In Economics

1. Work on the part of the individual person has been valued since the theology of the 17th-century Puritans sanctified it.

2. Economic well-being of the individual person is valued not only as the cornerstone of a sound economy but as the essential foundation for a full and rounded individual life.

3. The sanctity of contract and respect for property are valued as the foundation for orderly and dependable economic relations.

4. Production of goods is valued as a prerequisite to economic well-being.

5. Private enterprise is valued because it gives opportunity for the creative potentialities of the entrepreneur or of corporate management, because it gives the entrepreneur the largest measure of freedom in working out the destinies of the particular concern, and because the opportunities of sharing in the profits resulting from successful management provides a stimulus for individual effort.

6. The profit system is valued because only where there are profits can private enterprise long continue.

7. The economic well-being of the community (from the local community to the Nation) is valued for the same reason that the economic well-being of individual persons is valued.

8. Social security for the individual person is valued.

9. The principle of assistance by the state to certain economic groups is valued because it furthers the economic prosperity of the community.

10. In spite of the fact that the policy of price supports by the government for agricultural products prevents competition among producing farmers from bringing down prices below certain levels.

11. In the production of goods, rationalization and mechanization are valued.

12. The principle of collective bargaining is valued because it enables the worker to negotiate with the employer on more nearly equal terms and, as a result, have a voice in the formulation of policies of vital importance to his life as a workman.

13. Opportunity for the individual employee to rise in the managerial hierarchy of an enterprise through promotions based on efficiency is valued for two reasons: It provides for the mobilization of the maximum ability in the management of the enterprise; and it expresses the larger American ideal of giving the individual person the opportunity to make of his life what he can.

14. American value government in the roles not only of maintaining order and administering justice, but also in those aiding stable economic growth and preventing excessive economic inequalities.

In the Arts

1. Regard for the creation and presentation of music, reflected in the multiplication of composers, the growth of musical organizations, and the vast importance of recorded music.

2. Regard for the collection of and making available to the public in museums painting, sculpture, and the crafts, both classical and contemporary.

3. Regard for the quality of design in the artifacts of everyday life.

4. Regard for creative literature as an instrument for the fuller and deeper understanding of life.

5. Regard for the drama and the dance as presented in stage, film, and TV as instruments for enriching human life.

6. Regard for tradition and for innovation in painting, sculpture, and the crafts and for popular and mature participation in these arts.

7. Regard for tradition and innovation, together with the principles of form and function, in the architecture of a nation building to meet the needs of an increasing population and a swiftly evolving civilization.

8. Regard for criticism by scholars and specialists in the various arts to encourage discrimination by the public in appraising performance and recognizing excellence.

In International Relations

1. The principle that changes in the relations between nation-states be accomplished by peaceful means alone -- the rejection of violence as an instrument of policy.

2. The principle of national sovereignty under international law.

3. The value of collective security within an organization of nation-states has been increasingly recognized in the 20th century, superseding the older isolationism.

4. The observance of international law and international commitments formally undertaken.

5. The use of international adjudication to settle legal disputes.

6. The concept that free nations should practice neighborliness and that the stronger and more advanced among them should respond to requests for help, particularly from peoples struggling to escape from inherited poverty.

7. The concept that government should encourage and support cultural exchange among peoples, on the ground that increased understanding among diverse civilizations and mutual appreciation of their art and their values further the cause of fellowship among men of good will, and so of peace.

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3. Victor E. Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1970.

4. Michael W. Apple, "The Process and Ideology of Valuing in Educational Settings," in M. W. Apple, M. J. Subkoviak, and H. S. Lufler, Jr. (Eds.), *Educational Evaluation: Analysis and Responsibility*, McCutchan Publishing Corp., Berkeley, California, 1974, pp. 3-34.

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CHAPTER XIX

THE TEACHING OF VALUES

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I choose to write this paper, in the existentialist phrase, "from my own bloodstream." This is not because I disregard or downgrade the many learned authorities who have written over the years on values. Trained as a philosopher of education I can hardly do that. Rather, I want now to testify to you on the basis of my own suffering and personal experiences just what I believe can and cannot be done -- and should and should not be done -- in the realm of teaching values.

Your editor and I share, I believe, certain value judgments as to what constitutes the kind of human attitudes and behaviors we prefer. Like him, I am attracted to the qualities of openness, honesty, authenticity, and sensitivity to other persons, without which education is a meaningless enterprise. Also with your editor I agonize over the closed, suspicious, inauthentic, and warped behavior we have observed in the public life of this nation and the private value systems of too many of its citizens.

Starting from this base of agreement on what is generally desirable on the one hand and commonly practiced on the other, I propose to set before you a number of value-laden propositions on the teaching of values. These propositions have to do with the ways we encounter valuing and the teaching of values in our everyday lives, including the distortions that enter in through educational and other social institutions.

The didactic instruction of values is still widely practiced in our schools, families, and churches, to mention but three of the most crucial institutions of cultural transmission. It is a highly potent means for the inculcation of various kinds of orthodoxies, especially if one is able to gain access to the mind and feelings of the learner at an early age. Classical secular philosophies, expressing themselves in traditional liberal arts curricula, account in large measure for the power of this approach to captivate the imaginations and command the allegiance of generations of teachers. These philosophies, taking their cue especially from the pedagogy of Plato and Aristotle, were enormously magnified in potency by their marriage into the orthodox mainstream of the Judeo-Christian tradition.

There is a wonderful certitude, a "security blanket" in a confused and evil world of destruction and hatred, in the regularities of didactic instruction. Most students appear to be trained in this manner of teaching values and are therefore baffled by the teacher who attempts a more democratic and less authoritarian approach. The students themselves pinpoint both the strengths and weaknesses of traditional didactics: they used to believe everything their teachers and parents told them; as time went on, however, they have come to believe less and less of anything told or "sold" to them by way of any social institution, from schools and churches to politicians, advertizers, and the news media.

Didactic instruction, in and of itself, is not inherently evil. In a truly authentic community of true believers, it is a positive good. Among the "Old Order" Amish, for example, or in an Israeli kibbutz, adults practice what they preach and all members of the community, from the youngest children to the elderly, know that values are more than dreams. It is when what we call "schooling" is separated from life experience that this manner of instruction loses credibility. The child then grows up into a confused adolescence and finally into an adulthood of lifelong dissonance between ideology and survival.

An appealing way out of this dilemma is to shift to the proposition of behavioral engineering. This is enormously attractive to disaffected young people who have unmasked the hypocrisy inherent in ideals emptied of their original creative bases in daily life.

The wonderful thing about behavioral engineering is that it works. By employing the manipulative skills and technological expertise of modern biological-behavioral sciences we can alter human actions beyond the visions of utopian philosophers and theologians who have gone before. The problems of good and evil are removed by making these distinctions irrelevant. We can be conditioned to do what is best for a more efficient social order, and to be made to feel good, through positive reinforcement, about ourselves and our relations to others.

Behavioral engineering is psychologically possible and educatively efficient but it is an ethical and moral nightmare. It carries out the reductionist tendencies in modern science to their ultimate conclusion. Human freedom of choice, which makes both good and evil possible, is negated. This is too high a price to pay for the solution to our personal and social ills, yet it is the terrifying prospect that faces us as an alternative to the bankruptcy of didactic instruction in a world going mad.

Restorative dialogue is the third and last proposition I would offer as the basis for the teaching of values. The terms are chosen carefully: restorative, for bringing persons back together in a sense of shared interests that has been lost in our modern world; dialogue, for the process of seeing our students and peers from their side of a teaching-learning situation that involves us mutually.

We live in an urban industrial society which is creating a culture that is more and more inhuman. The person in such a world is becoming a standardized part who can be cast off when no longer functioning and replaced by a younger and presumably better conditioned self. We may succeed in "humanizing" this kind of system at a superficial level by providing welfare benefits, retirement communities, and even psychiatric care of an "adjustment" nature, but the problem still remains. All the soothing propaganda in the world will not alter the reality status of those of us who are either worn out and used up in such a culture or who never had a chance to compete for its material and psychic rewards in the first place.

Restorative values go beyond social justice even as such a redistribution of opportunities may be desirable at this time. These values seek to return us into a situation of community -- as distinguished from mere collectivity -- in which we may truly share ourselves with our fellow human beings. The maintenance of community in the face of the onrushing industrial culture was one of the great goals of progressive education, nurtured by social psychologists such as George H. Mead and philosophers like John Dewey. Unfortunately, their creative humanistic ideas have proven vulnerable to the distortions of reductionist manipulation.

We have reached the stage in human history where communities must not only be maintained but recreated in the face of bureaucracies quite capable of routinely letting patients die in the waiting rooms of public hospitals or of sterilizing welfare clients without their knowledge or of experimenting on captive populations in mental institutions and prisons. It is also time for that special form of social interaction, ethically informed dialogue, to come into the process of educating.

The greatest pain and frustration I experience in teaching is watching a blankness appear on the faces of students when I am obliged for one reason or another to fall back on didactic instruction. My joy in the communication of values arises when I allow myself to see pupils as persons from their side of experience, so that together we are involved in the unanticipated revelations of dialogue.

How does one bring about restorative dialogue? It is not so much a question of method as of manner: lectures can become dialogical if they are conducted in a low-key, unpretentious manner; discussions in which student participation is not over-controlled by the teacher are a form of dialogue; the "social studies" student committee approach lends itself very well to give-and-take and unanticipated outcomes.

Dialogue is as much a matter of the feeling tone of a class, the expression passing across the face of a student, the atmosphere of learning as it is an exclusively cognitive process. A teacher can feel mutual respect, openness, and good vibrations as he or she also can feel tension, hostility, and barely concealed rebellion. In elementary education, restorative dialogue means fewer directions and negative corrective commands and a de-emphasis on elaborate verbal descriptions, with more and more initiative and activity coming naturally into the hands of young learners. By the time these children are growing into adolescence in the secondary years, they should be open, honest, and very much in partnership with their teachers in the discovery of personal and social knowledge.

Ultimately, the restorative dialogue of the school must become the reconstructive culture of the society. The whole person implies also the healed community. Schools as we have known them will need to evolve into open community learning centers. Only then will we be able to say we are truly teaching values that are real and lasting because they are lived in the world around us.

CHAPTER XX

VALUES AND CHANGE

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On the first day of my daughter's second year of high school, her English teacher wrote on the chalkboard, "Everything changes!" She then elaborated upon her statement to the effect that reality is change. In response to a query from my daughter, the following was jotted down for her consideration.

Some Questions For a Teacher Who Says That Everything Changes (That Ultimate Reality Is Change)

If so, does not this proposition change? Isn't it logically self-destructive?

If everything changes except this proposition, how can we account for the stability of our minds, which understand this proposition the same way day after day?

If everything changes, how can we conduct this class? Won't we all be different people tomorrow? How can we find our way to class? How can we tell it's a class and not a horserace?

If everything changes, but not that fast, how can you tell the rate of change without some fixed criterion? How can you have a fixed criterion if everything changes?

If everything changes, how is it that this point-of-view of Heraclitus has maintained its essential features for over 2,000 years?

How can you tell that everything changes? Isn't this really a statement of faith?

Isn't the proposition that everything changes really a line of bunk utilized by demagogues and charlatans from time immemorial to get people to change their beliefs to those of the pitchman?

If reality is constituted entirely by change, isn't it impossible to hold any value with conviction? If no, why do you believe in telling the truth? What relationship do your reasons have with permanence and change? If yes, why should we believe anything you say? Yes or no, why should we believe anything you say, since you may not believe in telling the truth tomorrow?

Does not the assumption that reality is change lead to a philosophy of absolute relativity? Are you for progress? Are not the concepts of progress and absolute relativity mutually exclusive? If no, how in a context of absolute change, can you detect or measure progress? If yes, why do you talk to your students about change in the interest of progress?

Can relativity exist in a context of absolute flux? How can you identify relative entities? ----Take them seriously?

Isn't it more reasonable to believe that both permanence and change are aspects of reality?

The teacher involved was in fact making a massive metaphysical assumption. Consciously or unconsciously, she was engaged in a broad scale intellectual seduction of those committed to her influence. By any adequate definition, she was teaching religion. Her procedure constituted a flagrant example of indoctrination, in the worst sense of the term. Sadly, she was probably only dimly aware of what she was doing. This does not alter the fact that her guiding concepts may lead to personal and social catastrophe. To accept the proposition that change is reality necessarily eliminates the possibility of committing one's self to normative values. This leads to nihilism and cynicism in direct proportion to the individual's capacity for logical thought and rational behavior.

It is fashionable to respond to this sort of complaint with the rejoinder that people are not rational anyway, that values are controlled by social, psychological, and physiological pressures. But this does not justify the sort of teacher behavior described in our opening anecdote. It suggests, rather, that such behavior is meaningless and inefficient. To be consistent, teachers who argue in this way should cease to philosophize about change in front of their classes. It does no good in this connection to argue that change is everywhere present in experience. It does not follow that the concept of change is therefore simple, concrete, commonplace, and easily understood by everyone. When extended at all beyond the simple empirical registering of specific movements, the idea of change quickly becomes as complex and difficult to define as, say, the Christian concept of the Triune God. Since people in general, or teachers in particular, are no more apt to quit talking about change than they are about God, educators should accept the necessity and responsibility of dealing with change in an honest, adequate, and open manner. This suggests the desirability of a degree of philosophical sophistication not always manifest in the profession.

One does not move in Educational circles very long without becoming aware of very careless use of the word change. The influence of John Dewey no doubt accounts for educators' fascination with the idea. Not everyone, however, uses the term with Dewey's philosophical expertise. Many, unfortunately, reflect what is a central flaw in his system of thought. Although he is the American philosopher of change *par excellence*, he never adequately defined his term. One searches his writings in vain for a careful delineation of the idea itself. (1)

Coming into educational circles some years ago as a relative outsider; it was soon observed that most speeches by educators made a dozen to thirty references to change in the introductory remarks. These references were almost always to change in general, or to change in the abstract. Analysis revealed that they were without specific referents in the real world. They were in fact metaphysical expressions of a symbolic nature. They were ritualistic devices of the sort commonly used to insure group identification and ideological acceptability. This was easily established by inquiry as to the specific changes being recommended. It became embarrassingly evident that the remarks meant nothing at all in terms of real conditions or actual proposals. Their efficacy as means of cultic participation was evident, however, in the hostility generated toward one who did not share in the common mystery. No one cared to say exactly what change meant in this context, but the subversive character of one who did not know was assumed to be perfectly apparent to all right thinking educators. It should be observed that this kind of invocation of change is a persuasive device for committing a group in advance to whatever specific changes its leadership subsequently proposes. After all, if one is in favor of change in general, how can he resist changes in particular when they are put before him? It is not surprising that educators who use this manipulative device on their peers would use it on their pupils. This does not, however, improve the ethical quality of the procedure. Because pupils learn from the procedures used upon them as well as from the ideas and activities presented to them, in the long run this practice may result in commitment to values not wanted or contemplated by the teacher, such values as craftiness, deceitfulness, and psychological domination of others.

If one is to be seriously involved in the teaching of values, he must grapple with fundamental philosophical issues. Basically, philosophy is concerned with three questions. (a) What is, (b) what is true, (c) what is good and right. Though the third area is the area of values, the first and second are integrally related to it. Change is an aspect of the first. When people talk as if change is the arbiter of values, they do so because of certain assumptions about reality. It is very easy to assume that every concrete physical object that comes to our attention is subject to change. Does it then follow that reality is change? Before jumping too easily to that conclusion, notice something about the concept of reality. It is involved in its opposite, the concept of illusion. Is the distinction between reality and illusion expendable? Hardly! We have tripped over an aspect of reality that is permanently necessary to all thought about reality. It would also appear to be necessary to human life and society, since this distinction marks the border between sanity and insanity. How can one assert that reality is change when faced with the necessity of assuming permanence in order to meaningfully make the assertion?

There are other problems inherent in the assumption that reality is change. For instance, take the problem of assigning proper value to human beings. In order to do this, one must assume that humanity is a permanent thing. In no other way can one hope to convince anyone that all men are to be valued superlatively, in a way that distinguishes them from other objects in the world. Without these assumptions, all discussions of human rights are meaningless. In order to deny their rights to certain people, all one must do is convince himself that change has altered the proper identification of human beings. He may then reclassify certain people and misuse or destroy them without compunction. By this device the Nazis murdered the Jews in World War II. On the same grounds, the Communists killed millions of Kulaks in Russia between the World Wars. History strongly suggests that wherever people intellectualize such behavior, someone is likely to implement it. When men convince themselves that change affects the definition of man, they may then kill and abuse other men without conscience. Indeed, they may easily come to believe that they must do so out of necessity. Marxism long since should have taught us the bloody potentiality of assuming that History is an engine that is properly driven by change. This is to endow the source of power in history with the capacity for directing history. Since this power is mindless, the real source of direction becomes the minds of the people who identify themselves with change.

Teachers who indoctrinate their pupils with the irrationality that reality is change should not be surprised when they resort to barbarism, with technological improvements.

Also related to one's view of what is, his view of reality, is a person's self-concept. The idea that everything is subject to change undercuts the capacity to value one's self at critical points in life. The idea that all values change with changing conditions may easily lead to the conclusion that your life is not of high importance. One wonders if the exaggerated emphasis upon change that has characterized American education in the twentieth century may have contributed to the drug problem in this way. Emphasis upon change easily leads to the conclusion that short range satisfactions are preferable to the long-range goals. To substitute the sovereignty of change for the Judeo-Christian heritage of the permanent worth and eternal potentiality of each individual tends powerfully toward contempt for the self as well as others. It is a curious pedagogical mentality that harps continually upon the omnipotence of change while denying in principle that ideas have consequences in human life. The cult of change is not very well equipped to protect the individual against corrosive attacks upon his or her values as a human being. If what a human being is is presumed to change by the hour without qualification, why should a person place any particular value upon himself or anyone else?

The second major consideration of philosophy mentioned above is the question of truth. This is sometimes referred to as the problem of knowledge, but in all real problems it quickly becomes apparent that it is a problem of truth. When people are urgently concerned with knowing, they wish to distinguish between illusion and reality. They want to know the difference between what conditions and procedures will allow a solution to their problems, and which will not. This distinction appears to be permanently relevant to human life. It is not difficult to convince sane men that if they do not respect this value they will die. For this reason truthfulness and truth seeking are generally considered to be very important values. They must be given high priority in any educational program. Yet how can this be done if all permanence is sacrificed to unlimited change? The questions directed to our exemplary teacher about this (see p. 1) are not facetious. If reality is constituted entirely by change, why should anyone value the truth? How can a teacher recommend this value by referring to change? How can people believe a teacher who tells them that they should always value truth because absolutely everything changes? This is part and parcel of the problem referred to by Alexander Solzhenitsyn in his Nobel Lecture. He indicates that the human abuse of human beings is made possible by the suppression of the truth about what is happening. Violence and lying are siamese twins. When people adopt violence as a method, they must accept lying as their principle. The mark of courage in a vicious world is not to participate in lies. Commitment to truth is essential to humanity in the late twentieth century. (2) Solzhenitsyn has learned man's need for a stable value system in a hard school. (3)

Educators should take both permanence and change seriously. They cannot safely dispense with either concept in theory or in practice. The two ideas are especially potent in the area of values. The naive invocation of change so evident in much educational writing constitutes a kind of disciplinary fetish. It rarely qualifies as serious thought, and its metaphysical implications are ludicrous. To generalize change into a metaphysical absolute is a logically self-destructive process. One cannot account for à steady metaphysical axiom in the context of an ontology of absolute flux. To invoke progress as a guiding value in such a context is fantasy, but fantasy not infrequently evident in education. Progress, as a value, requires stable standards for its detection and measurement. Likewise, change cannot be equated with process. A process implies continuity, regularity, and identity. All of these are subject to change rather than reducible to it. No philosopher of change is able to show why absolute change does not imply chaos. There is rather general agreement that temporal change is irreversible, something like an axiom of historical process. Neither the past or the dead normally return in reality. To suggest that this concept of time might be a temporary reality or principle is not a viable maneuver to protect a philosophy of flux. Rather, it is to entertain the possibility that change may be an illusion! If time is not linear and irreversible, then history becomes circular or repetitive. Change loses its credibility.

Western thought and culture has a profound commitment to the concept of linear time. It is unlikely that this concept can reasonably survive in conjunction with an assumption of omnipotent change. Unfortunately, to abandon the concept of linear time, the idea that events may be going somewhere in particular, it to undercut the concept of progress. But this is one of Western Civilization's most creative and productive ideas. Change is necessary to progress, but unlimited change is the enemy of progress. To abandon progress is to abandon the hope of improvement in human conditions. A radical concept of change cuts harshly into human hopes and aspirations.

On the other hand, the naive espousal of permanence in values, knowledge, and reality is equally invalid. Permanence and change are both evident to human experience. No comfortable scheme is evailable by which certain values, realities, or truths can be guaranteed immunity against change. Man cannot escape the necessity of faith by either the obscurantism of the reactionary or the irrationalism of the radical. Neither permanence nor change is a panacea whose adoption as an absolute will deliver us from the pain of confrontation with an uncertain reality. The fusion of permanence and change which confronts man's thought presents him with both enlightenment and mystery, and the two often pull against each other. Both, however, are frequently recognized as authentic human values. It is possible to flee from reality by turning to change as an absolute. It is equally possible to perform that maneuver of immaturity by making permanence an absolute. One may seek solace by denying the power of change over certain realities or values. One may also escape certain problems by denying all permanence. This is a common haven of self-justification for tyrants, traitors, and crooks. The reactionary is stalked by fear that his truth, his God, or his status quo may be dissolved by change. The radical is frantic to keep God at bay by a too-persistent denial of permanence, and he perennially falls victim to some utopian scheme or persistent theme that betrays his hunger for stability of purpose and meaning. There is no authentic humanity that does not grapple with the anguish of permanence and change. There is no salvation without faith, whether secular or sacred.

Perhaps the most persistent question relative to the teaching of values is the why of values. Why is one thing, or condition, or kind of behavior valued above another, or valued at all? To give an answer to any such question is to invoke a sanction for a value, or for values in general. Always some reason will be given, some reality mentioned, by which the value is made apparent or in which it finds a ground upon which to stand. For every value a justifying referent will be found in what is, or in what is true. Implicit in every referent is some degree of permenence, for no relationship can exist without identification of what is related; and no identification can be imagined in the midst of total flux. On the other hand, all human valuing takes place in a context which includes change. It is impossible to imagine any human valuing in the absence of change because it is impossible to imagine human existence in the absence of change. Therefore, the presence of both permanence and change is implicit in any consideration of human values. Teachers can hardly deny to their pupils their right to search out permanence upon which to base their values. It is evident that this involves faith. In essence faith is the same thing whether secular or sacred, temporal or eternal, naturalistic or supernaturalistic, theistic or atheistic. The justification of values simply cannot avoid this problem. Valuing always involves faith as soon as it involves public policy or social behavior. Differences inevitably arise about what is good or bad, right or wrong. Such differences simply cannot be answered by scientific method. They quickly leap-frog to questions of normative value. This involves what people believe, not what they know.

Lately, one observes a certain educational maneuver designed to avoid this pressure. The teaching of values is alleged to involve merely the process of valuing. Valuing itself is adopted as the object of educational procedures. This is gutless and hypocritical teacher behavior. Since people will value anyway, the process itself is not educational. People no more need to be taught to value than they need to be taught to breathe. Such activity is not education, since it has no objective. Such teachers know perfectly well that they are utilizing the process of valuing for the purpose of recommending certain values preferred by themselves, the administration, or some part of the community. No one is fooled by this, especially the pupils and patrons of the school. The major result is simply diminished respect for educators.

This is related to the canard that teachers are simply "change agents." It is implied that this is an adequate educational objective. Such assumptions are valid only if it is accepted that change is the ultimate reality, that change is the normative value of human life, and that change is the sanction for all values. This is to say that change is everything. About all one can then do is change, until he disappears, since one can hardly hope to continue to exist if change is everything. This is, of course, nonsense. No more, however, than the notion that a teacher is simply a change agent, especially when trying to teach values. Every effective teacher is a change agent. Effectiveness is recognized by changing pupil belief and behavior toward specific objectives. Especially in teaching values, these objectives must be recognized and acknowledged. Not to do this is to be ineffective or dishonest, or both. There is an ethical necessity laid upon the teaching profession here. Teachers cannot effectively teach values that they do not hold. They cannot teach normative values to pupils who do not respect their integrity. They cannot escape the element of faith involved in the sanctioning of values. Superficial appeals to the alleged secular nature of the American public school are not adequate to the solution of this problem. It cannot be avoided forever. Problems of instrumental value lead inexorably to problems of ultimate value. These are religious in nature. This is equally true for adherents of secular and supernatural religion. In either case, ultimate value commitments involve faith, the assumption that certain things are true that cannot be proven to be true. The Constitution of the United States no more justifies the use of the public schools to support a secular establishment of religion than it does their use to support a supernatural establishment of religion. The history of the twentieth century suggests that secular bigotry is no more benign than sacred bigotry. (4) The increasing emphasis upon the teaching of values will not permit educators to continue to avoid this problem. It is no longer possible to evade it by recourse to a bankrupt philosophy of absolute change.

It would appear that values cannot be justified without permanence. It would also appear that no appeal to permanence can eliminate uncertainty in the validation of values. The sanctioning of values always involves faith. Also, no appeal to permanence can eliminate the radical challenge that change presents to values in practical application. Change is a reality that eliminates simplicity from consideration of value. A world that exhibits both permanence and change guarantees the presence of mystery in human life.

Closely related to the problem of sanctioning values is the strength of value judgments. There is common agreement that some values should be held with great tenacity and conviction. This is especially significant in the face of changing demands and circumstances. In one way or another, however, implicitly if not explicitly, unction and duration in values are of necessity related to permanence. Philosophers who theoretically embrace change do not prove to be exceptions to this. (5) Strength in value judgments is always related to permanence in some way, at least to the permanent identifying characteristics of a philosophical system. Values are required because of change, but they are maintained by reference to permanence. Values are applied in a context of change, but their power depends upon permanence. To suggest that change renders some values irrelevant is to imply that unlimited change would render all values irrelevant.

At a time when the concept of system is increasingly receiving attention, it would be useful for teachers to familiarize themselves with what Sorokin calls the principle of limit. (6) He points out that if we posit unlimited possibility of change in a given system, it can change to such an extent that it will lose its essential characteristics and become unidentifiable or non-existent as a system. Rather, for a system to exist certain limits are necessary. To advocate unlimited change, therefore, is to advocate the destruction of all systems, whether personal, intellectual, biological, ecological, political, or socio-economic. If educators choose to espouse philosophies of absolute change, they should at least take responsibility for what they are doing and acknowledge to their pupils at the beginning the end results of their recommendations. Those results would include the destruction of all present values, no matter how precious, as well as all human beings to whom the principle is extended.

During their professional preparation, teachers should be made aware of the probability that both permanence and change always functions in the sanctioning and teaching of values. This probability should be acknowledged in teaching values in the public schools. Not to do so is to deny to the teachers and pupils essential insight into the processes involved in human valuation and in the teaching and learning of values. Failure to do this in American education is usually the result of the adoption of a general if superficial philosophy of change through the direct or indirect influence of John Dewey. It should be recognized that philosophies do not in fact successfully eliminate permanence from their systems. The permanent features of Dewey's system illustrate this. Permanence as well as change plays a crucial role in human valuation. Philosophical extremism relative to the reality or significance of permanence or change seriously impairs the normal human processes of evaluation. Implicit denial of the full significance of either permanence or change is an effective means of axiological seduction through the educational process. It is contrary to democratic deals and constitutes a particularly reprehensible form of indoctrination. In the most serious sense, it is a violation of the integrity and personality of the individual pupil. Permanence and change are two of the most powerful concepts at work in human life. Their ubiquitous influence is undeniable. The relative weight and function assigned to each of them is of crucial importance in the determination of the philosophy and life-style of the individual. Education should be designed to bring each person to the fullest possible insight into the significance of these ideas in order that he may employ them freely in the determination of his own values. To indoctrinate people with a particular, limited, and tendential view regarding permanence or change is a violation of human personality. The subtle and subjective aspect of such a process makes it even more contemptible than overt and blatant acts of propaganda and coercion. It is unworthy of the teaching profession.

To install absolute change as one's guiding principle guarantees the pursuit of the unknown and unknowable and eliminates the possibility of truth from the world. One can only encounter. To do this is to guarantee futility in life. To appeal to change in general is to appeal to the unknown and the unpredictable. It is an act of unparalleled obscurantism. The educator who installs absolute change as his leading value and guiding concept has decided in advance to avoid accountability, to limit purpose to personal and arbitrary whim, to eliminate responsibility from society and government, and to guarantee the absence of true direction in life. Education must aknowledge both permanence and change, for both are present to all authentic human reality. Change is more than movement. It implies the alteration of quality. It thereby forever defies reduction to the quantifiable world of extension. It is distinctively human, a permanent aspect of man's experience. Both permanence and change are integral to all education that is authentically human.

Documentations

1. See this writer's Ph.D. dissertation, An Examination of the Relationship Between the Categories of Permanence and Change and the Sanctioning and Teaching of Values in Selected Philosophies of Education, Arizona State University, 1971.

2. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Nobel Lecture, New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1972, pp. 24 ff and 32 ff.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 4 and 8 ff.

4. Cf. Solzhenitsyn's book, The Gulog Archipelago in this connection (New York: Harper and Row Publisher, 1973).

5. John Dewey, for example, did not. See the dissertation referred to above, pp. 365-372 and 415 f.

6. Sorokin, Pitirim A., Social and Cultural Dynamics: A Study of Change in Major Systems of Art, Truth, Ethics, Law and Social Relationships. Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1957, pp. 647-675.

CHAPTER XXI

VALUES

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AND

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Introduction

There is good reason to wonder if our schools have sufficiently helped students with value development. We see young people with substantial knowledge who do not know what to do with that knowledge. We see others who chronically react in a negative and unthinking way to almost everything in their surroundings. In general, we see many students who are confused about what their values are or should be.

Given the condition of the world, such value confusion is quite understandable. The contrasts and changes that surround all of us today are dramatic.

Look at these social realities, for example: Support for the arts is hard to come by. Educated men insist that our leaders twist the truth for their own purposes. The crime rate goes up and up. Roaming mobs face riot-trained police. And American soldiers in foreign lands are accused of rounding up old men, women, and children and shooting them.

At the same time there is new concern for the plight of the American Indian, the elderly, and the slum dweller. People no longer look aside as the air, streams, and lakes become polluted. The courts strengthen the individual's freedom of speech. The rich are asked to pay more taxes; there is new support for the poor. And people are wondering aloud if America is on the right track.

One can see how it is difficult for students to relate to this inconsistent world. Traditional values are not accepted the way they used to be; some students plainly reject them. But many students cannot seem to find replacements for traditional values. The result is often an absence of values. Students are unsure of what to do with the knowledge they find in school. Some are not sure that knowledge has any use at all. And some seem to confuse knowledge with wisdom and adopt a life-style of either chronic conformity or impulsive rebellion. (1)

More precisely, a value problem is indicated for a student if, in the absence of a prior emotional disturbance, he finds it very difficult to face typical life situations and to make choices and decisions. Or if he typically makes choices without the awareness that some alternatives may be more worthy than others. Or if he does not behave in ways that are consistent with his choices and preferences -- that is, if there is a gap between his creeds and his deeds.

What Teachers Can Do About Values

There are other ways of characterizing value problems among youth. (2) But however one sees value problems, the question of what, if anything, teachers can do remains. That is the subject of this article. What alternatives are open to a teacher who would help students with value development? We will address that question by listing several of the more common approaches to values and commenting briefly on each. There is no assumption that the list is exhaustive or that any one approach should be used exclusively. For example, although the authors favor the last approach introduced, we would use other approaches in certain circumstances, as we note in our concluding remarks.

Teachers have three main alternatives in dealing with value development. One alternative is to do nothing about such development. Another is to transmit a preexisting set of values to students. A third is to help those students find their own values.

Doing Nothing About Values

Some choose the first alternative because they believe that values are the domain of the family and religious institutions. Others choose it because, practically, they do not know what to do. Some educators choose to do nothing about value development because they are trained for and are interested in teaching only subject matter. A few educators believe that values come from trial-and-error interaction with life, and that there is nothing a school can do other than provide an array of useful experiences and encourage students to use those experiences the best way they can.

But the reality of schooling is that it is impossible to do nothing. (3) When a teacher says that it is important to master a lesson to get good grades to get into college to get a good job to earn a good salary, he is obviously promoting several values -- a work ethic, a future orientation, and materialism, to name a few. When a textbook constantly pairs communism with autocracy and capitalism with democracy, values are clearly suggested. And, simply, when schools talk about safety, good manners, and good health, they are usually trying to promote these values. Thus it is unreal to say that schools should do nothing about values. The question is, should they continue to work at values the way they currently do?

There is a special problem facing those who would leave the teaching of values to the family or to religious institutions. Most parents probably do not know how to impart values, and most religious institutions have only minimal impact on the values of youth. (4) One could, of course, argue that these institutions should learn to be more effective. Until that happens, however, it is unlikely that parents or religious institutions will change the way young people perceive and deal with values.

Transmitting Values

Some educators who are concerned with the state of youth's values believe that we must work more effectively to transmit the values we know are right, desirable, and good. They assume that such values are known, at least in part, and that the task of the educator is to learn better ways of passing those values along to students.

Two general problems face such educators: being certain that their values really are universally right, desirable, and good; and finding ways to transmit them. The problem of value certainty is beyond the scope of this article, but it is dealt with in a book by Abraham Maslow. (5) The question of transmittal is considered below in a discussion of six common approaches to transmitting values: the model approach, the reward-and-punishment approach, the explanatory approach, the nagging approach, the manipulation approach, and the transmittal liberal arts approach.

The Model Approach

Some people who assume that what is right and wrong can be identified and communicated to others believe that one should model desirable values. Such people try to behave in ways that reflect the values they want to transmit.

There is much evidence that modeling has a strong influence on children's behavior. If we assume that one absorbs values as one absorbs behavior patterns, we can say that modeling affects children's values as well as their behavior.

There is a parallel between modeling and what is sometimes called imprinting. Thus some experiences, especially those repeatedly or strongly presented to a susceptible subject, are deeply imprinted in the growing orgamism. (6)

The most serious problem for the modeling approach to value development is that, in our complex society, conflicting models exist for almost every value one could name. A parent or teacher could model hard work, for example, but a friend or television star or story-book character might present the opposite model. The modeling approach by itself provides no means of helping youngsters deal with the conflicting and inconsistent models that they are almost certain to perceive in a world drawn closer and closer together by modern communication devices.

The modeling approach is also weak in dealing with values that are only imperfectly reflected in public behavior. It is difficult to model certain very personal values and internal phenomena, such as aspirations, faith, or loyalty.

The Reward-and-Punishment Approach

Some educators believe that one does not so much influence values as shape behavior. In the reward-and-punishment approach, the teacher or parent first identifies desirable behavior and then, by judicious rewards, encouragement, and the like, encourages the repetition of that behavior. Thus one might reward punctuality, reflective thinking, and kindness, and ignore their opposites. (7)

Sometimes teachers try to develop certain value habits by giving students materials or activities that channel behavior in desired ways. For example, a teacher might give students round pencils and tilted desks to encourage the habit of tidiness; the built-in penalty for a pencil left carelessly on a desk is a pencil rolling away.

However, proponents of this approach have the problem of explaining how it can influence internal operations of humans, operations below the observable behavior level. One can shape much behavior, but can one shape feelings and thought processes?

A somewhat different problem is that humans are not completely malleable. Humans have certain innate and early-learned drives and limitations. They have their own individual processes of thought and evaluation, drives for activity and power, and needs for self-expression. How does the notion that adults can shape children's behavior come to terms with children's internal powers and inclinations? What happens if there is a conflict between the two? (8)

In a sense, it is even manipulatory for teachers to fail to raise controversial issues in school, for that perpetuates the status quo. Forces for change do not have a fair chance. Thus, schools that do not raise such issues as the role of women in society, the problems of minority groups, and the forms of real political power in the country might be accused of manipulating values.

The manipulation approach has several disadvantages. It is uncomfortable for those who believe that man's rational processes need to be fully utilized. And it runs counter to current trends in society, as more people are being exposed to more ideas through increased communications. It is increasingly difficult to keep ideas away from students, to sustain distorted consequences, and to limit student experiences.

The Transmittal Liberal Arts Approach

Some educators believe that right values exist and will be revealed to those who are immersed in what is often called the liberal arts. These right values, these basic goods, might not be the ones currently accepted, it is asserted, but they do exist and will most likely be found by those who study man's thoughts and accomplishments with an open mind. Educators who take this position, called the transmittal liberal arts approach, want students to read widely, think deeply, and experience broadly. They trust that life experiences and thoughtful study provide a route to absolute goods and values.

However, because values are complex and because man's thoughts and accomplishments are both abundant and complicated, it is difficult to recommend that the average student rely upon this approach. It takes substantial mental stamina and ability, and much time and energy, to travel this road. While the study of our cultural heritage can be defended on other grounds, we would not expect it to be sufficient for value education.

Clarifying Values

The two approaches outlined below are not based upon the assumption that absolute goods exist and can be known. They view values as relative, personal, situational. The main task of these approaches is not to identify and transmit the "right" values, but to help a student clarify his own values so he can obtain the values that best suit him and his environment; so he can adjust himself to a changing world; and so he can play an intelligent role in influencing the way the world changes.

Proponents of these approaches have at least two problems. First, they must learn methods whereby, without promoting particular values, they can help students obtain values that will work for them and for those around them. Second, they must devise methods of controlling behavior so that, while students are in the process of developing values, they and others are protected against destructive behaviors. The usual solution here is to have behavior rules that are not defended as values, but merely as devices for protecting individuals and groups against pressures from others.

The Clarifying Liberal Arts Approach

The clarifying liberal arts approach is similar to the transmittal liberal arts approach; both utilize the records of man's thoughts and accomplishments. But the purpose of the clarifying liberal arts approach is different: it is aimed at exposing students to the best in the culture so that a student may find the best values for himself and his environment, not so that he may discover the "right" values for all times. In the clarifying liberal arts approach, students read widely, think deeply, and experience broadly -- not to find universal values, but to find themselves.

Unfortunately, it is probably not much easier to use all of culture to find oneself than it is to use it to find eternal truths. Our cultural heritage is too broad, too complex, and too inconsistent to expect the average student to grasp it and relate it to his life and times with any degree of comfort and comprehension.

The Value Skills Approach

Another approach holds that the problem is not so much helping a student find values as it is helping him learn skills to continue the clarifying value approach throughout his life, and to apply his values in ways that are personally and socially useful. Proponents of this value skills approach often note that the world is changing rapidly and recommend that we provide students with skills to change values as the world changes and as students become more knowledgeable. Noting that it is easy to mouth creeds and not perform the accompanying deeds, they recommend that we teach how to apply values in real situations, so that behavior reflects value thinking.

Pragmatic philosophers after Dewey (9) favor developing in students an experimental attitude toward life. They believe that value questions should be treated like other questions, with thoughtful consideration of alternatives and consequences, both social and personal. They assert that moral issues are as susceptible to rational processes as are other issues. Persons who take this position believe that, just as one learns critical thinking skills, so one learns value skills. They often favor in schools a nonmoralizing examination of current real-life issues, what is sometimes called the problems approach, usually not in place of academic study, but in addition to it. (10)

Some children's readers have been built around value issues and are meant to encourage value thinking. (11) And some curriculum approaches have been built in this style. In this connection, special note should be made of the work of Donald W. Oliver and James P. Shaver. (12) They have identified specific skills useful for dealing with political controversy, and especially the ethical problems that arise out of such controversy. Measuring instruments for those skills are also identified.

In general, the purposes of these approaches are to sensitize children to value issues, to give them experiences in thinking critically about such issues, to give them opportunities to share perceptions with others and learn cooperative problem-solving skills, and to help them learn to apply value skills in their own lives.

Some educators approach value skills from a psychological perspective. Many so-called humanistic psychologists, such as Carl Rogers, say that if a person is put into a supportive social environment and encouraged to tune into his feelings and the feelings of others, and if he is taught communication skills that minimize communication distortion, he will naturally tend to make wise judgments and will use experience to correct judgments that are unwise. (13) Such psychologists place a good deal of trust in man's internal evaluation mechanisms and in the ability of groups who share data to arrive at wise decisions. A key implication is that teachers should be helped to become more honest, warm, and empathetic.

A more comprehensive methodology, built on the positions of the pragmatic philosophers and humanistic psychologists, has identified seven broad value skills and has gathered a series of classroom techniques to help students learn those skills. The skills are (a) seeking alternatives when faced with a choice, (b) looking ahead to probable consequences before choosing, (c) making choices on one's own, without depending on others, (d) being aware of one's own preferences and valuations, (e) being willing to affirm one's choices and preferences publicly, (f) acting in ways that are consistent with choices and preferences, and (g) acting in those ways repeatedly, with a pattern to one's life. Those skills and the exercises to develop them are presented by Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon in Values and Teaching.

There are, however, problems with this approach, too. When one focuses upon processes of valuing and not upon the values themselves, one is faced with the problem of what to do with students whose processes are faulty, or who for other reasons (sometimes emotional pressures) come to adopt values that are, for them or for others, counterproductive.

There is the additional problem of knowing which skills best prepare persons to clarify and revise values. Could it be that those who advocate a particular list of skills are saying that they have found a new set of universal values (which happen to be in the form of processes rather than products)?

Conclusion

Research on the effectiveness of the various approaches to values is lacking. Researchers to date have not agreed on goals for value education, especially on the balance between value indoctrination and value clarification. They need better measuring instruments, especially to distinguish values expressed on paper-and-pencil tests from values woven into behavior.

We conclude from what sketchy research does exist, and on the basis of rather consistent observations of young people's difficulties with values, that value confusion is growing in the United States. Teachers can help students avoid substantial drift and ambivalence by giving them value-clarifying experiences. A combination of the clarifying liberal arts approach and the value skills approach is probably best. The former provides data often useful for making choices, and the latter provides a climate and experiences for practicing value choice-making.

Models are also useful, but not as prescriptions of behavior to be emulated. They are useful as illustrations of what a life can be, not what a life should be. Students should be helped to examine models critically and to consider what is recommended by them, and not be led to believe that they should try to plan their existence as an imitation of the models.

Explanations are likewise useful if they inform a student's thinking, not if they are delivered as the last word on a value. When a teacher explains why he supports a certain value, he is being honest and open and responsive to students' needs to know. Explanations, as long as they are offered as personal or consensual statements of positions and not as dogma, encourage rational processes and thus develop value skills.

No matter what approach to values one takes, there will be some students who will behave in ways that contradict the teacher's, the school's, or the society's values. These students must be taught that there are limits to accepted behavior. But they should not be led to believe that they must accept the values upon which those limits are based. Thus a student should be told that we cannot accept his disturbing the work of others, even though we can accept the fact that his disturbing behavior is motivated by a strongly held value. Of course, we also believe that this position is relative; sometimes the value that the student is defending is more important than the disturbance he is causing (as many felt was the case with the black sit-ins at Southern lunch counters a few years ago). The point here is that one may view values as situational and personal without believing that society should be lawless or chaotic. Indeed, observations of children who have learned to be rationally self-disciplined suggest that value clarification approaches, based as they are on individual responsibility, are more likely to produce lawful and orderly environments than are approaches for transmitting values, which too often leave students feeling confused and valueless.

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CHAPTER XXII

THIS BUSINESS OF VALUES: A REVIEW

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Within the broad theme of "The Teaching of Values," the writer displayed his ability to make simple things complex and complex things even more complex. This article was originally designed to wage a polemic toward all those persons who were going to wave the banner of "value-free" values teaching. The article would have then concluded with the obvious, i.e., value free education by definition is impossible. But, since that was fairly well agreed upon, an equally complexing task would have been to show how the major proponents of the Teaching of Values usually fell into two camps. The camp of the absolutist might have suggested that there was only one set of values to transmit; there was only one agreed upon structure for the discerning of values; or the "stuff" of values was readily discernible as being of x, y, or z. The camp of the relativist might have suggested that there was a legion of values (whether or not conflicting) that could be transmitted; or that values could be subjective, emotive, or relational. Suffice it to say, this business of values became more complex, until the words of Rucker became quite appropriate. "The concept of value is made so needlessly puzzling and complex that all one's energies are used in trying to comprehend it. Little is left over for concretely examining values at work in every educational transaction -- every moment of its flow." (Rucker, p. v) Therefore, it was decided that maybe a modest review of some of the literature on this business of values would provide the readers of this yearbook with an opportunity to allow their own biases, thoughts, and confusions to develop into insights as the review of literature did for the author.

In an attempt to narrow the field of review, the author made the assumption that the reader was primarily interested in curriculum, instruction, and/or supervision. Further, the author assumed that goals and objectives were part of the business of curriculum; and, according to certain models such as Otto and Sanders (1964), Goodlad (1968), Tyler (1950), and Parsons (1959) there was a certain relationship between values and goals. Therefore, the reviewer looked to the literature viewing values as a source of goals. Thus, the review also included a brief look at this business of goals and a few implications for "curriculuming," and "instructing."

Values As A Source Of Goals

A primary source (unless by definition the only source) of goals was the domain of statements that connote something of worth, i.e., values and value statements.

According to Beauchamp "the first task for curriculum planners with respect to values is to identify and state those as expressed as attitudes, beliefs, ideas or concepts that the school should bring to the attention of pupils" (1968, p. 162). O'Connor suggested a similar thought when he stated that goals should consist of "a set of values or ideas embodied and expressed in the purposes for which knowledge, skills and attitudes are imparted" (1957, p. 5). The embodied set of values would be the expressed purposes or value statements translated into goal statements.

It could be said that basic to the determination of purposes of a school (its philosophy and goals) was the assumption that certain attitudes, concepts, and beliefs were of worth for the individual or the society depending upon the model of curriculum development employed. Therefore, those attitudes, concepts, and beliefs ought to have been attended to when the purposes of the school were developed.

In light of the above statements it seemed necessary to review literature and research that attended to value questions including a general description of various value positions.

Positions on Values. In his succinct historical writing, Hunnex (1961) discussed the problems of values which included three basic questions: Is value a quality, a relation or an attitude? Is value found or made? and, Is a value definable, analyzable, or reducible? Through his discourse he presented four positions. The four positions are stated below.

1. Axiological Objectivism or Realism. This position stated that in some sense value judgments were objective. Values, norms, ideas, and the like were constituents of, or reside in, objects, or in objective reality (as in Alexander); or they were ascribed to objects by desire (as in Spinoza). Value judgments were meaningful, i.e., true or false, even though they were not verifiable, i.e., not definable in verifiable sensory terms. Values resided in objects as did colors or temperature. They were grounded in reality. Some typical expressions of axiological objectivism included:

> Bosanquet (idealism) "Value is a certain quality of objectives bona fide belonging to them but especially revealed in their manifestations within the attitude of human minds." (Hunnex, p. 21)
> G. E. Moore (Intuitionism) "Values may be factually predicated of acts or objects." (Hunnex, p. 21)

2. *Axiological Subjectivism*. Theories of this position reduced value judgments to statements about mental attitudes toward an object or situation. Lacking independent reality, value had reality only as a state of mind in the subject. Some typical expressions of axiological subjectivism were:

> Hume (Scepticism) "X has value means that most men prefer X."
> Sartre (Existentialism) "Values are created by the subject."
> (Hunnex, p. 22)

3. *Axiological Relationism*. This position proceeded from theories that value was a relation holding between variables or a product of variables in interaction. Values were not private (subjective) but public, though not objective in the sense of being independent of interest. Typical expression of Axiological Relationism included:

> Dewey (Instrumentalism) Values are the relation of things as means to the ends or consequences actually achieved. Values qua values are instrumental.
> Ducasse (Humanism) Value is not an event in the subject nor a quality in the object but a capacity to effect a kind of relation. (Hunnex, p. 24)

4. *Axiological Nominalism or Scepticism (Emotivism)*. Theories of this position held that values were meaningless because they expressed emotion or feelings or attempts to persuade. They were private. A science of values -- axiology -- was impossible.
Typical expressions of Emotivism were:

> Nietzsche (Axiological Relativism) Value judgments are expressions of feeling and custom rather than statements of fact.
> Ayer (Logical Positivism) Value judgments serve an expressive function giving vent to feelings and, as statements, are emotive or non cognitive.
> Stevenson (Logical Empiricism) Value judgments serve a persuasive function. Since values are emotive and not subject to error as true or false, persuasion is needed to evoke their acceptance. (Hunnex, p. 25)

From this very brief overview of values positions, the complexity of values theory became evident. It was noted, however, that many educators were quite willing to accept at "face value" a definition of values as "something that is desirable, or of worth." There were others who found the question of what it meant "to value" or speak of values as problematic. Warnock, in his book *Contemporary Moral Philosophy*, concluded by saying "This is a subject (values theory) in which there is still almost everything to be done" (1967, p. 77). And, "The meaning of the term "value" is by no means clear in the social sciences or in philosophy! One can find consensus for no definition. About the only agreement that emerges is that a value represents something important in human existence." (Rath, 1966)

Another concern that became evident was the more subtle implication for curriculum and instruction. If there were alternative positions concerning this business of values, then it could be the case that efforts under way in the school settings directed toward the "teaching of values" could at best prove to be problematic if someone attempted to transport value exercises, techniques, or objectives from one setting to another without first asking a few questions. These questions might include:

> What are the motives for teaching with those specific techniques? From whence came the goals and objectives that before or after the fact of instruction justified the use of those techniques? Upon what position(s) does the technique rest?

A case might be made that unless these and other questions are raised and in some cogent manner and resolved for a time, that mysterious line separating teaching and indoctrination may forever disappear and be replaced with battle lines made up of persons in an uncompromising arena of curriculum development.

Clarifying Attempts. Krathwohl, *et.al*. (1964) also made the above distinction between values and valuing. This thought was extended by Raths, Harmin, and Simon, (1966) when they stated that the act of valuing was an integral part of that which is of value, i.e., unless something was "actively prized," that something would remain only a potential value.

O'Neil (1970) demonstrated critical distinctions when speaking of "values" by differentiating between a value experience (e.g. pleasure), a value object (e.g. ice cream) and a value principle (e.g. Golden Rule). All were said to be of worth relative to questions of either one of three types, i.e. (1) personal value question -- what is personally good?; (2) moral question -- what is interpersonally good?; and (3) ethical question "Did I intend to act as I did?"

Rucker, et.al. (1969) wrote on the topic of values instruction. Their definition of values, "a preferred event," closely approximated the previous distinction between values and valuing.

> To describe a value, therefore, we have not only to say what is distinct about the pattern that embodies it (the value) but, as part of that, what it is being preferred to in terms of alternatives (p. 86).

However, Rucker did not share the concern for analyzing in depth the concept of value as was mentioned before. Yet, the complexity of values theory and alternative positions was briefly exposed. If the concept of value and its status (objective, subjective or relative) would not be discerned, it would be unlikely that "bona fide" concrete examinations could occur.

According to Murphy (1969) who borrowed heavily from Dr. Harold D. Lasswell of Yale University, human beings had needs which must be met. This was true of individuals as well as groups of people. "Those things which an individual (or a society) needs and wants, he places value upon. These are his values" (p. 1). Further, "An individual makes his choices and decisions in terms of his needs and wants -- his values" (p. 1). An interesting application of the Lasswell System is currently being utilized by James House and Laverne Cunningham with the Detroit schools. This was reported at the 1974 Urban Curriculum Leaders Conference in Atlanta.

Magee, in his book, Philosophical Analysis in Education (1971) stated:

> Every human activity presupposes values that are essential to that activity. If you deny the proposition that these things are worth knowing, there would be no sense in doing scientific work. Similarly, education presupposes certain principles and values that must be accepted if one is to take education seriously . . . . Establishing schools, for instance, presupposes that education is doing some kind of good to somebody, benefiting both the young and the society as a whole. Whatever our rationale for those values, this kind of activity makes no sense whatsoever without presupposing this benefit. (pp. 147-148)

In discerning values, or attempting to describe what was of value, Magee suggested a number of reasons for preferences. His logic of values or rules include:

(a) Use empirical means wherever possible. This was most easily accomplished when the values in question were a means to another value already agreed upon.

(b) Apply the rule of consistency. "If you can show a reasonable man that his evaluations are inconsistent with one another, he usually will acknowledge that he must modify them in some way to overcome the criticism" (p. 155).

(c) Fertile values were better than sterile ones. That is, other things being equal, a reasonable man would always choose a value that led to other values.

(d) A durable value, one that lasts a long time, was preferable to a short-term value.

Magee concluded by stating that "when we turn to practical reason, to the business of deciding and evaluating, then we discover the context in which values appear. Value in this context becomes a classification word for modes of valuing rather than a substantive noun of some thing in the world." (p. 159) To assist in the clarification of this process of valuing, Rescher, in his Introduction to Value Theory presented the following comparison with a cognitive process:

Cognitive	Evaluative
Belief	Valuing or desire
Correctness of belief	Correctness of valuing or desire
Believes to be true	Valued or desired
Actually true	Valuable or desirable (1969, p. 131)

In the applied field of systems theory, a typical expression of what was of value was "The value of anything is a function of the purposes of the user" (Walker, 1970). The similarity between Walker, Magee and Rath seemed evident. That which was of worth to the individual (directly or indirectly) could be said to be of value. However, this was quite close to the utterance of a tautology (A = A).

Taylor (1961) in his book Normative Discourse presented a comprehensive study in the general theory of value using the tools of philosophical analysis. In Chapter One he explicated the meaning of the verb "to value" as approximately synonymous with "to hold precious or dear."

> A person values something when he has a certain sort of pro attitude toward it. When the word "value" occurs as a noun, it may be used either to designate the concept of desirability (goodness, rightness, valuableness) or it may be used as a substantive. It is in the first sense that we speak of a person's or group's or society's values. (p. 297)
>
> A person's values are those judgments and standards which define his ideals and life goals (to fulfill the standards; to follow the rules). They are the standards and rules according to which he evaluates things and prescribes acts, as well as the standards and rules he tries to live by, whether or not he is aware of them. (p. 298)

Taylor's exhaustive treatment of "value" concluded in the final chapters of his book with a description of values as a basis for the goals of all organizations, institutions and the existence of societies per se. His treatment of this relationship between values and goals made explicit the assumed relationship mentioned at the beginning of this writing.

Values at the Base of Goals. Taylor stated that in all civilized cultures there were eight points of view (or realms of value) that could be designated as "basic." They were called basic for two reasons.

> First, they pervade the culture, in the sense that the conduct of any given individual in the culture is always subject to a value system belonging to at least one of them and is usually subject to value systems belonging to more than one of them. Second, they are dominant points of view in a culture, in the sense that they set the values of the major social institutions and activities which carry on the civilization of the culture. These major social institutions and activities are the moral code, the arts, the pure and applied sciences, the legal systems, the customs and traditions, and educational institutions. The eight points of view corresponding to these institutions and activities are the moral, the aesthetic, the intellectual, the religious, the economic, the political, the legal, and the point of view of etiquette or custom. There is no single point of view corresponding to the educational institutions of a society, since education is a process which may take place within any point of view. Thus, there is moral

> education, aesthetic education, intellectual education, religious education, and so on.
>
> Value systems belonging to the eight basic points of view are embodied in the organizations and institutions of a society. Thus the purpose of a social organization may be to fulfill standards which belong to one or another of them. Or else it may be governed by rules which belong to one or another of these points of view, and to carry on the organization's activities is to follow these (practice - defining) rules. A church as an organized social institution, for example, exists to further goals defined by religious values, and to practice a religion is to act in accordance with the rules of religious conduct (worship, ritual, prayer) (p. 299-300).

If one accepted the above mode of classifying values, then values were _the_ source of goals. Education as a process for transmitting values would be subservient to the eight basic points of view. Yet, that statement might in fact be a specific type of point of view, i.e. that one is implicitly agreeing that the prevailing and dominant values be perpetuated. It may be the role of education to test, question and possibly change dominant points of view. If one accepted the above mode of classifying values (points of view), then values were clearly seen to be the basis for institutional goals. In the case of education, maybe the prevailing and dominant values needed to be discerned within the eight points of view and questioned, tested and/or transmitted. Those values that were translated into educational goals would gain authority from a particular moral code. "It is also appropriate to judge the organization from both the moral and legal points of view, since their purposes are to achieve certain goals or to pursue certain ends _without_ breaking society's laws." (p. 300) The same directive was given by Kluckhohn in stating "the shape of the future society and of its educational system is affected by the "dominant paradigm," that is, by the set of underlying basic assumptions upon which the prevailing belief system . . . is built" (1961, p. 23). Also, Katz and Kahn stated, "Norms (embodied in values) develop around the dominant ongoing functions of the social system. They (men) give cognitive support and structure to the behavior in which people are engaged" (p. 15).

Granted, values are at the base of goals or the determinants of goals; and, that values are "something of worth." However, the above realizations seemed to be the mere beginnings of curriculum planning. Among other critical concerns or questions to be answered seemed to be:

(1) How does one discern "what is of value;" and,

(2) Whose values ought to prevail; whose values ought be transmitted; or whose values ought be considered of "greater" importance?

Approaches to these questions were attempted by many including O'Neil as he stated:

> All education is normative . . . All knowing is radically characterological and goal oriented. We learn instrumentally, as a means of solving our problems and thereby satisfying our needs . . . Values and goals can be determined objectively by studying what is and therefore what is capable of being and becoming. (1970, p. 68)

Beauchamp (1968) on the other hand was less liberal in answer giving as he suggested that the "implication of values and value theory for curricular theory have not been explored to the present time in depth." (p. 168) If goals should be based upon the values of society according to Barlow (1969), then it is suggested that we must contend with the observations of Lynd (1939) as possibly valid for the 1970's when he pointed to a few of the prevailing value contradictions.

> (1) Individualism is a prime value, and survival of the fittest is a law of nature that made Americans great. But, people ought to be charitable, helpful to one another, loyal to the group, and work for common purpose.
>
> (2) Democracy is the ultimate form of living together because all men are created free and equal. But, you cannot trust popular votes and some people are "more equal" than others.
>
> (3) The family is our basic and most sacred institution. But, business is our most important institution and other institutions must conform to its needs.
>
> (4) America believes in progress. But, the old tried fundamentals are best. People who desire change are suspected of being the dupes of foreign radicals." (p. 60-61)

Magee (1971) pointed out that

> neither a society nor a person enjoys having such contradictions pointed out, but it is fatuous to suppose that a rationally cultivated mind can overlook such tasks. This philosophical consideration is suggested by the sociological fact that societies tend in varying degrees to be systems of value articulated through its various institutions. If the tensions among its values is too great, the society itself is in peril. (p. 157)

According to writers such as Booth (1972), Downey (1965), and Macdonald and Clark (1973), the society and education in particular was in a perilous state. However, Jones (1970, p. 83) stated, "The values of our society are . . . in a period of great change. But some values, whatever changes others undergo, remain undiminished: Tolerance, mutual understanding, and respect for human rights. I suggest that, rather than diminishing, these values are becoming more assertive." If there are values becoming more assertive, then they must be discerned as a basis for the institutional goals of education according to various writers. Pellegrin (1966) stated, "We have learned the hard way that education is intimately bound to the social trends and rapid changes that characterize our society . . . the alternative to planned change (discerning the values and setting goals) is to be buffeted about by the clamors for educational services of many kinds." Beauchamp suggested that two avenues seemed to be available to curriculum planners. "One is to search the recognized school subjects and the scholarly disciplines for value content that reflect decisions made in earlier times. The other is to make judgments about existing values in the general cultural ethos of the school and its community" (1966, p. 161-162). Yet, an assumption about the role of the school as "that which did not have a primary role in social reconstruction" was made. Glatthorn (1970) viewed the school as an integral part of a movement to reconstruct society. He projected or extended trend lines in society and then determined various goals that would ensure the continuance of the trends or values. Others differed even more dramatically by refusing to plan or discern goals as reflections of the past or extensions of the present. Marien (1973) stated, "We have created a society that we cannot understand and therefore cannot manage." (p. 513) It might have the case that John Donne was thinking of educational practice when he wrote:

> Tis all in pieces, all coherence gone;
> All just supply, and all relation.

The recent movement labeled futuristic (of which Marien has contributed) would lead one to question the here-to-fore accepted sources of goals as "the norms (embedded in values) developed around the dominant ongoing functions of the social system" (Katz, 1966, p. 15) or the need for the curriculum to reflect the values that are shared by the community as espoused by Dewey. (1934, pp. 336-44)

A critical question, then, must still be answered, i.e. "which values should be transmitted if in fact values are to be transmitted?" The answer to this question would in effect establish criteria for developing goals. Beauchamp (1968) stated, "The selection of values is very much a judgmental procedure" (p. 162); and, as summarized by MacDonald, Wolfson and Zaret (1973):

> Education is a moral enterprise. This means that questions answered and decisions made in education are mostly "should" questions and decisions rather than descriptive "is" questions and decisions. We tend to prescribe activity according to our assessment of its worth as compared to other possible activities. Our decisions reflect value commitments and ethical choices, thus education is not only not value free, it is (along with politics) the most value laden of human activities. The important questions, therefore, are in what directions are we headed, and in what directions should we be headed? (pp. 4-5)

At the base of questions concerned with direction giving statements was the domain of curriculum or more specifically goals, ends, or purpose statements. According to Walker (1970), "To be useful to educators, value concepts must be clearly linked to reality (made explicit) and to plans of action -- their own, and their students." (p. 96) And so, the business of values has taken us full circle.

Summary. The brief overview of the literature more than adequately displays the complexity of the problem and the accompanying covert value laden issues.

For "curriculuming," questions need to be raised concerning "who's values are to prevail?" if any can or/ought to prevail. However, this is to have already decided upon questions such as "What are values?" and "Where are they to be 'found?'" Questions could also be raised concerning the values implicit in goal statements. Certainly not all people serve the same values with the same goals.

For instructing, questions need to be raised concerning the advisability of "wholesale" transportability of techniques; the plausibility of the teaching of values according to a preset series of stages; and the likelihood of the teaching of values (by any definition) being inseparably bound to indoctrination of an ever so subtle a form.

In any event, the raising of questions is a humbling undertaking that can do no worse than make one draw short of the expeditious answer. At best, it can assist us toward "valuing progress."

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CHAPTER XXIII

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF VALUES AND MORAL EDUCATION

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A phenomenological dimension of a study is that structure utilizing science and philosophy to explain and analyze the presentation of some given phenomena. The phenomena to be presented in this paper are moral values adding those conditions that relate them to education.

I

A phenomenological explanation, and analysis of any phenomena, commences with an understanding of consciousness. It is to the topic of consciousness therefore, that attention must first be given to gain insight into the question of moral education. Edmund Husserl was one of the famous philosophers to make consciousness the center of philosophical study. He utilized both the thought of his teacher, Franz Brentano, and William James' Principles of Psychology for this understanding. The basis of consciousness for all three is that consciousness is a stream. Consciousness flows in a steady stream of past to present to future, feeling its own integrity in each step of advance. Thinking occurs within this consciousness as a mental activity of objects being experienced.

William James provides the best description of the stream of consciousness and discusses it in relation to five characteristics. First, the stream is personal. Each consciousness belongs exclusively to oneself and oneself alone. Each person possesses his own thinking to the degree that he cannot share it with anyone. He may attempt to transform thinking into symbols of communication, but the thoughts themselves are so personal that they can never be felt by another in their experienced form. Second, consciousness is changing. Thought is in constant change relative to the activities and will of the individual. The concept "stream" suggests the dynamic and fluid nature of thought, indicating that once a thought has passed, it will never return again in exactly the same form, manner, or feeling. Third, consciousness is sensibly continuous; a stream where the events of succession follow contiguously upon one another. There is no break or lapse in experience. Experience is a series of contiguous events which allows the past to be carried over into the present in the form of an inheritance. Fourth, consciousness appears to deal with objects independent of itself. In other words, thought is concerned with things in the outside world, things other than its own mental organization. From this concern comes knowledge, knowing the events and physical objects in the outside world. And fifth, consciousness selects. So much is present in the outside world that consciousness must select a minimum of objects in order to keep track of the phenomena that are there. Hence, an important characteristic of thinking is its selectiveness. Consciousness focuses and narrows its attention to something definite and vivid in order to control the amount of data to be processed. Hence, thought is always interested in one thing more than another. It accepts and rejects, always choosing while it thinks.

Husserl emphasizes one aspect of consciousness called the "noema" which appears to be missing in William James' five characteristics. James, however, does treat the concept in his own way and calls it 'the principle of constancy in the mind's meanings.' The mind endeavors to think of the same thing, identified psychologically by him as the "law of sameness." It is the key to identity, the recognition by the person that he is referring to the same object of thought. Husserl utilizes this idea of noema to explain the nature of intentionality.

Edmund Husserl identifies the circumstances of an object of thought in relation to the intentions of the observer. The intentional condition of all mental activities is the unifying relationship of the total process of mental object and its entertainment within the experiencing mind. Mental acts of various kinds confront us with objects. The individual is aware of these objects when experiencing such mental activities, and he owes to the referred objects the noema bearing on the objects themselves. This correlation of the objects with the mental activities is what is meant by intentionality. It implies that consciousness is always consciousness of something. There is always the memory of something, the perception of something, even the valuation of something. It is this intentional condition of the unifying of the object to consciousness which provides the mind and human experience with meaning, and it all occurs within the stream of consciousness.

II

The question of moral education relates to the phenomenological fact of the intentional circumstances of consciousness in correlation with its object. In regard to moral education, intentionality refers to the conscious process of valuing its object. But what are these objects of the process of valuing? Like the objects of perception, they contain the relationship between an external world and the person experiencing it.

Explicitly this means three things. First, there is an external world of values outside the individual. This external world can be interpreted as the abstract realm of values. Second, these values have to find their existence in experience, in the world of being. And third, values within human experience must be part and parcel of the dimensions of human definiteness and meaning.

What is this realm of values that exists as the external objectivity of valuing? It is a realm not visualized but made known through understanding, made expedient by the necessities of experience. It is a realm supported by the fact that values do exist everywhere and at all times and within all types of experience. The evidence seems to indicate that these values are independent objects, and it is the nature of experience to integrate these entities into a definiteness of what can be called a "concrescence," i.e., a coming together. Concrescence can only be an understandable process if the values have the significance of an independent nature.

To say that values belong to a realm means primarily that they are of a like kind and character, and possess some kind of interplay and relationship with each other. There is no suggestion that this realm is above or beyond this world. It suggests only a relationship of things of the like kind that can be classified as having the same type of object functioning within phenomena.

A primary fact concerning the value realm is the incompatibility of many values. All values signify importance of some kind or another, that is, each can prove to be valuable in some circumstance somewhere. The main circumstance of the value realm is that some values are simply incompatible with others by their nature and definiteness. These incompatible values can be termed ideal opposites, meaning values which are at opposite poles from one another. Ideal opposites signify the automatic exclusion of value counterparts. Possession of one means the automatic elimination of the other. It is the nature of the value realm to have such restrictions and limitations placed on its objects.

Some values have a grouping relationship to each other so that not all the members of that group can be experienced at the same time. Value groupings mean that certain values of that group manifest themselves experientially in the same way. Once one member of that group is experienced, all others of the same kind must be absent. For example, if someone chooses to paint his house white, he immediately eliminates the colors yellow, green, or brown. The house cannot be all these colors at the same time, nor even one other color. It is the nature of the value realm and experience that this is so. The value realm indicates that grouping and experience limit the historical circumstance to just one choice from among many.

Experience as a factor in values means that new values can be integrated into consciousness, but with the loss of values of a like kind. Human experience is not capable of an infinite expansion in the possession of values. There are temporal limits beyond which it is impossible to experience more values. A person is limited to experiencing only a small number of the total values, hence, the importance of selection from the whole range of values. The factor of existential choice in determining one's life and existence is possible because of the limitations provided by the nature of experience and the realm of values.

III

Many values present themselves in human experience as a consequence of factors other than conscious choice. Many values are a result of definitenesses that have occurred from biological and genetic conditions, and to a degree, from the unconscious influences from the environment. The human individual is laden with values by the very fact that he is a living physical being within place and time. We must consider such values as the "given" values of existence, relative to the individual. Unless consciousness directly works to replace these values, they exist unconsciously within the patterned behavior of the individual experiencing them. They are not the kinds of values that someone chooses for himself. They are, rather, the biological and social inheritances of body and intellectual system.

What this means is that the individual acquires or receives in the early course of his life values that are related to a dispositional system, a system functioning as an important framework for his values. This dispositional system is the focus around which most values are entertained. An individual's acceptance or rejection of a value is due in many cases to either the ease or difficulty in fitting the value into the dispositional system.

Although it is usually the case that the entertained values are the ones most easily related to the dispositional system, it does not necessarily have to be so. Conscious choice, deliberate effort, and strong outside influences can direct the individual to entertain values that are most difficult to relate to his inherent system. To entertain such values with any degree of strength, constant discipline and diligence are required.

Now, what are these dispositional centers, the experiential value cores around which the values from consciousness usually form? In actual fact, every individual has his own unique core that is peculiar to him and to him alone. For the sake of pragmatic assistance in moral education however, it is helpful to group the peculiarities into constructed generalities. There are enough common attributes in certain individual dispositions to classify and identify them as a group.

A list of the dispositional systems must include at least tentatively the following: (a) the disposition of curiosity, a more than average need for environmental stimulation and a questioning attitude; (b) riskiness, the disposition of physical and emotional restlessness with common things, the craving for chance, and the intensity for immediate action; (c) the socially dependent disposition, one that thrives on imitating what others do and the attempt to follow the wishes of the crowd or friends; (d) the ambitious disposition, the strong need to achieve and gain notoriety; (e) the cautious disposition, the careful and conservative disposition that fears failure and avoids risky situations; (f) the righteous disposition, the disposition that is overly concerned with doing the socially moral thing, following all rules to the letter and expecting the same from others; (g) the sensitive disposition, the disposition with an unusually strong feeling of empathy and concern for others, for their feelings and problems.

No doubt there are other dispositions that can be added to this list and which play a decisive role in structuring the values that are entertained by various individuals. This tentative listing, however, does give an indication of the type of phenomena educators must deal with when there is concern for moral education. It is the generalized notion of dispositional centers that is of major importance to this issue.

IV

The phenomenological explanation of education is based upon the phenomenon of intentionality. Education cannot exist apart from the intentions and intentional acts of the initiator or teacher, and/or the intentions of the receiver-creator, i.e., student, child, or friend. We use the term receiver-creator to indicate that the process of education from the point of view of the learner is not only an act dependent on outside stimulation, but it requires a creative conceptual construction of meaning on the part of the student. The student has to be conscious in education, creating concepts and making use of them in his own intentional activities. We use the term "initiator or teacher" to indicate the usual, but by no means only, source of external stimulation.

The late Russian psychologist, Sem Vygotsky, has researched the factor of adult assistance in the development of children's concepts. He concluded that a child can do more and go farther in the development of his school concepts with assistance than he can do on his own. The indication is that adults are a great help to children in acquiring concepts. If this be the case with school concepts, it must also be true with moral concepts. Concepts dealing with morality can be taught with the assistance of either adults, or, as indicated by the work of Piaget, older children. The same principles involved in learning school concepts (environmental stimulation and creativity) are paramount in the attaining of moral concepts. However, with moral concepts, there is an additional factor, the entertainment of the objective value of the concept. It is indeed possible for a moral concept to be known as a cognitive entity without being entertained emotionally. But the goal of moral education is to aim for the emotional entertainment of the concept. Emotional entertainment requires the personal involvement of valuing as well as knowing the concept. Because of this special ingredient, moral education can be a more difficult process for both the teacher teaching it, and the student learning it, than mastering school or technical materials.

The main emphasis in moral education is entertaining the values of moral concepts. This means that the individual must entertain moral ideas to the point that they guide his life and become rules of action and behavior. Although cognition and emotion can often fail to interact, in instances where concepts are held strongly and relate to personal involvement, there is usually a strong bond between them, a connection that is important to moral education. What this suggests is that the emotional entertainment of a moral concept rests on the grounds that what a man thinks and feels strongly, so is he that kind of man. As a man entertains certain ideas positively or negatively, his behavior will reflect that kind of entertainment. If he believes strongly that it is wrong to kill, to steal, smoke or drink alcoholic beverages, he will not do those things. He has to have a change of mind before he can accept them. The change can occur through reason, rationalization, even forgetfulness or emotional fervor. But something has to happen within consciousness before such actions can be performed. Whether the direction is toward positive moral affirmations or negative taboos, the individual is going to act in terms of the relative strength certain ideas are entertained in consciousness in the process of intentionality.

V

The relative strength in the entertainment of values is the key to human character and direction. This suggests that the personal dispositional systems are important in determining the strengths of entertained values. One must believe strongly in an idea for the value to play a decisive role in his life. Here lip service is not enough. Strong belief involving emotional commitment is the primary ingredient, and this is in direct proportion to the allowances and stimulations from the dispositional system.

The relationship of value to dispositional systems can be illustrated by anyone of the systems. A child with a curiosity dispositional center, for example, is going to entertain strong feelings for exploring the mysteries of sex, while the righteous dispositional child will build strong taboos against it and may even refuse to entertain ideas about it. The person with a sensitive dispositional center, on the other hand, finds sex neither good nor bad in itself, but a precarious area of human involvement and sensitive expression. The person with a socially influenced disposition will entertain whatever ideas and experiences his or her peers entertain. And so it goes with most of our moral values. An ambitious person is more likely to kill or hurt than a cautious person. A risky individual will have more of a tendency to steal than a sensitive individual. This is not to say that any of these dispositional centers are evil or wrong. Merely, that each one has certain channels that relate to moral dimensions, tendencies which are more likely to occur in one disposition than another. Every disposition has tendencies toward or away from certain values. If educators and adults feel it is important to influence children in these involvements, the facts of dispositions and tendencies should be realized and known.

A child left to himself follows the tendencies laid down by his dispositional system. There is great variation among individuals, however, not only because the dispositions are different, but because the environments people live in vary greatly. Every kind of disposition interacts with and is influenced by every type of environment. If sex is not taboo and mysterious, for example, the curious child is not going to have the same emotional feelings toward it as in cases where it is. The same variations occur with the other dispositions. War, hate, fear, hunger, religion and world view affect dispositions and the circumstances of involvement. Thus, dispositions are not autonomous. Variable environments affect them greatly. Hence, in moral education, we are dealing with a very complex phenomenon, involving not only individual dispositions, but a general cultural and social environment that influences the dispositions to react in variable ways.

VI

Moral education proceeds on the ground that the teacher or parent can have a moral influence on the child or student. But two existential questions arise with this possibility. First, does another individual, parent or teacher, have the right to influence a child or student for one or a series of values? The question is one of existential responsibility and authority. As a whole, the existential writers defend the moral autonomy of every person, and the implication is that moral decision is a personal thing, and one has the right to tell or influence another human being in such matters. When it comes to the issue of telling or influencing a child in morality or values, the existentialist writers are not that strong on moral autonomy, and more often than not, avoid discussing it.

The issue as to whether adults should influence children and youth is a major one. But it is too large a question to be answered in the present discussion. What we do know, is that it does happen phenomenologically under the conditions of intentionality. Adults do intentionally influence children and youth in values and morals, and most scholars, even those within the existential posture, indicate that this is an acceptable adult function. Very few writers suggest the complete autonomy of children in matters pertaining to morals or any other kinds of values. We will thus assume, though we have not proved it, that parents and teachers have the right to influence children in matters of morals and values.

Once it has been assumed that influencing a child is an acceptable procedure, the second existential question is the choice the educator makes as to what values must be taught. Any decision is a precarious one because it is made for another and not for oneself. It is much easier to take the responsibility for one's own decisions than it is to accept the responsibility for another. There is special concern when it involves the initial stages of a person's life because the future may well depend on those early parental and teacher decisions.

There are some educators who suggest that the influence should never occur, that the parent or teacher must allow the dispositional system to run its course. These educators suggest complete trust in nature and childhood, and imply that adults withdraw from the responsibility of moral education. Adult influence is an imposition, a possible thwarting of the natural desires of development. The recognition of this danger is commendable, but even these educators attempt some moral influence, at least indirectly. Besides, human society will not allow the dispositional systems to completely control men's values and lives. Brutality, barbarism, selfish indulgences of various forms bear witness to the dangers of complete freedom of dispositionally acquired values. Society desires some degree of control on dispositional systems. Hence, each society expects parents and teachers to provide some kind of regulation on natural preferences and appetites.

An alternative suggestion is that parents and teachers influence children, but they should use the guidelines of society. The values chosen for any child should be those which would help him function in the particular society he will be living in. While the case for pragmatic social values appears to be valid, the pragmatic function should not be the only or major criterion for the choice. In the first place, society is such a complex entity that it is no easy task to identify the most useful values. Second, because of society's rapid change, the values that may be useful in one period of time may not be useful in another. And finally, many values are beyond the practical benefits of any particular society and may even be opposed by that society.

The grounds for making decisions about what values to teach are not simple. It is surely the case that a number of criteria are involved. The dispositional system must be a major consideration in the choice, although the dispositional system should not be given complete autonomy and free play. Nevertheless, there are strong assets resulting from each disposition which must be considered possible goods. Also, the dimension of society provides important criteria. It is generally good that an individual conform in some way to the standards and rules of his culture and society. It is also a good thing for him to be able to get along with close friends, neighbors, and family.

There are many criteria to be used in deciding what values to teach a particular individual. The educator must first and foremost know what is meant by value teaching. Then he must endeavor to utilize that one quality that makes any decision valid. This quality is what past generations of various cultures have called wisdom. The educator or parent must aim to be wise. Wisdom is that mental capacity of breadth of knowledge, awareness of consequences, and the acceptance of limitation in the realm of values and morals, in making proper decisions. Wisdom is what the educator strives to possess in deciding what values are to be taught.

VII

Moral education is the influence of one person on another, a child or youth. The educator must recognize that the youth possesses a genetic and experiential endowment in the form of a disposition, and that it is this disposition which generally channels behavior in a particular direction. It is the function of the moral educator to know and understand this disposition, to let well-enough alone if the channel is acceptable. If, on the other hand, changes are felt to be necessary, the educator must know what it is he endeavors to change and what difficulty he will encounter.

The task of the educator is to cognitively and emotionally stimulate the child or youth for the acquirement of a value-concept. This task contains all of the dimensions of intentionality. There are the intentions of the educator for performing and interacting with another individual. There are the intentional aspects of consciousness grasping its object (in this case the value object) and there is the search after meaning. The educator specifically intends that the student acquire the value-concept.

The educational methods used are many, and all have been relatively successful depending on the disposition of the child and the circumstances of involvement. There appears however, to be no exact correlation between any particular method of instruction and type of disposition, although there are some methods that are more stimulating to one disposition than to another. Forceful commands, stern statements, and wording fearful consequences, for example, would probably be more effective in the case of a child with a righteous disposition than a child with a curious one. An educator must note such differences. But at the same time, it will not be true that there is a one-to-one correspondence of method and a particular disposition. In some cases, circumstances will dictate the method.

The educational methods for teaching value concepts are of two general kinds, the direct and indirect. The direct methods are telling a person what is right or wrong, discussing values and human morality, and reasoning concerning situations and circumstances. The indirect methods are hinting about people's actions, condemning what others have done, commending good deeds and models, personal example, and interpreting human history and events. The aim of the educator is to use whatever method or set of methods which assist the child in acquiring the intended moral concepts.

Entertainment of values by the child will take either one of two forms. The entertainment will either be positive, whereby the child will be inclined to the affirmative action of a value, or it will be negative, produce a prohibitive action. The former is the entertainment of a favorable and acceptable value. It will contain the emotional belief that one should endeavor to possess this value within his own life-style. The latter is an avoidance value. It is the emotional belief that one should refuse to let this value become part of one's behavior and being. It is a value to be entertained, but entertained as a prohibition, a value to be shunned, avoided, and fought against if necessary.

For the teaching of positive values, the first function of the educator is to discover how the individual's dispositional system relates to the value chosen to be taught. He will discover that the value is either closely related to the particular disposition of the child or is against it. If the value is in line with the dispositional system and will automatically grow out of it, the task of the educator is greatly simplified. He merely allows nature to take its course. The educator may suggest the concept to the child. But, for the most part, there will be very little direct teaching in the effort. The value will be accepted quickly and strongly with a minimum of direction. If the educator pursues a more intense teaching of the value, however, he runs the risk of overemphasizing this value.

The value that is far removed from the dispositional system is a more formidable challenge because the student adds a foreign element to his system. The ally of natural inclination is not a part of this addition, therefore, greater effort is necessary on the part of the educator. The educator begins teaching on an intellectual plane. He first mentions the concept, then slowly structures intellectual dimensions around it. The teaching should occur often and be sporadic, and timely. Because of the length of time involved in acquiring the concept, the teacher must be with the student often and for long periods. It is one reason why parental teaching of values, is so successful.

In the course of many reiterations and suggestions of the concept, the educator hopes for at least an intellectual understanding of the value. In the course of time, the educator hopes for an emotional acceptance and a personal commitment to the value. When it occurs, the value will be as strong as any other value in the system. It will always be earmarked, on the other hand, by its intellectual foundation. It will always have a strong cognitive side with reason and rational discourse to support it.

VIII

Values accepted as negative values are those of prohibitions and taboos. They are values entertained as values-to-be-avoided, usually introduced with the expression "thou shalt not," and "don't do that." They are referred to in the context of religion as "sins," and in the secular world as "wrong doing." Religion is most often associated with these values, providing an authoritative base for them. Every human society has a large number of stipulated negative values. No individual, anywhere in the world, is without some major kinds of restrictions on his mode of life.

Negative values function to provide guidelines for behavior. They are the boundaries for doing, behaving, experiencing. Negative values are danger sign-posts which encircle the general area of human activity. Inside the sign-posts, the individual is relatively free to act in accord with his needs and wishes, while not trespassing the ground of forbidden territory. To trespass is to perform wrong doing. Negative values are in essence the negative rules governing the limits experience should go.

Repugnance and disgust are at the root of negative values. They form the emotional charge that places negative values in an aversion position in human experience. Man emotionally recoils from certain acts, and experiences that are loathsome and horrible to him. Negative values arise historically from distasteful experiences, developing into laws and socially disapproved customs and rules.

Negative values per se are the easiest values to teach for two reasons. First, the emotions that relate to begative values such as disgust, repugnance, and abhorrence can be stimulated more directly in dramatic histories, confrontations, and verbal explanations than the emotions of positive values. Hence, they are more vividly and easily remembered. Second, the negative values, including their concomitant emotions, can be taught to children long before any situations occur that involve such values. In most negative moral training, parents and teachers stimulate strong emotional feelings against certain values before the child connects himself with them. In other words, the child learns what is supposedly wrong before he imagines himself doing it. For example the boundaries of sexual experience, alcohol, and death, can be learned before the child experiences them. No personal conflict occurs in this early teaching because the child is not yet involved. The shock and trauma of adolescence is the child's first realization that these negative values are possibilities for him while in the early stages of childhood, negative values are simply distant boundaries that are far removed from the events of his own personal life.

IX

The values that are integrated into the life of a child are values that find their existence in the realm of values. But whether these objects be negative or positive depends not upon their place in the value realm, but how they are accepted and integrated into human experience. The realm of values determines only the relationship of one value to another, controlling only whether the values are compatible or not (ideal opposites, groupings). Settling whether a value is good or bad is a matter of the circumstances in the integration of that value into experience. In other words, the negative and positive dimensions of values as we experience them, with all their concomitant emotions and feelings, are human dimensions and not dimensions of the realm of values.

The human species weaves meaning into its activities. This weaving occurs in the acts of intentionality relating to episodes of human and event interaction. The earmarking of a value as being either negative or positive comes from the intentional experience of meaning. Meaning relates to the life being lived, and it is from this living as coordinated with intentionality that the creature determines what will be accepted as positive and what will not. Negative and positive, thus, are creature conditions, conditions necessary in the concrescence of value in the stream of life and consciousness.

Because creatureliness is an important factor in values as man experiences them, life and living become the all-encompassing circumstances in this integration. This means that life and living (and we are so deficient in having an adequate vocabulary to explain it) are the final and total circumstances of every value in the act of concrescence. It is in life and living that usefulness determines positive values. It is in life and living that negative values become boundaries and avoidance markers. Life is the Élan Vital of the system of values as these values are integrated into the world of events and happenings.

Because life is the determining factor in human values, then one value is above all others and can be declared absolute. Like the others, this value must be manifested in the concrescence of experience. But unlike the others, it can only be positive. It has this position because it is the essential ingredient of life itself. This value is "joy."

Joy is the one value that glorifies life and living. It is the value which gives to existence the richness of each daily birth and occurrence. Joy is the one true value of all humanity, the universal ingredient that makes life tolerable and its direction significant. Joy is life's worthiest possession. This fact says to us, first of all, that since joy is the supreme value that can be enhanced in experience, all other values must somehow reflect a relationship to it. It also signifies that positive values must have a more fundamental place in human experience than negative values. This indicates that in moral education, joy is the one ingredient that must never be lost and must be central to the concern of all value teaching.

Joy is the highest and most important value to be experienced by man. Although it can be expressed in many ways none is more fitting than Beethoven's immortal expression of it in his greatest symphony, the historic Ninth in which he utilizes Schiller's famous Ode To Joy for the vocal theme of his master work.

Joy, thou source of light immortal,
  Daughter of Elysium,
Touched with fire, to the portal
  Of thy radiant shrine we come.
Thy pure magic frees all others
  Held in Custom's rigid rings;
Man throughout the world are brothers
  In the haven of thy wings.

He who knows the pride and pleasure
  Of a friendship firm and strong,
He who has a wife to treasure,
  Let him swell our mighty song.
If there is a single being
  Who can call a heart his own,
And denies it -- then, unseeing,
  Let him go and weep alone.

Joy is drunk of all God's creatures
  Straight from earth's abundant breast;
Good and bad, all things are nature's
  And with blameless joy are blessed.
Joy gives love and wine; her gladness
  Makes the universe her zone,
From the worm that feels spring's madness
  To the angel near God's throne.

CHAPTER XXIV

VALUES, COMMITMENTS, DECISION-MAKING AND HUMAN CONSEQUENCES

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I want personally to attest to the value of values clarification. A few years ago I did the values clarification exercise usually referred to as the "Twenty Things You Love to Do." I discovered that I was living for the future and not really enjoying the present as much as I could have been. I was hurrying to complete a present task so that I could enjoy a future one but the next undertaking again became a task to finish in anticipation of the next. Becoming aware of this always-anticipating-but-never-enjoying-cycle allowed me to change my perspective and actions so that my life is more present-oriented and more enjoyable. I am a happier person today as a result of looking at my life style through values clarification techniques. It is my hope that through this paper I can add something to this useful area of education.

Introduction

The values clarification movement seems to have three primary goals. The first is to help people become explicitly aware of what their values are. The second is to help people become aware of how they attained those values. Are values the result of conditioning? That is, has one adopted values unknowingly and unquestioningly? Or have the values been adopted in a more considered and reflective manner where alternatives are weighed before a commitment is made? Commitments are values or at least based on values and these to a great extent determine behavior. This leads to the third goal of values clarification which attempts to help people predict the consequences of their values when those values are acted upon. It is the thesis of this paper that teachers must emphasize this third goal and that the consequences we stress must be human consequences.

Rationale

Everybody strives to be happy. Happiness is ultimately an intrinsic and highly personal value. As the song says, "Happiness is different things to different people" and the consequences of this truism are the root of many of our social problems today. One person's attempts to achieve happiness may thwart or become obstacles to another person's happiness. History is replete with examples of this from the personal through the nation-state levels. How many high level business executives have climbed the ladder of success either unknowingly or deliberately at the expense of others? How many peoples of the world have been exploited by their colonial, economic and/or governmental masters? How many "have-nots" does it take to support a "have?" At least in the United States we have been trying recently to analyze these painful questions. We are seeing that past decisions often have proven to help some people but badly harm others. We have too often followed a path of personal or group attainment of happiness without taking into account the consequences our decisions have on others. This has probably been the result of oversight as much or more than the greed to which it is usually attributed.

Not only have many of our decisions been based on narrow self-centered motives but we have also tended to be short-sighted. We haven't often considered the long-range consequences of our actions. Sometimes immediate gratification leads to long-term disaster. Pollution of our planet has resulted in large part because of these two aforementioned factors. Individuals and organizations have seldom considered what their actions meant in human consequences to others nor have the long-term consequences of their actions been given much consideration. The problems we now have are to a great extent because decisions have been made from the narrow view of "what is best for me right now."

Some people will undoubtedly argue that it is natural or even human nature to make decisions which are based on immediate self-gratification values. Regardless of how we acquired these inclinations, it seems foolhardy (maybe even fatal) not to go beyond these criteria when making decisions. That is, we need a population which makes individual and group decisions based on values which consider others as well as themselves and we need decision-makers who look to future consequences of action as well as immediate consequences.

It seems imperative that values clarification activities include some kinds of criteria by which values can be judged. There are many values. Different values lead to different commitments. Different commitments lead to different actions and different actions lead to different consequences. Decisions must be made. We want and need to make the best possible decisions. With these concerns in mind, I want to suggest that the following human consequences approach be used in conjunction with existing values clarification models and techniques.

The Human Consequences Approach

The major premise of this approach is that better decisions will be made if they focus on consequences -- HUMAN CONSEQUENCES as best the decision-maker can predict them. That is, one criterion which can and should be applied to any commitment is, "What will happen to people if the commitment is acted upon?" This does not mean that human consequences is the only criterion on which to base a decision. However, it would seem unwise to make any decision without first contemplating what the results of that decision would be in terms of the lives of human beings. Perhaps a humane person could be defined as a person who bases actions on the attainment of positive human consequences as best they can be predicted.

The concept of human consequences can be described as consisting of four parts which are:

Consequences for self.

Consequences for others.

Short-term consequences.

Long-term consequences.

The relationships of the four parts of the human consequences concept can be placed in the following matrix. Some general questions are included in each quadrant as general introductory probings into the consequences of a given decision or contemplated action.

	SHORT-TERM CONSEQUENCES	LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES
CONSEQUENCES FOR SELF	Will I be happier tomorrow, next week, next year? What is the best thing that can happen to me if I do this -- the worst thing? Is there a gamble involved? What are my odds?	Will I be happier 5, 10 25 years from now? Does this decision conflict with other future plans? Will I decrease my later alternatives with this decision?
CONSEQUENCES FOR OTHERS	Who will be influenced by my decision other than myself? Will I be attaining my goal at the expense of others? Will my actions cause others happiness or unhappiness?	Can I predict who will be influenced by my decision 5, 10, 25 years from now? Will others eventually suffer hardships if I act on my decision? Will others eventually be helped if I act on my decision?

Although the design above is simple, it is difficult to describe its application in narrative form without being in a real situation with a real decision to make. The introductory questions can provide a start but the specific circumstances of a situation will determine the appropriate questioning strategies. The reader might take the time to consider the diverse questions and specific considerations that would be necessary if he/she were to apply the four parts of the human consequences matrix to each of the following situations:

An unmarried high school girl who is pregnant and considering an abortion.
A high school student who is considering dropping out of school.
A teacher planning to pursue graduate studies.
A couple with several children planning a divorce.

The concept of human consequences as criteria for making decisions and judging actions can be used by individuals and/or groups. It can be used in counseling situations, staff meetings, classrooms, in the home or anywhere that decisions need to be made. It is relatively easy to use via the asking of appropriate questions, by listing the four parts of the approach or by using the simple matrix cited earlier. Not incidentally, it should be pointed out that the human consequences approach costs no money and does not involve major curriculum changes in materials, schedules, or facilities.

Although the emphasis to this point has been with how the criterion of human consequences could be used as a means of judging among alternatives in a given decision, this criteria could also be used to evaluate existing behaviors. That is, human consequences might be used to check the consequences of our usual patterns of behavior that normally go unquestioned. For example, a teacher could apply the human consequences criteria to the content that he/she normally teaches. A faculty meeting could be devoted to applying the human consequences criterion to the rules and regulations of the school. Obviously, students in a class could identify some of their most cherished values and analyze them in terms of the probable consequences they have when they are acted upon.

The use of human consequences as a criterion for judging or making decisions also provides what seems to be a way of dealing with controversial content. Many teachers avoid controversial subjects because they fear that they will be accused of propagandizing their students with their own opinions. Many teachers fear that student decisions will meet with criticism in the community and thereby cause "trouble" for the teacher. The use of human consequences to evaluate behavior and analyze decisions gives an open and relatively justifiable means for judging controversies. The only built-in bias of the process is a concern with what happens to people when decisions are made and acted upon. This bias is based on the belief that human life is valuable and if we value human life, we should judge the results of our values and consequent actions in terms of human life.

Today we are witnessing a more open society. Values are being questioned now which were recently sacrosanct. New values are constantly being proposed as ways to deal with "future shock." This increased number of value alternatives means that these new and different values will constantly need to be evaluated. The human consequences approach provides a means to tentatively assess our values before acting on them by judging them in terms of how they will affect ourselves and others in the near and distant future. Is it not better to have a considered-commitment to a value based on human consequences than to have a conditioned-commitment based on some ideology or authority? Should decisions be made because they are the democratic, christian, or American way even if they might have negative human consequences?

The use of human consequences as a criterion for judging or making decisions will not insure that the decisions will be wise ones. However, the consideration of the consequences of a given decision in terms of oneself and others in the near and distant future should increase the probability that gross harm to human beings will be avoided. Consider how many decisions in the past could have been more desirable if the glaringly obvious consideration of human consequences had been a priority. How many decisions in the future will be made by governments, teachers, parents, businessmen, you and me with a deliberate consideration of what happens to people as a major criterion? How many future decisions can we afford to make without deliberately considering their human consequences?

CHAPTER XXV

TEACHING VALUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION

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There was a time when the teaching of values was a central role of education. The earliest known schools 5000 years ago in Sumeria taught reading, mathematics, religion, history and aphorisms on behavior. The teachers of classical Athens and of Alexandria were concerned with ethics, behavior, beauty, along with geometry, history, and cosmology, and early universities in this country were largely concerned with teaching the clergy. Church related universities still teach moral values as an important part of their function. The transition to the modern secular university as we know it in America has taken place gradually over the years -- as religion has assumed a much smaller role in the curriculum and as science and the professional schools have come to play a larger role.

There are a number of voices now, representing differing ideological backgrounds and indeed differing concepts of what values are important, who advocate a return to a policy which stresses the teaching of values in the university. Some would go so far as to make this a central task of higher education once again.

William B. Boyd, the President-designate of the University of Oregon, advocates a strong emphasis on humanistic studies designed to persuade the student not only that society suffers from deceit and lack of values, but that the university itself is often essentially dishonest. His is more than a call for universities to teach ethics, morals and values, it is a call for total reform in operation. To one who is convinced that his colleagues in teaching and administration are by and large sincere and dedicated, striving for truth by standards not often fashionable in other callings, his thesis is not convincing.

Harlan Cleveland, the former President of the University of Hawaii and now Director of Programs in International Affairs of the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, advocates as a central role of the university the "teaching of the ethics of citizenship." He believes that the values of students must be molded toward appreciation of a better environment, more judicious use of resources that the world must share and less pollution. He advocates training citizens for a world of limited resources.

There are demands both from the left and the right that we teach more about values. There are calls from some humanists that we replace our science and engineering courses with courses stressing human values. The motivation varies from philosophical to social.

It is clear that there is not complete agreement on the reasons for a renewed emphasis on values in our curricula in higher education or on the particular values to be emphasized. There is, perhaps, a unifying theme in the conviction that society's problems would benefit from a greater general appreciation of certain values and that this greater appreciation can and should be taught in the universities. The evidence adduced varies -- too much emphasis on the material, too much deception, too little attention to the beauties of nature, too little or too much industry, too little or too much competition, too little self-reliance, too many robber barons, too little or too much patriotism, too much or too little attention to the basic values of the past. Whatever the precise reform desired, the thesis is that the universities should set about inculcating more appropriate value systems by requiring students to pass courses devoted to these systems in order to get a bachelor's degree.

This prescription for a responsive and responsible school system raises a large number of questions. Is society in need of restructuring? If so, in what direction? Is it worse than it has been on the average? Can we improve it this way? Can we do what the church could not? Is this restructuring a proper goal for higher education? Where is the thin line between education and indoctrination? What effect will we actually have on the students? Will a doctrinaire ethic liberate or will it enchain? Which ethic are we to teach? Are the various values advocated by different groups equivalent or is there at least a common base on which we can all agree and if there is such a common base, how confident are we that it is correct? To what extent do we infringe on the home and the church? To what extent are we using the higher education system to further personal philosophies or personally congenial social or political theories? To what extent, if we give our students the facts, (whatever they may be) do we need to tell them how to interpret those facts? To what extent should we pick and choose the facts we will teach in order to prove our point?

In asking these questions in a negative way I do not mean to imply that all the answers are necessarily negative or that the answers are necessarily clear and unambiguous. Rather, I am pointing out that there are serious questions to be answered before we blithely undertake a major change in a system of education that has gradually evolved and that has served society in a world not completely devoid of major crises rather well.

Before discussing what we should do, it may be well to be clear about what we now do. It may not be appreciated and it should be stressed that the educational system and in particular higher education as an essential part of its function does make evaluations and does teach values. We have become much more cautious and circumspect about it than we were fifty or two hundred years ago, but it is inherent in the nature of a university that we must do so.

Values and evaluations must play a critical role in higher education if for no other reason than the fact that the amount of knowledge and information which has been accumulated in written form in the past 6000 years is far too great to be imparted to any student in a finite length of time. Not only does the existing knowledge occupy millions of volumes on our major library shelves but there is an information explosion which necessitates constant review and re-evaluation of what we selected to teach a few years ago.

The faculty of a university must continually evaluate both the old knowledge and the new with regard to its validity, its importance to a general education, and its relevance to developments with which we anticipate the student may have to cope a decade or two in the future. It takes a dedicated and a very wise faculty to undertake such a continual review, to be entrusted with such a vital evaluation, and to decide what small part of the totality of written experience is important enough to be transmitted to everyone who aspires to higher education, what parts are essential to a liberal education, and what parts should form the core of the fifty or sixty majors we offer.

If this function of evaluation, selection and synthesis of knowledge was not a critical function, the student who had the motivation would not need a school system once he had learned to read. He could find all he needed in the library at far less cost. The fact that it is a critical function is one reason for needing a first-rate faculty.

This continual review is required both because of new insights into the nature of our disciplines and because the needs of society and of technology change with time. Solid state devices have replaced the vacuum tube. The concern with air pollution has replaced the concern for more powerful automobile engines.

The importance of quantum theory to the understanding of solid state lasers and superconducting magnets have necessitated changes in the topics covered in algebra and calculus classes, changes both in emphasis and in kind. These changes appear in undergraduate curricula as well as in graduate work.

To indicate the pervasive nature of the evaluation function of a university, let me give some concrete examples.

Mathematics is a vast subject -- few if any mathematicians can be expert in it all -- and the needs of students change with time. Those of you who have become acquainted with "the new mathematics" in grade school and high school know that fresh and basic evaluations have been made in the last decade in what to teach and how to teach it. In the university, the material chosen for the major must be re-evaluated regularly because of the needs of science and engineering, as well as because of developments in mathematics itself.

Medicine is a rapidly developing and changing field. My colleagues on the medical faculty tell me that the treatments and prescriptions of today will be out of date in another five years. Nursing shares this rate of development.

The fields of economics and business, are rapidly evolving and are being profoundly affected by the computer, as is library sciences, sociology, engineering, and even archaeology. Even areas such as the languages and the classics are changing. In the case of the classics new archaeological discoveries and continued progress in the ability to read old documents and hitherto untranslatable records such as those in Hittite or Mycenean Greek have greatly altered and improved our understanding of ancient times and of the literature of ancient times. Myths and legends assume a new importance.

Due to historical research, we understand the societies which are the settings for Shakespeare's, Dante's and Goethe's works better than we did twenty years ago and we understand their masterpieces better. Although the pace of developments in the humanities is not equal to that of the sciences, here, too, the process of evaluation and re-evaluation is essential.

That the student is affected and his value system is influenced by this process of evaluation is evident in a number of ways. First, it is clear that the quality of his education depends on the validity of the value judgments of the faculty. He understands a subject better if the faculty judgments are better.

Moreover, the material of a course is selected and presented from some point of view. This also involves a value judgment on the part of the faculty. Certain pictures, plays, music, books are presented as examples of excellent work and others are criticized. Certain styles and designs are praised. Certain presidents are lauded and others not. Certain historical events are stressed and others not. Shakespeare is of great importance now but there was a time when his work was not recognized as pre-eminent. English history is emphasized more than Danish or Polish history. Aristotle is discussed and Ptolemy is not. Astronomy is a department and astrology is not.

The student's system of values is also affected by the examples set by his teachers. The fact that a professor is openly and honestly searching for truth, that he accepts the results of an experiment that demolishes his pet theory and alters his beliefs accordingly will influence his students. The professor's hard work and dedication to his field will influence the value system of the student.

Finally, it should be mentioned that ethics and values are the subject matter for our philosophy courses and they are also introduced directly in various professional curricula such as medicine, law, engineering, public administration, business, and criminal justice.

The purpose of discussing at some length the role of evaluation and of value judgments in present day higher education is to stress the central character of this role and to point out that it affects the student and the educational process in an essential way.

The role as I have described it is not, however, what Mr. Boyd, Mr. Cleveland, Mr. Rafferty and other critics of higher education mean by the teaching of values. They call for a more direct and a much more prominent place in the curriculum for the explicit advocacy of values for all students. They would stress some combination or selection of traditional values, humanistic values, religious values, political values, and ethics as a part of all curricula. The evaluation of the topics to be included in a mathematics curriculum or the quality of a play, or of what knowledge constitutes essential background for a particular branch of knowledge is not sufficient in their view.

Few of us would dispute the importance of moral judgments and of ethical values for the health of the individual and of society.

There are several serious pitfalls, however, in explicitly teaching moral, religious, humanistic, or political values as a major part of the curriculum in a college or university.

If we look at universities in Germany and in France, for instance, we find that well organized cliques whose members share very strong political views and value systems and an equally strong conviction that these values should dominate the teaching in their universities have virtually taken over certain universities. The particular universities so afflicted have become reduced from instruments for educating students to instruments for indoctrination and propaganda.

Not only have such subjects as social science, political science and history become completely warped and dishonest in these schools, but even disciplines such as mathematics have become "red mathematics" in which large amounts of propaganda are part of the courses. The intellectual fare is sterile diatribe and many of the professors have by one means or another been pressured into devoting a major fraction of their time and energies to the indoctrination process.

The fact that great universities in lands which have produced some of the strongest centers of learning in the world have been so reduced illustrates that institutions devoted to productive scholarship and learning are extraordinarily fragile creations. Organized, resolute, and dogmatic groups can take them over. It also illustrates that universities have become recognized as potentially influential instruments for gaining power by groups committed to particular value systems. Teachers influence large numbers of students who will one day occupy important positions in society. These students will be in legislatures, in bureaucracies, in business, in law. They will write our regulations, our laws, our news stories, and our histories.

These sad examples show further that it is possible for men of basic good will, thoroughly convinced of the rectitude of their own value systems, to wrap themselves in a cloak of absolute morality and truth and in the name of these beliefs and social goals to practice intellectual dishonesty and deception on a grand scale. When this occurs the university is utterly destroyed as a seat of scholarship and learning -- in short, as a university.

There are other potential risks in greatly increasing the emphasis on teaching values and value systems in higher education. We live in a democracy which tolerates a very wide spectrum of beliefs and of values. As long as the universities which serve this democracy are perceived by legislatures and by the average citizen as being devoted to objective truth, they are in a good position to defend their programs and to continue their search for knowledge. If, on the other hand, the general impression becomes prevalent that individual professors mis-use their academic freedom and the public platform provided them by their university positions in order to preach their own personal value systems to a large captive audience, the universities are not in a position to defend the integrity of their programs. Other non-academic citizens will feel that they also have a right to preach their particular personal value systems from a university platform -- and it will be difficult to challenge this right. The only special claim the professor can make for being granted a university platform for his views is that he has earned access to the platform by mastering the knowledge in a given discipline and by being acknowledged by others in that discipline as an authority. He normally re-establishes this status regularly by publishing in his field and by contributing new insights and new knowledge to the field. When he strays from the field in which he is an expert, however, and begins to teach his personal value system, he has given up the basis for his peculiar, exclusive claim to a university platform. If the university is seen as a vehicle for promulgating the personal value systems of particular individuals, value systems not objectively based on study but on personal preference, then it is arguable that it must make its platforms available to any citizen and in particular to any citizen who vehemently demands this right.

I am not suggesting that a teacher need hide his views or his value systems. There are good reasons why he should not. The student would be misled who believed that his professors have no interest in values or are ashamed to acknowledge that they do. But the professor has no mandate to attempt to induce his students to change their values to conform to his outside his field of competence.

The argument I have been making then is that universities are concerned with values and do teach them. Thoughtful men have suggested that they should do more. There are, however, dangers we should bear in mind if we undertake to do more on a very large scale.

There may nevertheless be a case for increasing the emphasis on some values. There are values which we can probably assume are shared by a large majority of our society. We share a belief in the virtue of such concepts as honesty, integrity, charity, equal opportunity, freedom of speech, patriotism, democracy and justice. (The fact that we do share a belief in these values in itself indicates that these values have been taught.) It may be a function of our history, political science, and other social disciplines, to study the effect of these values or the lack of them on a people, a nation, or a society. It is arguable from such studies that nations in which the population had lost or ignored too many of these values have not faced crises or adversity well. The practical survival value of an industrious, free and educated population, of highly developed health care systems, of low levels of pollution, of low levels of drug abuse, can be demonstrated. The diseases to which different governmental systems have proven vulnerable are subject to impartial and objective study. It may be that some of these studies should have received greater emphasis in our curricula than they have received in the past. More emphasis is being placed on some of these topics now.

We should not, however, try to usurp the function of the church. There is no evidence that we can do a better job than the church has done in inculcating moral values.

Finally, I would suggest that the majority of the social and national problems we face today are not the result of a lack of appreciation of values on the part of the average citizen but are due to a lack of understanding of how to deal with these very complex problems, of what course will achieve a given goal, and often perhaps of a lack of will to pursue a given course. Most of our students, I believe, share the same deficits. The great majority of them have high standards, ethical value systems, good will, but they do not know how to achieve goals which may be excellent in themselves. This is not surprising since our experts, our engineers, economists, social planners, politicians, and professors do not know how to deal with many of these complex problems either. They are not in a position to face the electorate with a clear-cut set of alternatives. They cannot say with confidence that if we do this, such and such a public or personal value will be benefited to a given extent but some other value (such as a high level of employment) will suffer to some other extent. A basic element in our inability to solve these crucial problems is ignorance.

It is in helping to solve this problem, in helping to discover what the effect of various courses of action will be, in teaching the experts how to utilize this knowledge and in teaching the layman how to judge between the experts that the system of higher education has a central, an urgent and an inescapable role to play.

CHAPTER XXVI

VALUE SHOCK: A BLOCK TO CROSSCULTURAL COMMUNICATIONS

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It is recognized that in one chapter the linkage between the analysis of culture variables and selected socio-psychological factors which influence individual behavior cannot be presented in depth. This is an overview exploration of the relationship of value shock and culture shock to crosscultural communications and some strategies for amelioration.

Value shock and culture shock can have far reaching consequences in inhibiting crosscultural communications. Those in the helping professions -- social, educational, or healing -- face problems in crosscultural communications frequently. Basic to most poor communications is the interference of the value and belief system of the individuals trying to interact. The factors leading to value shock and culture shock tend to stem from an individual's misunderstanding of his own culture and the stereotopic notions of the target culture. The amelioration of culture shock is dependent upon an understanding of one's own culture and the development of crosscultural communication skills.

The relationship of values to culture cannot be disputed. The hierarchy of values within a culture constitutes a person's base for operation. One of the primary blocks to effective crosscultural communication is in the area of value disorientation and value miscueing. The discontinuity between cultures of persons in culturally different situations results not only in culture shock, but basically in value shock.

Value shock constitutes that state of consciousness which finds it difficult for the individual to function with a group of people whose values are different from his own or whose interpretation of values are divergent. It is possible on the cognitive level to explore meaning in terms of values. One social group might indicate that it values independence and freedom while another group might say that in its culture it values independence and freedom. But the meaning of these terms may be from a different psychological and social orientation. Members of the first group might suggest independence and freedom as being able to function in a capacity of individual determination. Freedom suggests freedom for opportunity, exploration, and divergent thinking, and independence to make use of an opportunity to take risks and to succeed or to fail. The other group might suggest that freedom and independence indicate that they are free from making choices and decisions and therefore independent from this kind of responsibility. These two points-of-view, while using identical terms, are diametrically opposed to one another.

In any crosscultural or intercultural communication situation the cultural meaning of values presents a real stumbling block. Frames of references long established within the cultural development of the individual through his socialization reflect a high level of commitment which is often difficult to ameliorate or overcome. However, there are strategies that an individual might utilize when in contact with opposing values. Spindler (11) suggests four possible modes of adaptation for a person encountering values that may be different from the one he originally held. This strategy also suggests possible problems which might occur that would tend to inhibit the development of successful crosscultural communication.

The first basic mode of adaptation to accommodate to the stress situation of value conflict is that of reaffirmation. This is the return to or conscious preservation of the traditional cultural patterns and values with corresponding resistance to new patterns and new values. Some of the evidence of this occurring today may be found in the nativistic reaffirmation groups that tend to advocate the return to the values of a perceived original culture. This may appear to be from the strong right of American tradition of the Founding Fathers to the invention of a state of Atzlan.

The second adaptive mode is the synthesis of the patterns of culture that have been developed from confrontation with new values and cultural systems. This synthesis may or may not have a rational base but at least it has a functional base and one which permits a person to operate on the facade level within the target group of his choice. In Micronesia the natives who acquired the facade of American culture, which they observed from the movies and from interacting with Americans, were identified as "arrived." They had taken on the artifacts and some of the cultural components, but had not fully acculturated to the culture they were attempting to imitate.

Spindler's third basic mode of adaptation is assimilation which involves rejection of certain existing cultural values and embracing new ones. However, based on some kind of rationale with some degree of consistency, the notion of assimilation infers the rejection of some basic values of one's primary group in favor of some values of target group. Assimilation suggests that a person has a security and a conscious capacity to overcome the resistance of traditional values and embrace new ones with a certain amount of vigor and resolution. A classic example of an assimilation process is a person who has found a new religion and has been converted to it. Quite often he becomes the strongest advocates of that religious group and tends toward fanticism in converting others.

The fourth mode of adaptation is segmentation or compartmentalization of the individual's life through selection of values and patterns that are appropriate to role behavior in various social relationships. Segmentation permits a person to operate eclectically but with consistency within the department or segment of the selected operational culture. Many individuals are able to do this with a great deal of facility, especially those who find it necessary to function in more than one cultural group whose values are not closely related. Going home, for some people, requires a certain kind of behavior pattern which they can tolerate only in the home situation, but once away they operate on an entirely different value structure reflecting a different cultural affiliation.

The relationship of values to culture, and behavior as reflected by this culture, is one of the most interesting areas of research in crosscultural communication. It is important to determine what the individual's perception of his own culture is in relation to the interpretation of the cultural values that are shared or are public. Goodenough (4) explores the notion of public culture and private culture. Triandis (12) supports the idea of subjective culture, meaning the culture held by a group, and of the notion of auto-stereotyping and hetro-stereotyping. These seem to reinforce what Linton (7) originally was referring to when he wrote about cultural universals, cultural alternatives, cultural specialities. Each of these notions suggests that culture and its value system is learned behavior and has components which each individual shares reflecting some cultural universals. At the same time, it is also suggested that there is a private, auto-stereotyping culture. That while central professed values may be universal, individual interpretations and hierarchies of values exist.

Coupled with the notion that an individual possesses both public and private cultures, and based on psychological field theory, some research has been done in relation to exploring a person's phenomenological field and phenomenological self (Snygg and Combs, 10). A person moves into a cultural milieu taking into it the perception of his own culture and at least a stereotypic impression of the target culture. It tends to indicate that cultural and value identification exists within the individual entering or observing the target culture. It is on this basis that man creates his own universe and makes it what it is (6). The perceptual field of psychology ties in closely with the cultural press that tends to inhibit or to accelerate effective crosscultural communication. In a sense, this suggests the notion of transcultural communication, emanating from the self and the area defined by the self as an intra-active function. It was on this theoretical basis that a crosscultural laboratory situation to help a person explore his ethnicity and to develop the skills of crosscultural communication was designed.

The Cultural Literacy Laboratory was developed at The University of Arizona with the assistance of several graduate students. (13) Cultural literacy is defined as an awareness of own culture and development of the skills of crosscultural communication. The methodology suggests that individual consciousness is fundamental. The phenomenological self and the phenomenological field constitute the basic unit in any crosscultural situation (or any situation). An understanding of this relationship results in a heightened consciousness of one's values and belief system and is prerequisite to the development of effective crosscultural communication. Linton (7) indicated that "those who know no culture other than their own cannot know their own." It is a placement in juxtaposition of one's own belief and value system in contrast or comparison with another that forms the basic awareness methodology of the laboratory which moves the participant beyond the cognitive level to the affective domain.

The Cultural Literacy Laboratory is based on the following premises:

1. Insight into one's own culture is essential in enlarging a person's recognition of his own values, frustration and tolerance levels, and his ability to work with people who are culturally different.

2. Awareness of one's ethnicity will result in a heightened perception of one's impact on new environments with this being a prerequisite to effective crosscultural communication. (In other words, a person's ability to see himself as he is is a necessary condition for correctly interpreting how others view him and is thus a necessary condition for having reasonable expectations as to how others will react to him. Ethnicity emerges from the beholder and is imputed into what appears to be external stimuli. The difficult task is to recognize the impact of the perceiver's own culture on what is observed and how this affects the interaction process. The struggle for the maintenance of pluralism is not external, but a function of recognizing cultural similarities and differences, or the range of discrepancies between own culture and target culture.)

3. A combination of planned intellectual input and interaction sessions develop attitudes and skills for crosscultural communication which prepare the participant for an effective and indepth penetration of a culture which is different from his own.

4. There must be an opportunity for the participant to have an impact in the target culture in order to field test the skills and techniques acquired during the readiness period. The impact period or tasks cannot be haphazard; they must be planned and structured in order to provide maximum payoff.

5. That upon completion of the first five stages in the development of cultural literacy there must be an analysis and diagnosis based upon pre-test and post-test readings. The diagnosis and analysis are designed to identify and develop areas that will transfer to the classroom.

The laboratory is designed to provide for an analysis or diagnosis through instrumentation of the participants' entry behavior, cultural commitment, and value and belief system. It was impossible to locate an adequate diagnostic instrument that would help a person explore or analyze his own culture and invoke a similar reaction to a selected target culture. The Cultural Literacy Inventory was developed to do this task. (14) Sixty items based on Hall's Map of Culture and Primary Message Systems (Hall, 1959) are given to each participant to explore how he perceives his functioning within his own and target operational culture. The operational culture is a combination of public and private cultures. (4) It relates most closely to Linton's (7) universals and cultural alternatives and forms a part of what Triandis (12) would suggest to be a combination of a person's auto-stereotyping and hetro-stereotyping or subjective culture. The exploration of these items forms benchline data reflecting participant's entry behavior before the laboratory intervention stages.

In addition to the Cultural Literacy Inventory, Rokeach Scale E (9) was selected as another diagnostic instrument. The forty items on this openmindedness scale were generalized to eight categories: 1) flexibility of belief and disbelief systems, 2) aloneness, isolation and helplessness of man, 3) uncertainty of the future, 4) urgency, and reiteration of ideas, 5) security of self image, 6) authoritarianism and cause identification, 7) intolerance, ability to change beliefs, and 8) value rigidity over time. These two instruments together with a personal questionnaire which involved the usual demographic data and eleven items reflecting the mobility, academic, and perceived social interaction pattern of the participant comprised Profile A of the Laboratory.

The second stage is Readiness and intervention. It is designed to teach the social scientific skills of crosscultural communication and provide opportunity to practice these skills before field work and impact in the target culture. In Readiness, the participant is given an overview of crosscultural communication from a theoretical base with practical application. He is taught how to use the skills of verbal and non-verbal cueing, use of informants, gathering of information and questioning, value clarification and valuing, observing and participating, how to do field work, keep field diaries on both subjective and objective data, and how to work effectively in small and large groups. After approximately 12 to 15 hours of preparation the participant selects a task from one of the primary message systems from Hall's Map of Culture. (5) He then enters the selected target culture where he has to function almost independently for 3 to 4 days attempting to practice the skills that he has learned during Readiness. While in Impact he has the responsibility of maintaining a field diary. Even though he may not know the language of the target culture he is expected to use informants, observation skills, cueing from non-verbal sources, and so forth, in order to explore in some depth the task he has selected.

Following the Impact Task period there is an on-site Impact Task Diagnosis session before the participant returns to his own culture. After a week or so in his own culture, the participant re-takes the Cultural Literacy Inventory and the Rokeach Scale E which is classified as Profile B. At this time the data from Profile A are compared to the data from Profile B and returned to the participant. This is a period of diagnosis, feedback and discussion of transfer of skills to other crosscultural situations.

The Readiness phase of the laboratory consists of intellectual input and interaction sessions to provide theory and practice opportunities. The interaction skill sessions provide a basis for large and small group work and insight into one's own behavior as a process of interaction and intra-action. The intellectual input allows for levels of sophistication because each participant enters the laboratory at a different stage of readiness. A Reading Box is provided to help students extend their knowledge in areas where they have discovered blind spots and need additional theory or application suggestions.

While the Impact session appears to most participants at first like field work in a target culture, many soon realize that it really focuses on the self and influences of the self-system on the target situation.

The values the individual take into impact forces a certain amount of stress which Oberg calls cultural shock. (8) The notion of cultural shock suggests a discontinuity between the person's perception of his own culture and his perception of the target culture. The basis of culture shock is of course value shock because of the discontinuity with and lack of clarity of one's own values. Cleveland (3) suggests that the "antidote for cultural shock starts with making sure that American overseasmen have taken a sharp look at their own culture."

Oberg (8) suggests that there are four stages of culture shock. The first one is one of euphoria, excitement, and enthusiasm of being in a target culture. The participant in this stage imputes into the situation the values that he has carried with him. These values reflect both his private and his public values. He sees the target culture almost as his own. In a sense this becomes a kind of American enclave culture where there is no need for drastic accommodations to things that are different because he perceives many more similarities than differences. Once this level of euphoria has been exploded by the awareness of value and belief system conflicts the participant enters the second stage of culture shock which is characterized by anxiety, suspicion, fear, disgust, and intolerance. This stage may result in actual physical disability. It is at this stage that the values that he has imputed into the target culture cannot be verified and the stereotypes with which he has entered the target culture (even of his own culture) are not valid to him and are not borne out in what he has observed or how he has interacted. The greatest areas of conflict between own culture and target culture for more than the thousand participants who have gone through the laboratory have been in the primary message system (5) relating to bisexuality, territoriality, temporality, and association. It is in these areas each culture has a valuing hierarchy that is greatly reflected in the public culture and operationally accepted behavior pattern.

The third stage of culture shock and of value shock is the stage of accommodation. The participant may say "I only have three more days to stay here," "I can make it until the end of the week," or "I can make an accommodation while I am faking it through the next few months." The accommodation stage is similar to Spindler's notion of segmentation in which there is opportunity to withdraw to one's own culture and at the same time when operating in the target culture at least put on the facade of accommodation and putting up with differences. The final stage in Oberg's notion of overcoming culture shock is the one of the adjustment stage in which a person has been able to make some kind of synthesis of values and has come to some rational adjustment in the process. This is the state of homeostasis.

The important thing to recognize, and one of the crucial elements of the laboratory, is that the participant imputes into the situation his own values and his own cultural commitment. When the participant enters the target culture the purpose is not to know more about the target culture, the purpose is to know more about one's own value system and culture. The laboratory is designed to help the participant recognize that nothing is going on but his individual perception of his own values and culture, of his own universe, and he makes the target culture what it is. The mere fact that he is in a target culture skews that culture and changes the social relationship under observation. Arensberg (1) stated that "to examine the cultural premise of one's own action and thought is a difficult process. In one's own culture it may never be necessary and most people probably think more freely and act better without ever doing it. However, in dealing with the people of another culture it is a necessity of first importance."

Participants who have gone through the laboratory have reflected in their field diaries and through the instrumentation, a keener sense of awareness of their own values and culture. The hidden agenda is to specifically recognize that one's own value system and culture is the key to ameliorating value shock and cultural shock. This key when uncovered and explored provides the participant with a stronger sense of his own ethnicity. The conscious effort to overcome the hesitancy to explore one's own culture provides a methodology, and a cognitive and affective sense of power, to work more effectively in overcoming value shock and the debilitating aspects of culture shock. Effective crosscultural communications require this kind of self-insight and growth, which for most participants must be planned and developed sequentially.

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CHAPTER XXVII

HOW VALUES ARE LEARNED

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Before investigating ways in which values are learned we should establish what is meant by the term values. They may be used to describe what is or was, or what ought to be or ought to have been. As an intangible bases for behavior they constitute an interdependent set of guidelines which provide for consistency in the life of an individual or a group. An individual's character is based upon his value system. As such it serves as the penetrating and recurring quality in the decisions of the individual. Although the individual may not be conscious about which particular value or set of values is determining his choice, the person is attracted to a particular solution to a decision because of his value system. Values give the individual a sense of purpose and direction. They provide a bases for determining what is right or wrong. By having values an individual knows what his behavior should be and what kind of behavior he can expect from those around him.

Values may be considered to be in a hierarchy. Values may be considered to be constant or they may be considered to be altering as a person develops. A person's philosophical approach will determine whether he sees values as constant or changing. Values may be grouped to assist in understanding them. They can be separated into physical, intellectual, and social or into additional categories which would include aesthetic, economic, religious, and theoretical. Through examining a classification system an individual can start determining some of his values and begin to see how they influence his life.

Individuals will identify various ways of learning values. Each person will have his own philosophical approach and his own idea about the source and origin of values. His identification of the method of learning a value will vary according to the particular value being learned.

Examples of the influence of one's personal philosophical approach will clarify the idea that is meant. Idealism declares that values are absolute and unchanging. With such an approach facts learned would be the basis for developing values. Values are relative for the pragmatist, therefore he would need to know the situation and setting to determine his values.

Some values are learned in different ways at different ages in life. An appreciation for the opportunity to participate in the affairs of the federal government is an example. In early school life students have the advantages of our system of government explained in lectures and textbooks. Students read and hear about the value of such a system of government. They have opportunity to analyze and even to see some advantages of our type of government. Later in life they get to experience the act of voting for particular candidates. For some, even later in life, comes the opportunity to hold public office. Another example would be learning to value money. A child values money because it brings for him some things his parents have not given to him. In most cases in adult life he learns to value money because he has to work to earn it.

There is no difficulty in understanding that honesty is learned in a different way than is appreciation for the work of a famous artist. Respect for hard work will be developed in a different way than a person would cultivate an appreciation for great literature.

With some agreement about what values are, how they can be classified, and some generalizations about influences on how values are learned we can examine some specific methods of learning values. Most groupings of items such as ways of learning values leaves something to be desired. The writer has used an acrostic as headings to group methods of learning values: viewing, analyzing, liberal arts approach, urging, experiencing, and social approval.

Viewing

People develop values by viewing the other people and things in their environment. As babies they see the model that parents present. The example set by others later in life continue to mold values.

Young children see the value that parents place on courtesy, respect for the individual, and emphasis on family pride in the home. In school students see the values of others exhibited. They observe the way others act in the group situation. New experiences and new values are presented for students to observe. As students work and study together they exhibit their values related to citizenship, school spirit, and work habits. In their relationships they display their tolerance for others, their own self discipline, and their own respect for truth and intellectual honesty. In the church people observe religious objects and symbols which provide a basis for values. The business world provides advertising, slogans which influence values as they are viewed. Various groups use uniforms, medals, and badges which are observed and which influence values. An example would be the color of a jacket worn by athletes at a particular school.

Analyzing

There are various ways in which people can analyze information. In the process of examining information, values may be learned, weakened, or strengthened. By interpreting data people will be exposed to information which may influence their values. Values may be influenced as the result of formal research. Problem solving gives an individual an opportunity to examine his own value system. By reflecting on one's values a person may reevaluate his value system. Beyond that one may use his imagination to place himself in a new setting thereby analyzing his total value system. By simply stating one's values a person has opportunity to probe his values. An alternative would be to compare values with someone else. Through a more thorough search one may summarize his values and even seek to devise his own classification system for his values. One may scrutinize his values by making a deep investigation into each one, its origin, and its influence on the decisions which he makes.

Liberal Arts

The liberal arts approach to developing values assumes that students will adopt the proper values from the materials with which they come in contact. As students are given opportunity to examine the great thoughts and accomplishments of man they gain a basis for developing their own values. By being exposed to the best that is available in literature, art, and music students will adopt the values which will prove to be best for them according to this approach.

In order for the liberal arts approach to provide what is intended some planning for the curriculum is necessary. First some broad objectives must be determined. Then the objectives must be desired behavior. Third the types of activities from the liberal arts which will produce the desired behavior must be selected. Some method of appraisal will be needed if any evaluations of the program is to be made. The final step is to compare the result with the original objectives that were established.

Steps through which students go as learners are a knowledge of principles and facts related to a particular problem, understanding and grasp of the information so they can make an application of the knowledge, analyzing the particular situation, and applying appropriate principle or guideline to bring a desired solution to the problem.

To be effective in influencing student values the liberal arts approach should be developed with the foregoing guidelines in mind.

Urging

Values may be learned through urging from other people. There are various forms or degrees or urging. As used here some of the urging may be in a positive form and some may be in a negative form. People are persuaded to accept certain values by others by having certain values stressed. Urging may be in the form of indoctrination which is often subtle but effective. Propaganda programs influence the value systems of people. The advertising which millions of people watch daily determines values. Slogans which people hear help form values. Flattery and praise influences the values which people develop. People are urged to determine values through various commands. Values may be influenced through name-calling or gossip. A threat to a person or his family may alter his value system. By nagging some people will be an influence on the value system of those about him.

Experience

It is often stated that experience is the best teacher. Certainly it is an influence in the development of a system of values. The environment influences the language which a child learns, the emphasis he will give to an education, and his attitudes toward his fellow citizen. These in turn constitute values and are influences on the whole value system of the individual. The values which a person learns from experiences in his environment will depend upon his intellectual ability and upon the pressures placed upon him by his society. The setting for the experience and the quality of the relationship with the people involved will also influence the values which develop.

Group experiences in a classroom will influence values of students. By working in groups people develop certain values related to human relations. Practicing respect and thoughtfulness in a class changes value systems. Opportunity to work with those who exhibit a willingness to seek to reach the maximum in assisting others is an example. Participation in a group in which actions show that privilege carries a responsibility, will influence the values of an individual.

As children grow older and have experiences with people from different races, socio-economic backgrounds, and cultures they often revise their value system. It is one thing to recognize and accept a value intellectually, yet it may be quite another to put the value into practice when the setting changes. New experiences provide the change of setting to allow a testing of values.

Social Approval

The desire to be accepted by the group causes people to accept certain values which are thought to be significant by the group. A society is a system of relations which unites the members. The social interaction provides opportunities for the members to evaluate various values. The social heritage or culture will help determine which values are most highly regarded.

There are various methods used by groups to exert pressure on the members. The influence thus exerted sways the individual in his value system. One method which is used is a reward and punishment system. Society determines the correct behavior and the individuals receive various forms of reward or punishment dependent upon how much the individual deviates from the prescribed norm. Such an approach usually discourages breaking the norm rather than encouraging seeking to set goals above the norm. The particular norm will of course vary according to the section of the country in which the individual lives and whether he lives in a rural or urban setting. An individual disagreeing with the behavior and values prevalent in his society will seek social approval and may find it in a small group which thinks as he does.

Another way in which society exerts its pressure is through manipulation. Parents will give emphasis to those ideas and goals which they value and will paint dark pictures of those things which they oppose. By such tactics they influence the value systems of their children.

Censorship is a way of determining the values in society. When some options are removed from society the value system of the group is influenced.

Other pressures from society include taboos, folkways, and mores. The lower class is economically insecure. Lower class children are therefore concerned with things which are related to the constant struggle for existence. Society determines the role that individuals play in the group. Learning a role includes learning to behave, feel, and see the world in a similar manner to other persons who are in the same role.

At first, symbols of approval are important to a child only when they come from those who are responsible for caring for his needs. He later learns to seek approval from the whole society. This socialization involves learning sets of values, as well as means of communicating with others. Schools, churches, clubs, and other social institutions interact with the home in influencing values of the individual.

Summary

Values are assumptions, which are largely unconscious, of what is right and important. They imply a prying or cherishing. Some are more important to an individual than are others. Various systems of groupings of methods of learning values could be made. In this case an acrostic was formed by using the following devisions: viewing, analyzing, liberal arts, urging, experiencing, and social approval. Briefly people can learn values by seeing them in those about them, by making an intellectual evaluation of values, by reading, hearing, and seeing the great ideas of the past in literature, music, and art, by being persuaded by others, by opportunity to try out values, and by acceptance or rejection of one's society. By design one half of the categories used are considered to develop values at the initiative of the individual and one half are those which are considered to develop values by stimulus from outside the individual. This does not mean that both are actually equal in real life.

Every culture has its value system. Values have their primary source in early family experience of children. If value experiences came to people without any reference to their actions in relations to them, then it would appear that there is no significance for education in value theory. But in a civilization such as ours we do need education to assist in transmitting our culture. If true values do exist, not to help our students discover them is to leave them prey to false ones. The growth of mature values cannot be left totally to chance.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

HISTORY

CAROLINE TUTTLE, RETIRED, FORMERLY PRINCIPAL, PHOENIX
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT ONE,
PHOENIX, ARIZONA

In 1946, Miss Lucile Bailey, newly appointed principal of Machan School, felt that she lacked the necessary techniques for proper supervision of the instructional program. She wrote to The Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development requesting helpful materials which she soon received. In an accompanying letter, the Association stated that it had a few members in Arizona and asked Miss Bailey if she would try to start a state group. It was further suggested that she get in touch with Alexander Frazier who was at that time in California, but who was soon to return to Phoenix.

When Alexander Frazier returned, he and Miss Lucile Bailey, in the spring of 1947, made a list of educators who might be interested, and planned for a meeting.

This was the beginning of the Valley Breakfast Group. The first breakfast was held at the American Kitchen, a restaurant on Central Avenue in downtown Phoenix, in either November or December, 1947. Meetings were held on Saturday mornings about once a month.

In March or April, 1948, a meeting was held at Whittier School, Phoenix. Those attending agreed to form a state association called the Arizona Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development and to affiliate with the national organization. These decisions were carried out. Officers were elected with Alexander Frazier, president, and Lucile Bailey, secretary-treasurer. A. A. S. C. D. and the Valley Breakfast Group owe much to each of these educators.

According to assembled records and memory of early members presidents of A. A. S. C. D. have been as follows:

Alexander Frazier, Phoenix Union High School, Phoenix, 1949-1950.

Dr. Emily Baker, Arizona State University, Tempe, 1950-1951.

Dr. Lawrence Walkup, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, 1951-1952.

Dr. Joe Smelzer, Phoenix Junior College, Phoenix, 1952-1953.

Miss Mildred Kiefer, Phoenix Elementary District, Phoenix, 1953-1954.

Dr. Duane Manning, Arizona State University, Tempe, 1954-1955.

Dr. Victor Kelley, University of Arizona, Tucson, 1955-1956.

Dr. Charles E. Fauset, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, 1956-1957.

Mrs. Barbara Provost, Osborn District, Phoenix, 1957-1958.

Mrs. Norma Richardson, State Department of Public Instruction, Phoenix, 1958-1959.

Dr. Thomas Lee, Tucson District One, 1959-1960.

Miss Caroline Tuttle, Phoenix Elementary District, 1960-1961.

Dr. Milo K. Blecha, University of Arizona, Tucson, 1961-1962.

Dr. Gordon Foster, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, 1962-1963.

Mr. Arden Staples, Osborn School District, Phoenix, 1963-1964.

Miss Dorothy Talbert, Tucson District One, Tucson, 1964-1965.

Miss Louise Withers, Phoenix Elementary District, Phoenix, 1965-1966.

Mr. John C. White, Principal, Mesa Public Schools, Mesa, 1966-1967.

Dr. Herbert Wilson, University of Arizona, Tucson, 1967-1968.

Mr. Richard Smith, Alhambra School District, Phoenix, 1968-1969.

Dr. James John Jelinek, Arizona State University, Tempe, 1969-1970.

Mrs. Mary Rill, Phoenix Elementary School District One, Phoenix, 1970-1971.

Dr. Chester Brown, University of Arizona, Tucson, 1971-1972.

Mrs. Evelyn Johnson, Cartwright School District, Phoenix, 1972-1973.

Mrs. Phyllis McMennamy, Cartwright School District,
Phoenix, 1973-1974.

Mrs. Jayne Miller, Cave Creek Elementary School District
Ninety-three, Cave Creek, 1974-1975.

When I went to Franklin School as principal in September, 1948, The Valley Breakfast Group met for Saturday morning breakfasts there until I left in June, 1954 and for a year thereafter. Since that time, breakfasts have been held at various times and places, currently at the Smokehouse Restaurant.

APPENDIX B

EXECUTIVE BOARD

THELMA PETERSON, SECRETARY, ARIZONA ASSOCIATION FOR
SUPERVISION AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT, C/O
ALHAMBRA SCHOOL DISTRICT,
PHOENIX, ARIZONA

President. Jayne Miller, Cave Creek Elementary School District Ninety-three, Cave Creek, Arizona.

Vice President. John Black, Tevore G. Browne High School, Phoenix, Arizona.

Secretary-Treasurer. Thelma Peterson, Alhambra School District, Phoenix, Arizona.

Immediate Past President. Phyllis McMennamy, Cartwright School District Eighty-three, Phoenix, Arizona.

State Representative to the National Board of Directors. James John Jelinek, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona.

Proportional Representative to the National Board of Directors. Herbert Wilson, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona.

Member at Large. Jewel Taylor, Tucson School District One, Tucson, Arizona.

Member at Large. Howard Stitt, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, Arizona.

Member at Large. Mary Rill, Phoenix Elementary School District One, Phoenix, Arizona.

Student Representative. John Drury, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, Arizona.

Student Representative. Elna Spragia, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona.

Student Representative. Elizabeth Preece, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona.